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Abstract
When nineteenth-century southern nationalists seceded from the Union and
created a southern nation, they sought to justify their actions by situating the Confederacy
as one of many aspiring nations seeking membership in the family of nations in the
middle of the nineteenth century. To support their argument that the Confederacy
constituted a legitimate and independent nation, southern nationalists claimed nineteenth
century European nationalist movements as precedents for their own attempt at nationbuilding, using the southern nation’s supposed similarity to, or, at times, differences
from, these European aspiring nations to legitimize the Confederacy. Such claims built
on a long antebellum precedent in which southern opinion-makers analyzed events
abroad through the lens of their own national values, developing an international
perspective on issues of nationhood. As they debated the revolutions of 1848, southern
commentators used this discourse on nationalism abroad to distinguish between the
national values that were and were not acceptable to conservative slave-holders,
clarifying an altered southern definition and vision of liberal nationalism. When
southerners turned to creating an independent southern nation, secessionists utilized this
international understanding of nationalism to claim that because the aspiring southern
nation followed the model of new and aspiring nations in Europe, particularly Italy, it
deserved independence. Such an argument, while popular domestically, failed to
resonate with Europeans and northerners who understood the contrast between slavery
and liberal nationalism, forcing Confederates to re-evaluate their claims about the
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international place of southern nationalism. In response, some Confederates intensified
their comparisons, further manipulating the ideals and symbols of nationalism to continue
positioning the Confederacy within the broader trends of nineteenth century nationalism.
More conservative Confederates rejected comparisons between southern nationalism and
more liberal European nationalisms, claiming that the Confederacy actually purified
nationalism through slavery. From the earliest stirrings of southern nationalism to the
defeat of the Confederacy, southern analysis of European nationalisms played a critical
role in shaping southern thought about nationhood.
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Introduction
When southerners seceded from the Union to form the Confederate States of
America, they were faced with the immediate necessity of forging a nationalism for their
new nation, a necessity that led them to look outward as well as inward for inspiration.
As southern nationalists sought to construct a national narrative that would justify their
place among the family of nations, they turned to the images and symbols of other
aspiring nations, drawing comparisons between their nascent nationalism and nationalist
movements in Europe in order to define and legitimize the southern nation. These
comparisons drew on a long antebellum precedent in which southern intellectual elites
had analyzed foreign nationalism through the lens of their own national values, a process
that had aided southerners in refining their beliefs about what it meant to be a nation.
Upon secession, southern nationalists utilized this precedent to claim both similarities
with and differences from nationalist movements in Europe as a way of explaining,
legitimizing, and gaining support for the aspiring southern nation.
Although southern nationalism was in many ways a domestic response to
American issues such as slavery, southern nationalists also embraced an international
perspective on their attempt at nation-building, turning to almost a century of nationalist
thought and activity to help them justify the creation of an independent southern nation.
Along with slavery, religion, and the American Revolution, nationalist movements in
Europe stood as an inspiration upon which southern nationalists drew as they sought to
forge a nationalism that would explain the values and meaning of the new southern
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nation, as well as to cultivate loyalty amongst and win support for the Confederacy from
fellow southerners.1
As southern opinion-makers looked abroad, they found much to admire in the
values exhibited by nationalist movements in Europe. From the self-determination of the
Greek people in the 1820s-1830s, to the republicanism of the revolutions of 1848, to the
fight against tyranny embodied by the Italian Risorgimento, southern intellectuals
admired the values in these revolutions that they believed echoed their own national
values.2 This support was not unqualified, however; the southern elite was deeply
conservative and committed to slavery, which left southern analysts wary of European
nationalists’ cries for freedom and liberty.3 Most nationalist movements in Europe were
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Some influential analyses of the origins of southern nationalism include Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation
of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1988); John McCardell, The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern Nationalists and
Southern Nationalism: 1830-1860 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979); Anne Sarah Rubin, A Shattered
Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2005). Historians including Faust have identified the existence of international influences on
southern thought about nationhood, but these ideas were largely unexplored until recent work by Paul
Quigley and Andre Michel Fleche. Faust, Creation of Confederate Nationalism, 11-13; Quigley, Shifting
Grounds: Nationalism and the American South, 1848-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011);
Fleche, The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2012).
2

For an overview of the Greek nationalist movement, see Paul Pappas, The United States and the Greek
War for Independence, 1821-1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). For an overview of the
revolutions of 1848, see Jonathan Sperber, The European Revolutions, 1848-1851 (Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For an overview of the Italian Risorgimento, see Denis Mack
Smith, The Making of Italy, 1796-1866 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1968) and Lucy Riall,
The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification (London: Routledge, 1994).
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Paola Gemme, Timothy Roberts, and Andre Michel Fleche have all argued that conservatism limited
southern support for the revolutions of 1848. Gemme, Domesticating Foreign Struggles: The
Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005); Roberts,
Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 2009); Fleche, The Revolution of 1861. Robert E. Bonner, Stephanie McCurry, and
Manisha Sinha reveal the importance of conservatism to southern politics and the development of southern
nationalism. Bonner, Mastering America: Southern Slaveholders and the Crisis of American Nationhood
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power
and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Sinha, The
Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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inspired in large part by liberal nationalism, which grew out of Enlightenment ideas such
as human equality and constitutional rights, and sought not only to achieve independence
and self-determination for nations, but also to attain the liberal goals of equality and
natural rights.4 The contradiction between a conservative slave society and the liberal
nationalism that underpinned the movements abroad created tension in southerners’
analysis and usage of foreign nationalist movements, helping to shape a southern vision
of nationalism that was both reactionary and liberal, and that both embraced and, among
the most conservative of southerners, rejected nationalist movements abroad. Regardless
of this tension, however, the southern elite understood their nationalism as connected to
the larger movement of nationalism in the nineteenth century, and, upon creating a
southern nation, defined their nation through its context within the larger family of
nations.
The tension between southern conservatism and the liberal values highlighted by
analysis of foreign revolutions played a critical role in the development of southern
nationalism. As early as 1848, when the vast majority of southerners were still
committed to the American nation, conservative fears of unchecked revolution abroad
guided southerners in developing a southern vision of nationhood. Southern analysts
began celebrating the foreign nationalists’ values such as republicanism that they
believed were positive aspects of nationhood, while rejecting the values such as absolute
equality and freedom that southerners saw as extremism and as threats to hierarchical
power and social order. In doing so, these southern analysts manipulated the idea of
liberal nationalism. The altered vision of nationalism that they developed would clarify
4

For a discussion of the different types of nationalism, see Lloyd Kramer, Nationalism in Europe and
America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1775 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2011).
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southern belief about the proper values of a nation, and would prepare later southern
nationalists to claim European nationalist movements as a precedent for their own
attempt at nation-building by teaching southerners to ignore the obvious contradictory
values.
As sectional tension became critical throughout the 1850s, southerners used
analysis of foreign nationalist movements to make sense out of the growing national
crisis at home. They compared their fears of what the increasingly influential northern
abolitionists would do to the South with the oppression suffered by aspiring nations in
Europe. Southerners turned to foreign revolutionaries exiled to the United States to
inform their conversation about the sectionalism of their own nation, using such figures
as Hungarian patriot Louis Kossuth and Irish nationalist John Mitchel to claim that
northerners and southerners responded differently to European revolutionaries, and that
these responses followed differing sectional visions of the national values. This analysis
prepared southerners to see themselves as distinct from the North on issues of nation, a
critical step to conceiving of an independent southern nation.
When southerners seceded from the United States and began forging their own
nation, they used their long tradition of understanding issues of nationalism through an
international lens to help them legitimize a southern nation. Using the altered southern
definition of nationalism, they claimed that the supposed similarity between the new
southern nation and aspiring nations in Europe justified an independent southern nation.
These international comparisons aided Confederates in defining the Confederacy by
providing a blueprint of national values for which the Confederacy stood. Confederates
also used these comparisons to seek support for the Confederacy, claiming that any aid
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and legitimacy granted to aspiring nations in Europe, such as the diplomatic recognition
extended to the newly-united nation of Italy, should likewise be bestowed upon the
Confederacy.
While the southern elite seemed remarkably convinced of these comparisons, or at
least convinced of the comparisons’ ability to gain support and to create a national
identity for the southern nation, as early as the first year of the Civil War, challenges
threatened these comparisons. The contradiction between slavery and liberal nationalism
that southerners glossed over by manipulating the definition of nationalism proved more
problematic for the rest of the world, including the very nationalists with whom
Confederates compared themselves. The lack of official diplomatic recognition from
abroad, combined with famous Italian patriot Giuseppe Garibaldi’s support for the North,
revealed that the rest of the world was not convinced that the Confederacy resembled
aspiring nations in Europe. In response, many southern analysts intensified their
manipulations of the ideals, and now symbols, of nationalism, continuing to claim that
the Confederacy represented a legitimate attempt at nation-building according to the
principles established by revolutions abroad. More conservative southerners, however,
rejected these comparisons, claiming instead that the Confederacy represented a new and
improved form of nation, one in which slavery and conservatism purified the excessive
liberalism that had characterized the European revolutions. Despite widespread
ideological manipulations, then, the tension between conservatism and liberal nationalism
would never be fully reconciled. Southerners’ attempts to make sense out of nationalism
through international analysis, however, were critical to the development of southern
nationalism.

5

Because issues of nationalism were largely determined by the same elite, white,
educated men who made up the political and intellectual power structure of the South,
these are the southerners to whom this dissertation refers. Particularly during and after
secession, this powerful but small elite, including men who held positions of public
authority in fields such as government, journalism, business, and academia, tasked
themselves with constructing a new nationalism. These elite southerners were wellversed in international affairs, and were familiar with the actions and ideas of nationalists
in Europe, enabling them to use international comparisons to define their own
nationalism.5
These elite opinion-makers recorded and disseminated their ideas and views on
nationhood through a well-developed print discourse with which they sought to inform
and persuade their fellow southerners. Newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and
published speeches provide a strong record of southern attempts to shape opinion about
nationalism. Print discourse plays an influential role in the creation of nationalism, as
Benedict Anderson has famously revealed in his seminal work Imagined Communities.
Anderson demonstrates that print culture can play a critical role in allowing strangers to
imagine themselves as part of a national community, thereby revealing the utility of print
culture to efforts at creating nationalism.6 Corroborating this sense of nationalisms as
consciously forged, Eric Hobsbawm has revealed that nationalisms can, in fact, be
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Michael O’Brien reveals that antebellum southerners, contrary to being isolated reactionaries, were fully
aware of and engaged in intellectual, cultural, and political trends of their time, and had particular interest
and even first-hand knowledge of European culture and affairs. O'Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual
Life and the American South, 1810-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004),
especially pgs 90-161; O’Brien, Rethinking the South: Essays in Intellectual History (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1988).
6

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(London: Verso, 1991).
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deliberately shaped by an elite intent on forming a new nation.7 Michael T. Bernath has
applied these insights to the South by analyzing southern nationalists’ attempts to create a
distinct southern nation through the development of an independent southern cultural and
intellectual life.8 Building off of such understandings of the centrality of print discourse
to the creation of nationalism, this dissertation utilizes southern print discourse as a
critical source for analyzing southern nationalists’ attempts to consciously forge a
southern nationalism. Because the purpose of placing southern nationalism within an
international context was to persuade an audience of the proper values for a nation and,
later, of the legitimacy of southern nationalism, this dissertation focuses on sources
within the southern print discourse that were designed to inform and influence thought on
southern nationhood.
The southerners who contributed to this print discourse, and who sought to shape
southern opinion of nationalism, included a broad cross section of elite southern society,
among which were intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and private citizens. Because of
the critical role of southern publications in forging a southern nationalism, editors,
publishers, authors, and journalists constituted a particularly important segment of the
southerners who attempted to create a southern nation. Since they determined what
southerners read and learned about nationalism and the southern cause, these men had
powerful platforms from which they could shape the discourse and debate within the
South, allowing them to interpret issues of nation for their audiences. Politicians and
other public figures also played a critical role in interpreting issues of nationalism and
7

Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983).
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Michael T. Bernath, Confederate Minds: The Struggle for Intellectual Independence in the Civil War
South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
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shaping public opinion. Public speeches provided these men with a common means of
conveying their ideas to wide southern audience. Republications of speeches and
political debates further spread the ideas of the elite to a larger audience. Beyond
speeches, pamphlets provided public figures with an extended forum in which to expand
on their defense of southern rights, especially slavery, and on the supposed northern
abuses of those rights. Together, the voices of all these elite southern men, drawn from
all segments of public life, created a strong and sustained defense of southern nationalism
that depended upon using comparisons and contrasts with nationalisms in Europe to
shape southern views on nationhood and to bolster the legitimacy of the Confederacy.
The audience to which these elite southerners made their national appeals largely
resembled themselves. The southern power-brokers who attempted to create a southern
nationalism found it particularly important to win the support of their fellow elite white
men, including the planters, businessmen, and officials who made up the formal and
informal power structure of the South. While the job of winning the support of foreign
nations belonged first and foremost to diplomats and other influential southerners abroad,
southern nationalists at home were also aware of the potential import of their words and
explanations on public opinion abroad, and, especially during the Civil War, incorporated
international opinion into their attempts to claim European nationalist movements as a
precedent for southern nationalism.
Southern nationalism has long been a subject of historical inquiry, and historians
have analyzed the origins of southern nationalism at great length. Drew Gilpin Faust
identified slavery, religion, and the heritage of the American Revolution as the primary
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ideological influences on southern nationalism.9 Other historians have looked at the
cultural foundations of southern nationalism, including Bernath, who argues that southern
nationalists desired to create a self-consciously independent southern culture and
intellectual life in order to strengthen a southern nation.10 My work analyzes an
additional source of southern nationalism by examining the international dimension of
southern thought on nations and nationhood as southerners undertook the process of
forming their own nation. In doing so, my work draws on both the ideological and
cultural explanations for southern nationalism, for example applying Faust’s
understanding of Confederate comparisons with the American Revolution to southern
comparisons with European revolutions, and utilizing Bernath’s understanding of the
importance of print culture in creating an independent southern identity by analyzing
international elements of this print discourse.
My analysis of the international influences on southern nationalism also responds
to scholarship on the critical importance of southern conservatism to southern
nationalism. The conservative basis of southern politics is well-established, and scholars
such as Stephanie McCurry continue to expand our understanding of the conservative and
even anti-democratic nature of southern thought.11 My work argues that southerners
could be both conservative and reactionary, as well as outward looking, at the same time,

9

Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism.
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Bernath, Confederate Minds. Other historians who present cultural explanations for southern nationalism
include James M. McPherson, “Was Blood Thicker Than Water? Ethnic and Civic Nationalism in the
American Civil War,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 143.1 (1999): 102-108; William
Robert Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National Character (New York: G.
Braziller, 1961). For more analyses of the origins of southern nationalism, see Rubin, A Shattered Nation;
Gary W. Gallagher, The Confederate War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
11

McCurry, Confederate Reckoning. See also Sinha, The Counterrevolution of Slavery; Bonner, Mastering
America.
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by demonstrating how southern nationalists used an international perspective to attempt
to reconcile their conservative, anti-democratic tendency with the liberal ideals that had
long dominated the American, and therefore southern, political tradition, and that were
gaining influence throughout the world.12 Despite their conservative nature, many
southern nationalists still found the liberal ideals that had long directed the American
political tradition so compelling that comparisons with movements abroad representing
these values remained a valuable method of seeking support for their new nation.
Because of the conservatism of the South, however, these southern nationalists carefully
edited their portrayal of foreign nationalist movements to fit with their own revised
understanding of what liberty and equality meant for an overtly slave-holding republic,
choosing to focus on the anti-imperialist aspect of these movements and largely ignoring
the social implications of the liberal nationalist cry for equality. My work thus reveals
how southern nationalists internationally contextualized their debate between liberalism
and conservatism, and how they attempted to adapt their conservatism to the international
trend of liberal nationalism.
Scholarship on southern nationalism has recently begun to explore the
international context in which southern nationalism developed. Paul Quigley, in
revealing the inward, outward, and backward inspirations for the Confederacy, analyzes
previous knowledge of European nationalisms as one of the ways in which southerners
made sense out of their own changing nationalisms. His emphasis on romantic
12

Scholars have generally revealed that southerners reconciled their liberal heritage with their slave-based
conservatism by denying the applicability of liberal ideas such as freedom to slaves. Scholars have also
shown that southerners argued that slavery constituted a valuable contribution to the American experiment
in government. James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South (New York:
Knopf, 1990); Bonner, Mastering America; Lacy K. Ford, Deliver Us From Evil: The Slavery Question in
the Old South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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nationalism in particular reveals southerners’ deep engagement with the trends of the
time.13 Andre Michel Fleche similarly recognizes Confederate awareness of international
trends of liberalism and nationalism, focusing on the revolutions of 1848 and their legacy
for Americans’ nationalism, particularly analyzing the impact of European nationalists’
immigration to the US, as well as the incompatibility of slavery and liberal nationalism as
highlighted by the European revolutions’ growing emphasis on issues of labor and
emancipation.14 Don Doyle has also worked to contextualize southern nationalism within
an era of nationalist movements, particularly by comparing the southern nationalist
movement and the Italian Risorgimento.15
My dissertation adds to and extends the conversation begun by these scholars by
providing a more complete understanding of how and why southerners understood issues
of their nationhood through an international lens, starting with the early antebellum
period and continuing all the way through the impending failure of the southern
experiment in nation-building at the end of the Civil War. Looking at antebellum
southern analysis of nationalisms abroad is critical to understanding the development of
southern thought on nationhood, as it reveals how and why southerners developed an
international perspective on issues of nationalism. Analyzing the antebellum roots of
southern thought on nationalism also shows how an international perspective shaped
southern thought about their nation throughout the antebellum period, including how this
13

Quigley, Shifting Grounds.
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Fleche, The Revolution of 1861.

15

Don H. Doyle, Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the Southern Question (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 2002). Other historians have also begun examining the international context of southern and
American nationalism, as well as the spread of ideas of nationalism from one nation to another. For
examples, see David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2007); Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History
(New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2006).
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perspective helped southerners to clarify their national values and to conceive of the
South as distinct from the North. Continuing the story through the Civil War shows how
the international perspective that developed in the antebellum period later shaped
southern attempts to build and defend the southern nation, and why southern nationalists
remained committed to the vision of the South as one of many aspiring nations of the
nineteenth century, even as events during the war seemed to disprove this stance. This
dissertation thus clarifies the international vision of nationalism that dominated southern
thought as southerners conceived of a southern nation, and shows how that vision
ultimately shaped southern nationalism.
Additionally, analyzing the tension between liberal and conservative responses to
revolutions abroad demonstrates how southern nationalists attempted to place their
conservatism within an international framework in order to reconcile their liberal political
tradition with their conservative tendencies. Such analysis also reveals the critical
importance of the ideological manipulations that southern nationalists went through in
order to justify their international contextualization of the Confederacy. As such, this
dissertation more fully explains why southerners believed they could use an international
perspective to legitimize their nation, despite the problems that slavery presented to their
project in nation-building. By providing a full-length analysis of the influence of
European nationalist movements on southern thought on nations and nationalism, then,
this dissertation expands understanding of the critical issues of why the South seceded,
why southern nationalists thought they had a case for independent nationhood, and how
they framed their cause as about rights rather than, or in addition to, slavery.
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Beyond southern history, my work also reveals that nationalist movements can be
built, in part, by borrowing from ideas of other nationalist movements. In particular, it
reveals that an aspiring nation can twist, manipulate, and re-cast the ideas of a foreign
nationalist movement, making them into something entirely different, yet more suitable
and useful for the new movement. This argument thus advances our understanding of
how nationalist movements are built and how they influence each other. My work also
expands the ways in which we think about liberalism and the ascent and fall of liberal
nationalism in the nineteenth century by complicating the binary between liberal and
illiberal movements. Through these contributions, my work enhances understanding of
both southern nationalism and of nationalism in the Atlantic world in the nineteenth
century.
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Chapter One
Debating Nationalism, 1820-1849
The world in the first half of the nineteenth century seemed full of new
possibilities for nations around the globe. Aspiring nationalists spread ideas of
nationalism from one nationalist movement to another. Led by the American and French
Revolutions, and continuing through the wakes of colonialism in the Americas and the
reactive, post-Napoleonic Congress of Vienna in Europe, an age of revolution saw
potential nationalities throughout Europe and the Americas rising up and attempting to
form independent nations.
Elite, educated antebellum southerners watched these developments closely, as
did the rest of the world. European movements in particular caught these southerners’
attention. Beginning with the Greek independence movement in the 1820s and
continuing through the revolutions of 1848 that spread across Europe, southerners
followed the advance of the ideals of liberal nationalism and the attempts of the Greeks,
French, Italians, Hungarians, Poles, and other nationalities to put these ideals into action.
As they analyzed these events abroad, southern commentators found much to support.
They recognized their own cherished national values in the aspiring nations they watched
in Europe, and through analysis of the values exhibited by nationalist movements abroad,
the southern elite drew connections between the various movements, identifying the
ideals that created similarity between aspiring nations, and even looking back to their
own history to connect these revolutions to the American Revolution.

14

Despite this support for the revolutions, however, the conservative slave-holding
elite who dominated southern political and intellectual life also approached the events in
Europe with wariness. The fundamental incompatibility between an unequal and
hierarchal slave system and a form of nationalism premised upon freedom and equality
challenged southerners’ perceptions of nationalism and complicated their reactions to the
revolutions abroad. Even as they celebrated some liberal values, southerners feared the
radical implications of the revolutions’ call for freedom and liberty. Thus, even while
supporting the aspects of these movements that they connected to their own values,
southerners criticized the aspects of the revolutions that they characterized as extremism.
This process of analyzing foreign nationalisms, learning to see them as connected,
and evaluating which aspects of these movements were and were not worthy of support
taught southerners about their own views of nationhood. As southerners watched and
debated the meaning of revolutions in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century,
they ultimately learned to define what they believed a nation and nationalism should be.
In doing so, southerners essentially created an altered vision of nationalism that sought to
reconcile the liberal ideals that underpinned their own American nationalism with the
conservatism that pervaded southern political thought. This vision of nationalism that
southerners developed through analysis of nationalist movements in Europe would
ultimately guide their sense of their own nationality, just as the subject of their own
nationalism began to become a critical issue for southerners.
Antebellum southerners were actively engaged in analysis of nationalist
movements in Europe, beginning as early as the Greek nationalist movement.1 Greece

1

Michael O’Brien argues that elite southerners were fully engaged in the intellectual trends of their time,
including a deep interest in classical history. O’Brien, Conjectures of Order.
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provided antebellum southern analysts with an early, and sentimentally favored, example
of a fight for national independence. In 1821, Greeks rose up under the leadership of
Alexander Ypsilantis to try to overthrow Ottoman control; although this initial attempt
failed, Greeks would continue to wage war against the Turks throughout the 1820s,
eventually gaining independence with the aid of European intervention in 1830. As
Greece fought for independence from the Ottoman Empire, American minds turned to the
glories of the Greece of antiquity, celebrating Greece’s historic role in establishing the
governmental practices of self-representation and republicanism that nineteenth-century
Americans so revered. This enthusiasm for all things Greek, combined with Americans’
desire to see their own political institutions and values echoed abroad, created widespread
American support for the Greek independence movement.2
Southerners joined their fellow Americans in celebrating Greece and the cause of
Greek independence, using print discourse to spread their enthusiasm. The vast majority
of reports in southern periodicals, while often generated abroad or in the North, showed
whole-hearted support for Greece, guiding the formation of southerners’ opinions.
Southern audiences read about how citizens in various cities held balls and raised money
for the Greek cause; government officials asked for support for Greece; and even the
president, James Monroe, informed Congress that it was natural that the Greeks would
“produce that great excitement and sympathy in their favor, which have been so signally

2

Pappas, The United States and the Greek War for Independence; David Brewer, The Greek War of
Independence: The Struggle for Freedom from Ottoman Oppression and the Birth of the Modern Greek
Nation (Woodstock & New York: The Overlook Press, 2001). Caroline Winterer also reveals the
importance of Hellenism to antebellum Americans’ intellectual life. She argues that American support for
Greece was based in part on their belief that the ancient Greeks had originated the idea of democracy that
Americans’ themselves cherished. Winterer, The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in
American Intellectual Life, 1780-1910 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
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displayed throughout the U. States.”3 While southern-generated reports were fewer in
number, they showed equal enthusiasm for the Greek cause. For example, the Natchez
State Gazette, a paper owned by colorful Mississippi journalism pioneer Andrew
Marschalk, synthesized foreign reports to inform readership that the news from Greece
was hopeful that “the glorious cause of National Independence, will prevail in Greece,
and she will soon take her station in the rank of nations.”4 The Charleston Courier took
the occasion of Christmas, 1823, to remind its readers that even as they celebrated the
birth of Christ, Christians in Greece were suffering, and that “Greece, worthy as she is of
our sympathies… holds a higher claim on our affections.”5 Such reports set the tone for
what southerners learned about the Greek cause.
The positive tone that reporters adopted toward Greece was echoed in southern
action. Charlestonians were the first Americans to respond to the Greek call for aid.6
Virginia legislators and citizens of Richmond, following in the example of northern proGreek organizations, met in 1824 to pass resolutions expressing sympathy and calling for
support for the Greek cause.7 Similarly, the Louisiana legislature passed an official
resolution in support of Greece, earning praise from the Milledgeville (GA) Southern
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Recorder, a states’ rights Whig newspaper.8 Southerners continued forming
organizations to collect aid and encourage sympathy for the Greek cause, and upon the
successful culmination of Greek independence and the subsequent uncertainty
surrounding the governance of newly independent Greek, southerners showed concern
for the future of the Greek nation.9 Clearly, Greek independence was a cause that the
southern elite supported.
While Greece, revered as the birthplace of democracy, won significant sympathy
from antebellum Americans, it was far from the only nascent nationalist movement that
southerners supported in the 1820s and 1830s. Southerners also turned a sympathetic eye
toward Ireland’s desire for independence from Great Britain; the various Italian states’
struggles for freedom from foreign empires and monarchs perceived to be despotic;
France’s creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1830; Poland’s fight for freedom from
Russia and Prussia; and Belgium’s bid for independence from the United Kingdom of the
Netherlands.10 As with Greece, this support was publicly displayed in a variety of ways
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throughout the South. Hibernian societies and other organizations formed for the support
of Ireland in southern cities and towns ranging from Savannah and Charleston to
Annfield, NC, often using St. Patrick’s Day to celebrate the cause of Irish
independence.11 Support for Neopolitan independence exploded in the early 1820s as
Naples sought independence from Austria, with Leesburg, Virginia’s Genius of Liberty
characterizing the revolution as “among the singular and wonderful events of the day.”12
France’s struggles to create a more responsive government won widespread support from
southerners, complete with parades, musical performances (including at least one
“Organization of Europe,” Richmond Enquirer, September 27, 1815; “Europe,” Georgetown (SC) Winyaw
Intelligencer, November 10, 1819; Leesburg (VA) Genius of Liberty, September 19, 1820; Fincastle (VA)
Herald of the Valley, May 7, 1821; “God Speed the Good Cause,” Richmond Enquirer, May 8, 1821;
“Sardinia,” Alexandria Gazette and Advertiser, May 11, 1821; “One Day Later from London,” Charleston
City Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser, May 12, 1821; “Naples,” Little Rock Arkansas Gazette,
July 7, 1821; Savannah Georgian, April 20, 1822. For support of France, see “Revolution in France,”
Charleston City Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser, September 11, 1830; Charleston Courier,
September 13, 1830; “The French Revolution,” Augusta Chronicle and Georgia Advertiser, September 15,
1830; Richmond Enquirer, September 24, 1830; “Volunteer Toasts,” Charleston Courier, September 25,
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instance of La Marsellaise), and even an official letter of congratulations from the state
legislature of Louisiana that declared the support of the people of Louisiana for the
people of France.13 Poland’s revolution, inspired by France’s, also warranted
southerners’ support, as southerners “look[ed] with feelings of enthusiasm” to “this
gallant, chivalrous and noble country” according to Whig Samuel Snowden’s Alexandria
Phenix Gazette.14 Meanwhile, the settling of Belgium’s independence was nothing less
than a “promise for civilization.”15 All of these revolutions were a common subject of
toasts at southern gatherings, as southerners praised nationalist movements abroad.16
Often southerners connected the European nationalist movements in their toasts, as did a
Mr. Patrick Cantwell, who celebrated “the Parisian heroes of July, 1830 – a bright
example for the Irish agitators.”17 The widespread support and celebrations of
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southerners for revolutions and nationalists in Greece, Italy, France, and other areas of
Europe reveals southerners’ positive view of early nationalist movements.
Southern commentators supported these movements because they believed that
these aspiring nations in Europe were fighting for the same political values that
southerners cherished. Despite the conservatism that dominated southern politics,
southerners still retained pride in their revolutionary heritage as Americans, and revered
many of the values upon which the US had been founded. Antebellum southerners, like
other Americans, celebrated values that had underpinned the creation of the United
States, exclaiming, for example, that the US stood as “a splendid example that a
republican government is best calculated to promote the dignity and happiness of man.”18
The values that southerners praised in revolutions abroad were thus the same ones by
which they defined their own American nationhood.
Among these values that southerners celebrated in European nationalist
movements was the right of the people to direct their own government.19 Although such
a value contradicted the limitation of rights inherent to slavery, southerners nonetheless
cheered as foreign peoples sought greater national self-determination, contextualizing the
revolutions in terms of the fall of the principle of the divine right of kings, rather than in
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terms of extension of individual rights to individual citizens.20 For example, Virginia
congressman, writer, and professor George Tucker, who believed in limited democracy
within the United States, nonetheless argued in his “Discourse on the Progress and
Influence of Philosophy” that the fight for the rights of the people against monarchy, as in
Belgium and Greece, was the key to the progress of mankind.21 Other southerners
likewise celebrated as the people of aspiring nations began to exercise their rights, as
when Samuel B. T. Caldwell’s Leesburg Genius of Liberty enthused that by demanding
their desire for independence be heard, the Neapolitans “begin to see that they have
essential rights to claim.”22 Similarly, a committee of citizens of South Carolina resolved
of Greece that “the mere contemplation of a people rising to assert its rights… excites the
sensibilities of every friend to liberal principles.”23 The liberty of a proposed nation to
exercise its right to independence was a considerable priority for southerners in their
evaluation of nationalist movements abroad.24
Because they wanted to ensure the protection of peoples’ right to nationhood,
southerners also adamantly supported what they saw as battles against despotism and
tyranny. Ignoring the fact that as slaveholders, they themselves were accused of tyranny,
southerners celebrated threats to governments that they perceived as despotic. Southern
20
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analyses reveal that southerners were convinced that aspiring nationalities such as Italy,
Greece, Poland, and Belgium were the victims of tyrants and despots.25 For example, the
revolution in Naples promised to end “arbitrary and despotic government,” according to
the Charleston City Gazette.26 Likewise, New Orleans’ Courrier de la Louisiane
exclaimed that the “heroic Greeks” made “such sacrifices to fling off the yoke of their
tyrants.”27 In doing so, they sought “emancipation” from “despotic thralldom.”28 Ireland
was an “oppressed, ravaged, and groaning country.”29 The Revolution of 1830 saw
“illustrious France” rising and “trampling underfoot a hoary headed tyranny,” according
to French Creole Thomas Theard, editor of the New Orleans Abeille.30 Southern hopes
also abounded that Poland would be “redeemed from the iron grasp of the oppressor,” as
the Natchez Southern Clarion reported.31 Furthermore, despotism had to be ended,
according to H. J. Groesbeck in the Southern Literary Messenger, as it led to the
degeneration of the mind, in contrast to free institutions, which led to intellectual and
25

“One Day Later from London,” Charleston City Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser, May 12,
1821; Savannah Georgian, April 20, 1822; “Foreign Articles: Greece,” Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, July
15, 1823; “Ten Days Later from France and Spain,” Richmond Enquirer, September 2, 1823; “Foreign
Intelligence,” Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, August 1, 1824; Charleston City Gazette and Commercial
Daily Advertiser, October 15, 1824; Stephen Edward Rice, “Address of Stephen Edward Rice, Esq,”
Augusta Chronicle and Georgia Advertiser, March 25, 1828; “Cause of the Greeks,” Charleston City
Gazette and Commercial Daily Advertiser, January 10, 1824; A Native of Augusta, “For the Chronicle:
The Cause of the Greeks,” Augusta Chronicle and Georgia Advertiser, March 17, 1824; “Greece,” Natchez
Ariel, December 5, 1825; Savannah Georgian, May 6, 1831; “Eleventh Annual Report of the Young Men’s
Bible Society of Alexandria,” Alexandria Phenix Gazette, April 25, 1832; Samuel M. Sommes, “On
Oration Delivered at the Request of the Citizens of Piscalaway, Prince Georges’s County, Md,” Alexandria
Phenix Gazette, July 11, 1832; Dew, “An Address on the Influence,” 261-282; “Oration,” New Bern
Carolina Sentinel, July 19, 1823.
26

Leesburg Genius of Liberty, September 19, 1820.

27

“Greece,” Courrier de la Louisiane, May 27, 1822.

28

“Greece,” Alexandria Herald, December 27, 1822.

29

Courrier de la Louisiane, July 28, 1823.

30

Abeille, March 28, 1831.

31

“Poland,” Natchez Southern Clarion, June 10, 1831.

23

moral development.32 Again and again, southern reports decried the despotism and
tyranny faced by aspiring nations in Europe, lending their sympathy, and, often, aid to
Europeans’ quests for freedom from oppression.
Because southerners saw republicanism as the best barrier against tyranny and
despotism, movements perceived to be republican warranted the most southern support.
Republicanism was another American and southern value that southerners revered and
searched for in movements abroad.33 As Thomas R. Dew, a pro-slavery writer and a
professor at the College of William and Mary, explained in an article in the Southern
Literary Messenger, republicanism was critical to the full development of humanity.34
Other southerners wrote about how republicanism was necessary for the protection of the
peoples’ rights, as well as their ability to build a functioning society.35 Because of the
importance of republicanism, revolutions that represented republicanism earned
celebration from southerners.36
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These values, believed to be shared between the United States and aspiring
nations in Europe, led antebellum southerners to perceive a bond or connection between
their nation and would-be European nations. Discussions of foreign nationalisms
occurred frequently during celebrations of the United States, such as the Fourth of July,
revealing the sense of connection between the nations.37 Orators often took the occasion
of celebrations of the United States to survey the advance of American principles abroad.
For example, the speaker at the Fourth of July, 1830, celebration for the Young Men of
Alexandria asked his listeners to contemplate the international effects of the American
Revolution, tracing the “spread of liberal sentiments” in France and Greece.38 The
occasion of the anniversary of Washington’s birthday also led to calls for sympathy with
Greece and other nations still “striving in a kindred cause.”39
Americans’ own nationalist movement, the American Revolution, constituted a
major aspect of this connection that southerners saw between their nation and nationalist
movements abroad. Southerners argued that the Greeks, Irish, Neapolitans, and other
nationalists fought for the same cause that had motivated the American Revolution. For
example, a committee of South Carolinians solicited aid for the Greeks on the basis that
the US had “fought and conquered for the same cause for which Greece is now
37
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contending. We therefore can triumph in [Greece’s] victories and commiserate her
reverses.”40 Ireland, according to the bilingual New Orleans paper Courrier de la
Louisiane, was “fettered and bending under the heavy iron rod of England,” and was thus
in “the same predicament” as the American colonies before their revolution.41 George
Tucker wrote that the same principles of free government had motivated the American
Revolution and both French Revolutions, as well as Belgium and Greece’s recent bids for
independence.42 The leader of the American Revolution, George Washington, featured
prominently in these comparisons, as southerners declared Lafayette the new Washington
for his role in the French Revolution of 1830, and wished for Washingtons for
revolutions elsewhere.43
By casting the American Revolution, and the US, as the model of the values
playing out in revolutions abroad, Americans, and southerners, shaped their perception of
their own nation by enhancing their sense of the strength and importance of their nation
and its values.44 Southern analysts took pride in their belief that the United States had
provided the model of the values that had inspired aspiring nations abroad. For example,
40
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the Natchez Ariel claimed the model of the American nation as a foe of tyranny, and
stated with pride that “kings and oppressors look at the American Republic, as the evil
genius that is to one day pull down their power, and level them with their subjects.”45
Accordingly, commentators celebrated that the United States and its principles had been
responsible for inspiring nationalists and spawning revolutions in France, Ireland,
Greece, and elsewhere.46 These comparisons shaped understanding of which values
allowed the US to be such an example. As Stephen Edward Rice explained, as “the
atmosphere of the world [became] contagious with America’s example,” republicanism
became “epidemic,” and “despots are in arms against despots.”47 Such formulations
pointed out American strengths through praising the appearance of American values
elsewhere. Looking abroad allowed antebellum southerners to reflect inward upon the
positive values and example of their own nation, refining their beliefs about the meaning
of their nation.
As they analyzed revolutions abroad, southerners, as did most of their fellow
Americans, eventually concluded that, despite the admirable example of the US, aspiring
nations abroad failed to achieve the standards of the American nation, and that the United
45
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States still represented a superior form of nationhood.48 In a speech celebrating St.
Patrick’s Day, Stephen Edward Rice claimed that the US “surpassed Europe, and
marched to the enjoyment of equal rights” without the “painful delays” and “vicissitudes”
that plagued other aspiring republics.49 Similarly, William A. McRea, despite praising
Greece and other nationalist movements, informed his Alexandria, VA audience that
“[the United States] is the only free and happy government in the world,” as “we are
blessed with institutions purely republican; and live under the genial ray of a constitution,
which declares, in the spirit of freedom, all men to be equal.”50 Hugh S. Legare, South
Carolina politician and journalist, likewise celebrated the superior functionality of the
American government compared to the bloodshed in Poland and France.51 Such
comparisons bolstered Americans’, and southerners’, sense of what made their nation
different and therefore what defined their nation.
Southern analysis of early nationalist movements in Europe not only engendered
southern support for these movements, but also caused southerners to reflect more deeply
upon the values of their own nation. Comparing and contrasting movements abroad with
the United States refined southerners’ sense of which values led them to support
nationalist activity in Europe, as well as which values underpinned their own nation.
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Although southerners in the early antebellum period still conceived of themselves as
Americans, the sense of international connectedness that southerners developed in the
1820s and 1830s would play a critical role in later antebellum southerners’ ability to
conceive of the South as an independent nation. After secession, this international vision
of nationhood would also enable Confederates to justify their nation on the basis of its
supposed place in the international family of nations. Without an earlier understanding of
nationalisms as connected, and without the practice of using foreign nationalisms to
understand one’s own nation, the international contextualization of the Confederacy
would have been meaningless.
Although nationalist activity in Europe began to diminish after the wave of
revolutions inspired by France’s July Revolution of 1830, southern attention to events
abroad did not end, and European nationalist movements were only temporarily inactive.
In the spring of 1848, revolutions broke out across Europe as French, Hungarians,
Germans, Italians, and other peoples sought to overthrow monarchies and empires and
replace them with more liberal, republican governments. Within a couple of years these
revolutions were defeated and the old order largely restored, but despite their defeat, the
revolutions of 1848 had a significant influence on the people who lived through them, as
well as on the people who watched them from abroad.
Americans were among the many people who followed the revolutions of 1848
closely. Because of their faith in the importance of United States as a model nation,
Americans from all regions eagerly watched to see if their model of nationhood would be
implemented overseas.52 Further, although Civil War was far from inevitable, the United
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States in 1848 was already on its own path toward nationalist conflict due to the divisive
issue of slavery, and the issues that would eventually lead to war already divided the
nation between North and South. While still retaining their American loyalties and
identities, Americans, including elite southerners, were very aware of the issues
threatening their own nation at the very same time they watched Europeans attempt to
create new governments and nations in 1848. The lessons that southerners learned about
the meaning of nationalism through their discussion of the events of 1848 would shape
the form that their southern nationalism would take a little over a decade later.
The widespread unrest, conflict, and revolutions of 1848 certainly provided
plentiful nationalism-related news for southerners to digest. Discontent had been
growing across the continent as Enlightenment ideas of self-government conflicted with
the post-Congress of Vienna Europe that saw control of the continent returned to a
handful of monarchs. The French Revolution of 1789, although over a half-century
distant, provided European nationalists with a model of a revolution based on
Enlightenment ideals, helping disseminate these ideas through the educated classes.53
The spread of liberalism and the ideal of republicanism drove a desire for greater political
representation and inspired people to fight for equality and freedom. The rise of
nationalism, which elevated the idea of the nation and sought the establishment of
independent nation-states in the place of large, multinational empires, further inspired the
mid-century revolutions. Meanwhile, increasingly difficult economic situations primed
workers and peasants for revolution. When the philosophical ideas met with real-world
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issues such as economic crisis or revolutions in neighboring countries, peasants and elites
alike began to fight for new forms of government, leading to revolution.54
The first widely-publicized revolution occurred in France in February of 1848,
when revolutionaries pushed for and gained the establishment of a republic, forcing
Louis-Philippe to abdicate. After the declaration of the Republic of France, revolution
swept the continent. Revolts and mass demonstrations in the Italian peninsula and the
German states forced monarchs, dukes, and other rulers to grant constitutions. Austrian
leader Metternich fled the empire as a result of mass insurrections in March 1848, and
Hungarians attempted to set up an independent government under Louis Kossuth.
Peasants, workers, and women all joined the cry for reform and fought for equality, and
uprisings and demonstrations spread throughout Europe. The thread tying together these
revolutions was a common desire for more liberal, representative governments,
preferably republics, or at least constitutional monarchies, that gave more power to the
people.55
Despite widespread support for these movements, however, they were ultimately
unsuccessful. The French Republic was dissolved after Louis-Napoleon staged a coup in
late 1851. The Italian Kingdom of Sardinia, which had united Italian nationalists to fight
against Austria, failed to win its war against the Austrian empire, and the short-lived
Roman Republic fell to the combined forces of the Pope and of Louis-Napoleon’s French
army. The Hungarian independence movement was defeated by combined Austrian and
Russian forces in summer of 1849 after almost a year of fighting. Although the
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revolutions gave early indications of success, by 1850, most of them had been defeated
and monarchies were restored. The possibility of revolutionary change in Europe had
been postponed.56 The defeat of the movements could not erase the impact that they had
on the international conversation about nations and nationalism, however. The
revolutions of 1848, despite defeat, significantly influenced the thoughts and beliefs, not
only of the revolutionaries who participated in them, but also of citizens around the
world, including in the southern United States, where southerners would soon enact their
own experiment in nationalism.
Southerners looking abroad had a variety of reactions as they debated the meaning
of the revolutions of 1848. As they had during the earlier revolutions of the 1820s and
1830s, southern analysts largely supported the revolutions of 1848, praising nationalists
in Europe for their efforts to establish republics and fight off tyranny. Elite southerners
in the late antebellum era, however, faced with the growth of abolitionism at home and
abroad and fearful for the preservation of slavery, grew increasingly wary of the full
implications of liberal nationalism.57 They still supported republicanism, and still
opposed tyranny; however, liberty, freedom, and equality became threatening ideas for an
elite determined to maintain a hierarchical power structure. These fears were made
apparent in southern criticism that the revolutions of 1848 were threatening the social and
political order that was necessary for stability. The southern debate and discussion over
the meaning of the revolutions of 1848 would guide the development of southerners’
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beliefs about nations and nationalism, as southerners sought a way to reconcile their
conservatism with their support for certain aspects of liberal nationalism.
Despite their fears of unchecked revolution, the majority of southerners
commenting on the revolutions of 1848 found much to praise in the events abroad.58
Turning again to their own values to make sense out of the foreign nationalist
movements, one of the ideals that southerners supported in the revolutions of 1848 was
national self-determination.59 The will of the people to determine and administer their
own government was a major ideal that southerners sought in revolutions abroad, and
southerners consistently praised revolutions that fought for what southern analysts
believed to be national self-determination. For example, the pro-Whig Texian Advocate
of Victoria, TX, asked “will Europe again relapse into a system of despotic governments,
or will the people of France, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, &c., show to the world
that they are capable of self-government,” adding that “these we consider great and
important questions.” 60 Hungarians earned accolades from a writer in the Southern
Literary Messenger for “contending manfully for representation” and “a substantial share
in the government .”61 South Carolina doctor J. F. G. Mittag, who had toured Europe in
the early 1840s, wrote to the Charleston Courier to praise European nationalists who
58
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“seem determined, at the peril of every thing, to resume the power” that monarchs had
taken from them.62 This self-rule sought in Europe was so important to southerners
because they believed it was nothing less than the same principle that had led to the
greatness of the United States.63 As they analyzed aspiring nations’ right to selfdetermination, some southern commentators pointed to history, ethnicity, or culture as the
basis for the right to independent nationhood.64 For example, Maximilian Schele de
Vere, professor of Anglo-Saxon studies at the University of Virginia, referenced the longoppressed pasts of Italy, Poland, and Ireland as justification for their current desire for
independent nationhood.65 Even as antebellum southerners intensified their conservative
desire for limited democracy at home, and expressed fears of individuals’ rights to
participate in the political process, they praised self-determination on the national level as
enacted in the revolutions of 1848.66
One of the reasons why southerners supported bids for self-determination was that
the aspiring European nations sought to throw off what European nationalists and
southerners alike agreed were tyrannical regimes. The harms of tyranny, as with the
benefits of self-government, remained a southern concern throughout the antebellum
period. Italian states were still fighting in 1848 for independence from the Austrian
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empire and for the unification of the Italian states, and southerners considered the Pope,
various monarchs, France, and above all Austria to be tyrants oppressing the Italian
people.67 For example, southern writers depicted Austria, the most commonly-identified
oppressor of Italy, as a brutal despot, contrasting the “tyranny loving Austrians” with the
“pleasure loving” Italians and claiming that the Italian people were “kept down by the
iron despotism of Austria.68 Hungary, like Italy, fought for freedom from the Austrian
Empire, earning it southern support similar to that given to Italy.69 Hungarian
nationalists, southerners analyzed, sought only to replace tyranny with a true republican
government, and subsequently the crushing of the Hungarian revolution caused deep
regret among southerners.70 Still ignoring the fact that as slaveholders, they themselves
were accused of tyranny, southern analysts strongly praised revolutions that sought to
overthrow despotism.
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As it had during the nationalist events during the 1820s and 1830s, republicanism
would again provide one of the standards by which southerners would judge the events in
Europe in 1848. Southern commentators explicitly referred to republicanism in analyzing
the revolutions; in fact, the most common language used to describe the revolutions
referred directly to republicanism, praising anything republican and criticizing monarchy,
tyranny, despotism, or anything else that stood in the way of the establishment of
republics. For example, the Augusta (GA) Daily Chronicle and Sentinel hoped that
French republicans would succeed in establishing a republican government that would
win “the respect of all nations.”71 After the defeat of the nationalist movement in Venice,
the New Orleans Daily Picayune lamented the fall of Venice with a sorrow they believed
was unique to “him who worships freedom with the devotion that only a republican can
offer.”72 Reports on the revolutions described the fervent desire of the world for
European nations to achieve a republican form of government.73
Southerners were not just interested in republicanism on an abstract level,
however. As they debated the revolutions of 1848, southern analysts used their
evaluation of whether or not a revolution fit their standards of republicanism to determine
their support for that revolution. Indeed, the level of republican virtue shown by a nation
or movement determined its place in southern ranking of movements, with reporters
claiming, for example, that Hungary’s republican efforts made the Hungarian revolution
71
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the most important conflict in Europe.74 In contrast, lack of republican virtue was
sufficient to earn a revolution condemnation. For example, southerners tolerated
Sardinian king Charles Albert’s leadership of the Italian independence movement as a
necessary evil until he failed to secure a united, independent Italy, at which point they
accused him, and the Risorgimento, of being insufficiently republican from the
beginning.75 Republicanism was therefore the clearest value by which foreign events
could be evaluated.76 According to this value, southerners deemed the majority of the
revolutions of 1848 republican, at least in intent and in conception, and therefore worthy
of southern support.77
As they analyzed the meaning of the revolutions of 1848, southerners connected
their nationalism to nationalisms abroad by comparing the revolutions of 1848 to the
American Revolution. Southerners saw the American Revolution as a model for the
revolutions of 1848, as they had for earlier revolutions.78 Newspapers praised nationalist
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movements for echoing the American Revolution, as the New Orleans Daily Picayune
did by claiming that the revolutions abroad were “the revolution of ’76 extending itself
across the seas.”79 Southerners read about how the spirit of the leaders of the American
Revolution, such as Washington, was motivating the European revolutions.80 The
documents of the American Revolution, not just the Revolution itself, corroborated this
comparison, as southerners read that the founding documents of new governments of
Germany, France, and Italy were based on the constitution of the United States.81
Additionally, newspapers such as Tallahassee, Florida’s Democratic weekly, the
Floridian and Journal, urged their readers to sympathy for European revolutions by
arguing that these revolutions were the same as the American Revolution.82 This belief
in the American Revolution as the model for the revolutions of 1848 seemed confirmed
when southerners read reports from abroad that held up the American Revolution as the
desired model for European revolutions.83
Southerners clarified the basis for the connection between the American
Revolution and the revolutions of 1848 by revealing that they supported certain values
exhibited by revolutions abroad because these were the same values that the American
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Revolution had established in their own nation.84 For example, one Floridian celebrated
the Fourth of July in 1849 by informing his fellow southerners that the struggles in
Europe were advancing the same ideals that the United States represented.85 Newspapers
reported on American demonstrations of support for the European revolutions, revealing
that these demonstrations occurred because the revolutions represented the same values
of freedom that America did.86 Similarly, journalist George Kendall, who had been a war
correspondent in the Mexican-American War before moving to France and becoming the
New Orleans Daily Picayune’s foreign correspondent, expressed pride at the proAmerican spirit that the revolutions had engendered in Europe, writing that he believed
that nationalists in Europe were trying to achieve the same freedoms and ideals instituted
in the United States.87 Southerners connected the ideals of the American nation with the
ideals of the revolutions of 1848, using these comparisons to show their support for the
events in Europe and, in doing so, internationalizing their thinking about their own
nation.
Although a majority of southern analyses of the revolutions of 1848 revealed
support for the nationalist movements abroad, southerners still had reservations about
these revolutions. Southern commentators, while largely supportive of the revolutions
abroad, nonetheless debated the meaning of these movements, and southern evaluation of
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the revolutions of 1848 was far from straightforward. Positive assessments of the
revolutions were often tempered with criticism, as southerners analyzed flaws and
weaknesses in the nationalist movements they observed, and as they rejected the fullest
implications of liberal ideals as threatening to their slave-based conservatism. Instead of
embracing the full extent of values such as freedom and equality, southern conservatives
sought to promote such ideals as limited democracy and a hierarchical social order. They
argued that governmental power should be seated in local rather than national
government, advancing a vision of states’ rights. Much of this perspective derived from
the desire to protect and extend the institution of slavery, which obviously made ideals
such as equality suspect. As they watched the revolutions of 1848, then, antebellum
southerners were confronted with the contradiction between the liberal ideals of their
American heritage, and their conservatism and defense of slavery.88
Guided by their conservatism, southern analysts found plenty of issues to critique
in the revolutions of 1848. Much of this criticism echoed southerners’ concern with
republicanism, as southerners debated whether or not foreign nationalists would be able
to live up to the republican promise of their movements. Even as southern commentators
recognized what they saw as the original republican intent behind the revolutions, they
feared that the revolutions were failing to live up to their republican inspiration. Many
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southern analyses reveal apprehension about whether or not the people of Europe were fit
for the republican governments they sought to establish. George W. Kendall, who had
co-founded the New Orleans Daily Picayune and served as its foreign correspondent
from his home in Paris between 1849 and the mid 1850s, was particularly vocal in
revealing his wariness about Europeans’ ability to properly direct their nationalist
movements. In fact, Kendall’s lack of faith in foreign revolutionaries helped to shape his
generally skeptical tone towards the revolutions of 1848.89 No less a figure than John C.
Calhoun also subscribed to concerns about Europeans’ abilities to implement republican
ideals. Calhoun believed that revolutionary action in Europe would lead to anarchy, due
to his opinion that Europeans were ill-prepared to sustain a republic. He admitted,
however, that if he were wrong and the revolutions succeeded, then freedom, liberty, and
republicanism would replace monarchy throughout Europe.90 This apprehension about
the fitness of the European people for a republican government could have possibly been
a veiled expression of unease with extending rights and equality to larger numbers of
people, certainly a concern for conservative southerners invested in preserving a
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hierarchical social structure.91 If this was the case, however, southern periodicals do not
emphasize the connection. Instead, analysts reveal fears that the inadequacy of the
European people would prevent the implementation of republicanism. Southerners may
have thought that the revolutions were republican in conception and intent, but for many
southerners, that intent meant little if the people were incapable of implementing it.
If inadequacy was one concern with the revolutions, extremism was an even
greater threat in southern minds. Elite southerners’ desire for hierarchical power led
many southern analysts to interpret the revolutions of 1848 as threats to political stability,
rather than as welcomed extensions of rights and liberty.92 Even as they embraced some
aspects of the revolutions, southerners debated whether or not extremism meant that the
revolutions were more dangerous than potentially beneficial. While they supported what
they saw as republican revolutions, many southerners grew uncomfortable with
revolutions that became too radical, either in action or in philosophy.
Violence was one path to extremism and radicalism in southern minds. Southern
commentators reported negatively on bloodshed, using the tally of deaths or the spilling
of blood to disparage the revolutions.93 As the enactors of such violence, mobs, in
particular, represented revolutionary excess to southern analysts. Mobs were obviously
threatening due to their tendency toward violence. Just as critically, mobs represented
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unchecked and dangerous power being wielded by people supposedly incapable of
exercising democracy or participating in a republic. Such excess power given to
supposedly unqualified people was particularly threatening for conservative, antidemocratic southerners.94 To southerners, revolutions that were led by mobs were too
violent and too egalitarian, and were to be considered radical and dangerous, and
therefore had no place in the proper process of nation-building.
Extremism and radicalism of ideology was even more concerning to southern
commentators than was radicalism of action, as it threatened not only the enactment of
the revolutions, but also the intent behind them. The Red Republican Party, a French
political party that sought, among other goals, redistribution of property, stood as the
clearest example of the revolutions’ embrace of dangerously liberal ideology to
conservative southerners. Elite southerners were too invested in the slave system and in a
hierarchical power structure that benefitted white slaveholders to favor any ideas that
promoted equality by granting more power to those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.
Driven by their desire to maintain strict hierarchy, southerners levied harsh criticism
against French red republicans for supposedly driving moderates away from
republicanism.95 Further illustrating their concern with the extremism they associated
with the red republicans, southerners used the term red republican to refer not only to the
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political party in France, but also to any events, ideas, and leaders that they saw as radical
or excessively liberal. Accordingly, southerners often linked red republicans negatively
to socialists, anarchists, and other political groups that they also believed were too radical
and liberal and, therefore, were threatening to southerners’ own vision of society, or were
antithetical to revolutionary success. For example, William W. Mann, Paris
correspondent for the Southern Literary Messenger, joined several ideologies together in
describing what he called the “socialist, terrorist, red Republican Party” to his
readership.96 Kendall, who viewed the revolutions abroad with a mixture of hope and
contempt, similarly argued that socialism, like red republicanism, destroyed the
republican roots of the revolutions and redistributed power in dangerous ways.97
Conservative fears of the fullest implications of equality led southern analysts to view red
republicans and related revolutionaries with great wariness. Such fear of extremism in
the revolutions abroad clarified southerners’ belief that radicalism violated the proper
method of seeking nationhood.
Underlying southerners’ fear of extremism was their conservative desire for social
order. If republicanism was the standard by which positive aspects of revolutions were
analyzed, social order provided the standard for measuring extremism of nationalist
movements abroad. Such a valuation of social order, as with self-determination and
republicanism, derived from southerners’ beliefs about their own nation. Social order
was necessary to preserve a hierarchical, slave-based society. Further, southerners
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believed that social order was among the American founding values that the US modeled
for nations abroad.98 Accordingly, “quality of order,” which derived from “conservative
tendencies,” was the New Orleans Daily Picayune’s standard of good governments, one
which some southerners believed the revolutions of 1848 lacked.99 Concern about mobs
derived, in part, from this desire for social order, as southerners feared that revolutions
that fell prey to mob violence would destroy all order.100 Kendall was a common
advocate of social order, fearing as he did that potential anarchy and mobs would be
harmful to order.101 His editors, even while gently chiding him for his pessimism with
regards to the revolutions in Europe, supported his positive view of social order, praising
his belief in the “philanthropic and beneficent influences which rational liberty exerts in
restraining evil passions [and] inculcating a love of order.”102 As Kendall and his editors
reveal, southern analysts did not reach consensus on whether or not the harms of the
revolutions outweighed their promise. Most commentators, however, agreed that social
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order was an important standard by which they could judge the revolutions. As they
debated the meaning of the revolutions of 1848, southerners turned to the conservative
principle of order to make sense out of the revolutions, solidifying southerners’ belief that
order was necessary for a nation.
Throughout southern analysis of the revolutions of 1848, praise and criticism coexisted uneasily. As they debated the merits, values, and events of foreign nationalist
movements, southern commentators largely agreed that republicanism, selfdetermination, and social order were values that nations should seek, and that extremism
of both ideology and action should be avoided. As southerners sought to understand the
revolutions abroad, they thus clarified their vision of what a nation, and a nationalist
movement, should and should not be.
While southern analysis of revolutions abroad led to fairly widespread agreement
about the desired values a nation should exhibit, southerners never fully agreed as to
whether or not the dangers of extremism outweighed the potential for good in the
revolutions. The debate over this question, and the subsequent mixing of praise and
criticism in southern analysis of the revolutions of 1848, produced remarkably nuanced
interpretations of foreign nationalist movements. As they debated the revolutions abroad,
southern judgment varied from revolution to revolution. For example, the Hungarian
Revolution earned praise for lacking the red republicans and socialists that had plagued
France’s revolutionary efforts, as well as for its desire for rational liberty and order.103
Kendall, the eternal skeptic, likewise distinguished between the many nationalist efforts
in the Italian peninsula, criticizing what he saw as the ineffectual Italian monarch Charles
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Albert, the squabbling Italian people, and the tyrannical King of Naples, even while
praising the short-lived Venetian republic for holding to the positive standards of the
revolutions.104
Southerners exhibited this nuance not only in their comparisons between
revolutions, but also in their analysis of various elements within the same revolution,
further complicating their final determinations about the positive or negative meaning of
the revolutions. Southern analysts frequently pointed to what they saw as differences
between the various revolutionaries who made up each nationalist movement. In a
speech later published in the Charleston Daily Courier, William R. Taber, Jr., one-time
editor of the Charleston Mercury, distinguished between the people and the leaders of
various nationalist movements when he blamed the leaders for diverting the people away
from republicanism, leading him to support the former but not the latter.105 Even more
common were distinctions between the moderates and extremists within the revolutions
abroad, with southern commentators using extremism as a disqualifier for southern
support even while maintaining their positive view of more moderate revolutionaries.
Reports regularly distinguished between red republicans, who were supposedly
corrupting the revolutions, and the more moderate republicans who upheld the positive
values of the revolutions.106 For example, the Charleston Courier informed readers that
in France, “there is a burst of indignation in all the organs of the moderate parties, of
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every shade, against the atrocious conduct of red republicanism.”107 Newspapermen like
Kendall and Taber argued that red republicans led their more moderate counterparts
astray, pulling them farther from the true republicanism of the revolutions.108 Extremism,
particularly of red republicans, earned condemnation from southerners, but southerners
nonetheless continued to support the extremists’ more moderate counterparts, allowing
them to support certain aspects of the revolutions, while rejecting those they found
threatening.
Southerners also used their beliefs about what a nation should be to alter their
support for nations and revolutions over time. France provides the best example of this
process by which southern analysts continually revised their opinions based on changing
circumstances and the changing values represented by a nationalist movement. France,
originally lauded for the creation of the French Second Republic, later received
significant criticism as a formerly republican revolution that betrayed its original values.
Although the French Revolution of 1848 initially enjoyed support and praise from
southerners, as the French movement became increasingly radicalized, and as LouisNapoleon consolidated his power, southerners became more critical of events in France,
even while holding out hope for the preservation of a republican government.109 After
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the French army invaded and defeated the Roman Republic, however, southern
commentators recognized what they saw as the defeat of republicanism in France and
began to describe France as a despot equal to much-reviled Austria.110 Despite their
criticism of the failed French attempt at republicanism, however, southerners continued
to support other revolutions in Europe, in particular those that they saw France as
oppressing.111 Such a shift of sympathy demonstrates southerners’ commitment to the
values of republicanism and self-determination, as well as their consistent rejection of
extremism and tyranny. Shifting opinions over time reveal southerners’ reliance on
certain principles to guide their analysis of revolutions abroad. Although no consensus
developed as to whether the revolutions were good or bad, the emergence of clear
principles by which southerners analyzed the revolutions reveals the importance of these
values to southerners’ sense of what it meant to be a nation, as well as the importance of
southerners’ nuanced analysis of foreign nationalisms to the development of southern
thought on nationhood.
As southern analysis of nationalist movements in Europe clarified southerners’
sense of which values were beneficial for nations, southerners established their own
criteria for nations and nationalist movements, ultimately crafting a southern vision of
nationalism. The southern vision of nationalism depended upon careful selection of
which values of liberal nationalism southerners believed were important for a nation, and
which values of liberal nationalism southerners rejected as harmful to the nation. The
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values associated with liberal nationalism that southerners retained in their new vision of
nationalism included republicanism, self-determination, and social order. As shown
above, revolutions advancing these ideals earned sympathy and praise from southerners.
On the other hand, the southern vision of nationalism rejected what conservative
southerners saw as extremism; even the most republican of revolutions could earn
criticism for devolving into radicalism, particularly by incorporating ideologies that
southerners saw as subverting order. What emerged was a vision of nationalism limited
to certain principles. This limited vision of nationalism allowed southerners to claim that
liberal ideals such as equality were, in fact, extremism that harmed rather than aided
nations. To exclude ideals such as freedom and equality from the concept of liberal
nationalism required significant ideological manipulation, but southerners proved willing
to do just that in order to attempt to reconcile their respect for certain aspects of liberal
nationalism with the conservative politics that emerged out of a slave society.
The New Orleans Daily Picayune offered a clear depiction of the southern vision
of nationalism that emerged out of the discussions of the revolutions of 1848. The New
Orleans paper defined its ideal nationalism by “the law-abiding nature of true liberty, its
quality of order, its conservative tendencies, its peaceful attributes.”112 The paper praised
Kendall’s analysis of the revolutions, which was characterized by his expression of “a
profound conviction of the conservative tendencies of true liberty… and devotion to the
fundamental principles of republican freedom.”113 As the editors made these claims, they
laid out the southern vision of nationalism: a nationalism that still retained much of the
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liberal ideals of liberty and republicanism, but tempered these ideas with conservatism
such as a respect for social order.
As they watched, analyzed, debated, and evaluated the revolutions of 1848,
southerners did so through the lens of their own values, which combined conservative
tendencies with a respect for the liberal ideals upon which the American nation had been
founded. Their discussions of the revolutions abroad brought these issues to the forefront
of the southern mind, revealing, enhancing, and cementing their importance for
southerners’ sense of nationhood. Southern analysis of the revolutions of 1848 enabled
southerners to form a southern vision of nationalism that borrowed from both liberal
nationalism and conservatism. This southern vision of nationalism would later prove
critical to southern nationalists’ conception of their own nation. The ability to support
parts of movements abroad while rejecting others would also prove critical to later
southern nationalists’ ability to draw comparisons between their own conservative,
slavery-oriented nation and the more liberal aspiring nations abroad.
While southerners viewed the revolutions of 1848 with nuance that allowed them
to create a southern vision of nationhood, they also saw these revolutions as connected,
guiding these southerners to see nationalism as an international movement. Frequently,
southern accounts spoke of the revolutionary fervor that grasped all of Europe, grouping
the revolutions together.114 Southerners did not just group the revolutions, however; they
also believed that the revolutions actively inspired more revolutions. For example, early
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on, the French Revolution received support for the positive influence it would have in
leading other nations to follow in revolution.115 This idea that one revolution would
inspire another ran throughout southern discussion of the revolutions.116 Additionally, by
seeing the American Revolution in revolutions abroad, southerners further learned to put
themselves into the international conversation that was developing about issues of
nationalism.117 Connecting the revolutions, to each other and to their own nationalism,
led southerners to see issues of nationhood and nationalism as part of an international
conversation.
Just as importantly, southern analysts and commentators encouraged people of
one nation to support those of another because of their shared ideals. For example,
southern analysts commonly expressed their belief that all republicans should support
other republics and republicans, linking the movements not just through common ideals,
but through mutual support and sympathy.118 Southerners’ own nation was part of this,
as newspapers played on their readers’ sympathy for European revolutions by claiming
that these revolutions and the American Revolution shared similar inspirations.119 Such
solicitations taught southerners that claiming common national values was an effective
strategy that nationalist movements could utilize to gain support, and that aspiring nations
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could claim legitimacy based on similarity to other nations. This was a critical step in the
development of later southern nationalists’ strategy of winning legitimacy for the
Confederacy through comparisons with foreign nationalisms.
Beginning with the Greek independence movement in the early 1820s and
continuing through the revolutions of 1848, southern commentators and analysts found
much to praise in nationalist movements abroad, particularly in these movements’
expressions of southerners’ own cherished political values. Conservative southerners,
however, also had cause to fear the implications of the liberal ideals of liberty, freedom,
and equality. The contradiction between conservatism and liberal nationalism led
southerners to use their analysis of nationalist movements in Europe to clarify their
beliefs about what a nation and nationalist movement should represent. Southern
commentators learned to continue to laud the values of republicanism and selfdetermination in the face of tyranny, even as they rejected extremism and the fullest
implications of foreign revolutions. The process of evaluating which aspects of the
movements deserved support and which did not guided southerners in developing a
southern vision of nationalism that reconciled respect for some liberal values with a
conservative desire for order. This vision of nationhood, combined with southerners’
new beliefs in the connectedness of nationalist movements, would ultimately allow later
southern nationalists to claim connections between their own anti-liberal aspiring nation
and more liberal nations in Europe as a way of defining the Confederacy, according to the
southern rather than international definition of nationalism.
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Chapter Two
An Internationalizing South, 1850-1859
Sectional conflict in the 1850s brought issues of nationalism closer to home for
southerners. In response to sectional tension, southern commentators turned to the
international perspective on nationhood that they had developed through their analysis of
nationalist movements in Europe, using this international perspective to help them make
sense out of the problems threatening their own nation. While still overwhelmingly
committed to the American nation, the southern elite nonetheless found it useful to
compare conflict at home to the conflicts that they had followed in Europe. Rather than
analyzing events abroad through a domestic lens, southerners now began analyzing their
own nation through an international lens. This international contextualization of the
challenges facing their own nation ultimately helped southerners to conceive of the South
as distinct from the North on issues of nationhood.
The 1850s were a decade largely defined by sectional tension within the United
States. The decade opened with a fierce debate over the extension of slavery into the
territories that the United States had gained from war with Mexico a few years prior.
Prompted by their desire to continue the expansion of slavery, fire-eating southern
radicals, particularly from South Carolina, began calling for southern unity and secession.
Delegates from slave-holding states met twice in Nashville in the summer and fall of
1850 to discuss the protection of what they saw as southern rights. In September,
Congress passed the Compromise of 1850, which, although failing to fully satisfy either
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section, did temporarily calm the tensions, albeit without solving the underlying sectional
issues. However, the spread of abolitionism in the North, and of increasingly radical
defenses of slavery in the South, including calls for re-opening the African slave trade,
would keep tensions simmering throughout the decade. The question of slavery in the
territories exploded again with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. The
anti-slavery Republican Party, formed by abolitionist former Whigs and free soilers,
steadily gained in power throughout the second half of the decade. Amidst this growing
sectional conflict, Americans from both sections began to question their national mission
and values, and their place within the nation. For elite southerners, the events of the
1850s would lead them to intensify their prioritization of slave interests as among the
primary southern interests, preparing them to conceive of the South as distinct from the
North, and from the rest of the United States.1
As southern journalists, politicians, and other opinion-makers analyzed and
debated the issues and events of the 1850s, they turned outward as well as inward, using
their analysis of nationalist movements in Europe to help them understand the issues at
play in the United States. The recently-concluded, and failed, revolutions of 1848 were
still fresh in educated southerners’ minds. The plight of aspiring nations abroad was
further emphasized, and brought home, when refugees from the failed revolutions began
arriving in the United States. Fleeing persecution after their failed attempts to establish
1
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independent nationalities, famous revolutionaries such as Hungarian Louis Kossuth, Irish
patriots John Mitchel and Thomas Meagher, and Italian general Giuseppe Garibaldi
arrived in the United States seeking refuge. The presence of these renowned European
nationalists in the United States in the early 1850s provided a timely opportunity for
southerners, and other Americans, to blend their domestic politics with their analysis of
European nationalisms.
Although initially the nation joined together in welcoming these celebrated
nationalists, domestic politics quickly interfered, and both northerners and southerners
began to discuss the famed revolutionaries in terms of sectional issues.2 Abolitionist
northerners sought to use the arriving nationalists to strengthen their case that freedom
must be advanced both for nationalities abroad and for slaves at home, which placed the
foreign revolutionaries at the center of sectional debate.3 The pro-slavery orientation of
Irishman John Mitchel, meanwhile, gave southerners ammunition with which to try to
negate the abolitionists’ argument.4 Beyond the obvious issues of slavery and freedom,
Americans throughout the nation saw these European nationalists as representatives not
only of aspiring nations abroad, but also of the values that Americans themselves
cherished as necessary for a nation. As northerners’ and southerners’ opinions of the
foreign revolutionaries diverged, then, European revolutionaries’ presence in the US
2
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revealed to southerners what they began to interpret as distinctly southern values,
differing from those of northerners.
Hungarian patriot Louis Kossuth was particularly influential in enhancing
southerners’ perception of the growing distance between their views of national values
and nationalism and those of the North, as southern commentators interpreted their
wariness of Kossuth as distinctly southern, and as differing from northerners’ supposedly
overly-enthusiastic embrace of Kossuth. By the time he arrived in New York in late
1851, Kossuth was well-known and widely-embraced throughout the Atlantic world as a
hero of the cause of Hungarian independence. The exiled leader of Hungary’s defeated
1848 bid for independence from the Austrian Empire, Kossuth had already been feted
during a stay in London. New York likewise embraced him as a hero, and from New
York, Kossuth set off on a tour of the United States, including an excursion into the
South during the spring of 1852. As he toured the United States, he solicited aid for the
Hungarian cause from individuals as well as from the federal government, attracting
much attention, both positive and negative, throughout the nation.5
When Kossuth first arrived in the United States, he was greeted by praise and
adulation by most Americans, southerners included. Most early southern reports on
Kossuth’s visit emphasized his republican virtue and expressed support for him as a
representative of an aspiring nationality for which southerners wished independence.
Newspapers repeatedly avowed their sympathy for Kossuth’s cause, describing Kossuth
and his traveling companions as brave patriots, and praising Kossuth for fighting against
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oppression and for his conviction in the universal principles of rights and freedom.6 As a
writer using the penname “Chat” wrote in Natchez’s Democratic Mississippi Free
Trader, Kossuth would be “honored as the representative of a great idea; he will be
welcomed for his sacrifices, talents, and services.”7 In keeping with this support for the
ideals Kossuth represented, the New Orleans Daily Picayune informed its readers that the
lavish preparations for Kossuth’s arrival in America were only befitting the “most
dangerous foe of European despotism.”8 Kossuth’s status as a representative of the cause
of Hungarian independence gained him praise and sympathy from southerners and other
Americans.
While southerners supported the cause of Hungarian independence, however, they
quickly found the limit to their support of Kossuth, specifically Kossuth’s desire for
American intervention in the Hungarian cause. Although Americans initially believed
that Kossuth was in the US for refuge, they quickly realized that he was attempting not
only to raise money, but also to gain arms and official American intervention in the cause
of Hungarian freedom.9 Despite the initial enthusiasm for Kossuth and the Hungarian
cause, and widespread private fundraising, the United States declined to officially
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intervene.10 Kossuth’s call for intervention went against the long-standing principle,
established in George Washington’s Farewell Address, that the US should not become
unduly involved in foreign affairs. Although some southerners desired intervention when
it meant the possible annexation of nations such as Cuba and Nicaragua, when it came to
the Hungarian case, the majority of southerners saw intervention as an anti-republican
action, and considered intervention to be inherently opposed to American values.11
Due to their desire for non-intervention in the case of Hungary, southerners saw
Kossuth’s requests for aid from the federal government as over-stepping his boundaries
as an exiled republican revolutionary, and as a nationalist in general.12 As George W.
Kendall, the conservative foreign correspondent for the New Orleans Daily Picayune,
wrote from his home in France, only non-intervention in the Hungarian cause would
demonstrate Americans’ commitment to liberty and human freedom. Many of Kendall’s
fellow southerners agreed that intervening to aid Kossuth would harm not only
Hungarian, but also American, republicanism.13 This opposition to intervention in
foreign affairs became increasingly apparent throughout Kossuth’s tour.14 Just as
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southern reports reveal support for Kossuth’s cause because it agreed with their national
values, they opposed his plea for intervention because they saw it as violating their
American principles.15 Southerners’ reaction to Kossuth through the lens of American
ideals demonstrates not only the importance that they attached to these ideals, but also the
extent to which they viewed foreign nationalisms as being in conversation with domestic
principles.
Because southerners believed that the United States should not intervene in
foreign affairs, however sympathetic those affairs may be, they began to criticize Kossuth
and his pleas for intervention.16 As they did so, southern commentators began arguing
that southerners were distinct from the rest of the nation in the fervency of their desire for
non-intervention. Southern newspapers reveal a widespread belief among southern
journalists, editors, and other opinion-makers that southerners were unique among their
fellow Americans in the vehemence of their opposition to intervention. Southern
commentators celebrated the fact that the South had welcomed Kossuth less warmly than
had other sections of the nation, describing the South’s less enthusiastic reception as a
more realistic, pragmatic response to the Hungarian patriot.17 Edward William Johnston,
academic, journalist, and brother of General Joseph E. Johnston, wrote in the Richmond
Whig under the pen name “Il Segretario” that “I desire to know with what sense…

15 “Kossuth's Speech,” New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 1, 1852; “Kossuth,” Montgomery Daily
Alabama Journal, April 16, 1852; “Kossuth in Georgia and South Carolina,” Macon Georgia Telegraph,
April 20, 1852.
16

“Kossuth,” Montgomery Daily Alabama Journal, January 9, 1852; “Kossuth in Georgia and South
Carolina,” Macon Georgia Telegraph, April 20, 1852.
17

“Kossuth in Georgia and South Carolina,” Macon Georgia Telegraph, April 20, 1852; “Baltimore
Correspondence,” New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 26, 1852; “Washington Correspondence,” New
Orleans Daily Picayune, May 10, 1852; Hamlet, “Political Letter,” New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 11,
1852.

60

Southern men can for an instant, countenance the Kossuth doctrine,” stating that the best
way for southerners to show their patriotism was to adhere to non-intervention.18
Similarly, the Daily Alabama Journal of Montgomery, Alabama praised southerners for
ensuring that “the doctrines of Kossuth” were “combated every where throughout the
South, and repudiated with almost perfect unanimity” in every southern state that
Kossuth had visited.19 Southerners’ rejection of Kossuth’s pleas was actually a point of
pride for many in the region.20 For example, the New Orleans Daily Picayune’s
Washington correspondent, writing under the pen name “Le Diable Boiteux,” praised
southern congressmen for their “cold” reception of Kossuth and commended the fact that
southerners had given Kossuth a much-needed window into the reality of Americans’
willingness – or lack thereof – to aid his cause.21 Southern analysts were clear in their
interpretation that the adamant insistence on non-intervention was a distinctly southern
value.
Southern commentators did not just praise their fellow southerners for their
restraint, however; they criticized northerners for excessive enthusiasm toward Kossuth,
further increasing their sense of sectionally divergent responses and values. The Macon
Georgia Telegraph accused northerners of “fulsome toadyism” in their response to
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Kossuth.22 A writer using the name “Chat” wrote to the Natchez Mississippi Free Trader
to criticize the “humbuggery” of the northern response to Kossuth, asserting that the
southern response would be quite different.23 Southern reports claimed that not only was
the South supporting the proper national values, but also that the North was betraying the
same, leading southerners to begin arguing that the North and South held different
national values.
The difference between the southern and the northern reaction to Kossuth’s visit,
and the sense of sectional distance that it brought, was further increased by the
introduction of the issues of slavery and abolition to the discussion of foreign nationalists.
Through the southern press, elite southerners were aware that northerners expected
Kossuth to support abolitionism and to speak out against slavery. They knew that many
northerners believed that abolition was part of the same international cause of freedom as
the revolutions of 1848.24 Elite southerners, however, dedicated to the preservation of
slavery and guided by the limited definition of nationalism they had developed through
their analysis of the revolutions of 1848, claimed to see no connection between
Hungarian freedom and anti-slavery.25 Although Kossuth himself tried to remain
outwardly neutral on the slavery issue, southerners were clear that they interpreted the
meaning of freedom as it related to Hungary and to slavery very differently than did
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northerners.26 Southerners’ awareness of these very different interpretations allowed
them to continue distinguishing between what they were beginning to see as differing
northern and southern national values.
Kossuth’s presence in the United States led southerners to begin discussing
domestic issues as in conversation with foreign nationalisms, helping them to
internationalize their sense of their own nationhood. Just as critically, southern discourse
about Kossuth helped to create the sense among southern opinion-makers that the North
and South held different national values. Through identifying the differing reactions of
the two sections to Kossuth, his pleas for intervention, and his stance on slavery and
freedom, southern opinion-makers began to develop the sense of national values, such as
non-intervention, that they believed were specifically southern in nature. As they did so,
they enhanced their perception that the North and South were fundamentally different on
issues of nationhood. Further, because southerners believed that their non-intervention
was tied to American principles such as republicanism, analysis of Kossuth began
building the idea among southerners that the South represented the purest iteration of the
ideals of the American Revolution, and that southerners adhered more closely to the
principles of the American republic than did their fellow Americans. This idea of
southerners as different from, and superior to, northerners in their national values, and of
southern national values as in conversation with international principles of nationalism,
opened up the possibility of considering the South as an independent nation. Kossuth’s
visit thus prepared southerners to later conceive of a potential southern nation.
Kossuth was not the only revolutionary whose presence and ideology led
southerners to distinguish themselves from northerners on issues of nationalism. Irish
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nationalist John Mitchel, an avowed advocate of slavery, also played an important role in
highlighting the differing values of the North and South. Mitchel, an outspoken
supporter of Irish independence who fled Ireland after being arrested by the British for
treason, subsequently became internationally recognized as a hero of the Irish
independence movement. He arrived in the United States in 1853 and used his talents as
a writer and journalist to continue advocating for Irish independence, while also engaging
with American issues. Unlike most foreign nationalists, Mitchel was adamantly proslavery, and would come to sympathize and identify with the South.27 He used his
platform as the editor of newspapers including the Citizen, published in New York, and
later the Southern Citizen, published in Knoxville, to spread his views, earning him the
support and favor of the slave-holding South. Most famously, Mitchel declared in 1853
in the Citizen that “we deny that it is a crime, or a wrong, or even a peccadillo, to hold
slaves, to buy slaves, to sell slaves, to keep slaves to their work by flogging or other
needful coercion,” adding that “we wish that we had a good plantation well stocked with
healthy Negroes in Alabama.”28 By embracing the southern, rather than northern,
interpretation of slavery, the place of slavery within nationalism, and the meaning of Irish
nationalism for American sectional politics, Mitchel became another international figure
who represented the growing divide between North and South, not just on slavery, but
also on the place of slavery within the ideals of nationalism.
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Due to his pro-slavery politics, southern analysts embraced Mitchel. Southern
newspapers such as the New Orleans Daily True Delta, a Democratic paper founded by
M. G. Davis, were aware of Mitchel’s strong pro-South sentiment, and took care to
inform their audience of Mitchel’s southern sympathies.29 Southern journalists
celebrated Mitchel’s arrival in the South, republished his speeches, and encouraged
fellow southerners to subscribe to the pro-slavery newspaper that Mitchel began in
Knoxville, TN.30 So strong was southern support for the Irish nationalist that South
Carolina Congressman Lawrence M. Keitt even used Mitchel to support his proimmigration stance, arguing that people like Mitchel should be allowed to enter and
enrich the nation.31
This support derived in no small part from the fact that Mitchel’s views on slavery
and nationalism closely resembled the limited vision of nationalism favored by many
elite southerners. Particularly during the revolutions of 1848, southern opinion-makers
had analyzed European nationalist movements through the lens of their desire to preserve
slavery and a hierarchical social and political order; as they did so, they had developed a
more limited, conservative definition of nationalism that embraced values such as
republicanism while rejecting values such as equality. Mitchel’s views seemed to
validate this limited southern vision of nationalism. For Mitchel, like southern slaveholders, slavery was compatible with nationalist values such as republicanism. Such a
stance was made possible by the fact that Mitchel also shared the southern elite’s belief in
29
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limited freedom, in which nations, rather than individuals, deserved liberty.32 Further,
Mitchel was clear that his sympathies were not just with slavery, but also with the South
and what he saw as the southern vision of the nation. The South’s agricultural nature,
racial hierarchy, and opposition to change appealed to his sense of romantic nationalism.
Critically, Mitchel also saw similarities between the oppression of the Irish at the hands
of the British, and what he perceived to be the growing oppression of slaveholders at the
hands of northern abolitionists.33
Southern commentators appreciated that, unlike many European revolutionaries,
Mitchel’s vision of nationalism more closely resembled their own. As Louisiana
politician Frank H. Hatch explained, slavery was all too often a casualty of overly
enthusiastic nationalists, as “men who have been engaged in national struggles for
freedom throughout the civilized world, have too frequently abandoned their reason, to
the guidance of their feelings, and in their zeal for the distraction of political oppression,
have often blindly included useful and necessary social institutions.”34 Demonstrating
recognition that Mitchel, unlike most foreign nationalists, did not interpret nationalism
and abolitionism as inherently linked, the Democratic Baton Rouge Daily Advocate cited
Mitchel as proof that “the bold assumption that foreigners are Abolitionists” was nothing
more than, as the title of the article put it, “a stupid fallacy.”35 Mitchel’s pro-slavery
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beliefs opened up the possibility in southern minds that their limited definition of
nationalism, that rejected concepts such as individual freedom and equality, was a
legitimate interpretation of the nationalist movements they followed abroad.
Southern analysis of Mitchel helped not only to confirm southern views of nation,
but also to highlight the differences between the North and South. Northerners’ growing
commitment to abolition, and southerners’ intensifying defense of slavery, seemed to be
creating differing sectional beliefs about the proper values of the nation, and Mitchel’s
views provided a clear illustration of this separation. Mitchel’s pro-slavery beliefs
confounded northern abolitionists, who wanted Mitchel – as with Kossuth and the other
‘48ers – to support the cause of freedom from slavery due to its similarity to the
nationalists’ fight for national freedom. Southern journalists were aware of northern
expectations, and made a point to report on northerners’ reaction to Mitchel’s pro-slavery
beliefs. The Charleston Mercury’s Boston correspondent, for example, informed his
readers of northerners’ confusion at the idea that a man could be an “apostle of Irish
Freedom” and still support slavery. The correspondent made it clear, however, where his
own sympathies lay, praising Mitchel for holding strong to his pro-slavery beliefs.36 This
confusion pleased southern slave-holders; as the Richmond Whig gleefully reported,
northern abolitionists were quite incorrect in their initial expectations that Mitchel would
support the cause of emancipation.37 Mitchel’s beliefs clearly revealed the growing
distance between northern and southern interpretations of nationalism and of the proper
values of a nation.
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Mitchel’s pro-slavery views had significant ramifications for northern and
southern views of nation. By challenging abolitionists’ definition of freedom, Mitchel’s
views seemed to allow for the possibility that the more limited, conservative southern
definitions of national values could be accepted as a legitimate part of the international
discussion of the meaning of nationalism. Mitchel seemed to prove to southerners that it
was, in fact, possible, and consistent with the principles of nationalism as interpreted by
foreign nationalists, to support both national freedom and slavery.38 John Mitchel and his
unusual combination of liberal nationalism and pro-slavery beliefs represented an
alternative vision of nationalism to that expressed by northern abolitionists, and one that
was far more acceptable to the South. As southerners discussed Mitchel, then, they
began to develop a sense of their views of nationalism as distinct from those of
northerners, but as worthy of discussion within the international framework of
nationalism, preparing southerners to conceive of an independent southern nation
premised upon a limited definition of nationalism.
Foreign nationalists such as Kossuth and Mitchel brought the issues of
nationalism home for the southern elite, right in the middle of the domestic American
sectional tension. As northerners and southerners both analyzed these figures, and sought
to use them to their own ends, they increasingly developed different views, not only of
these European nationalists, but also of the ideals of nationalism. Kossuth’s pleas for
intervention led southerners to celebrate the value of non-intervention that they believed
the South alone still defended, creating the perception of differing southern and northern
national values. Similarly, Mitchel’s pro-slavery views confounded northerners’ belief in
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national freedom and freedom of slaves as related, leading southerners to recognize again
the differing values, and visions of nation, developing in the two sections. Through
discussing international figures of nationalism, southerners increasingly defined their
own views of nationalism as in opposition to those of the North.
Revolutionaries who traveled to the US were not the only aspect of European
nationalist movements that led antebellum southerners to use an international perspective
to analyze and understand the sectional tension in their nation in the 1850s. While the
European revolutionaries were useful in helping southerners to develop a southern vision
of nationalism, broader general analysis of aspiring nations in Europe helped southerners
to express their fears about the sectional tension in the United States. The revolutions of
1848 that southerners had supported as examples of positive enactments of nationhood
now, in defeat, provided examples of the kind of dynamic that southerners feared was
developing in their own nation. Southerners were concerned that the North was growing
more powerful and that the South was losing its political influence within the union, and
they turned to comparisons with defeated nationalities in Europe to help them express
these anxieties. In doing so, they further clarified their sense of the South’s national
values, its place within the nation, and the possibility of an independent southern nation.
Southern slave-holders felt threatened by the growing abolitionist movement in
the North in the 1850s. Antebellum southerners were apprehensive that efforts to restrict
slavery in the western territories, the growth of abolitionism, and, later, the rise of the
anti-slavery Republican Party, indicated northern attempts to end what slave-holders saw
as their right to own, buy, and sell slaves. Furthermore, states’ rights southerners feared
that northerners were increasingly consolidating power within the federal government,
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which would limit slave states’ ability to protect slavery. The slave-holding elite
prioritized slavery as the critical southern value, and therefore they interpreted attempts
to end slavery as efforts to limit the ability of the South to advance and to protect its
interests within national politics. This southern elite thus feared what they believed to be
an impending southern oppression at northern hands. Such concerns about oppression
were greatly exaggerated, and premised, for the most part, upon anticipated rather than
actual developments. The slave-holding elite nonetheless feared that the South was
losing its influence to an ever-more-powerful North that was increasingly opposed to
southern interests, and that this loss of influence would open the door for the North to
oppress the South.39
The oppression of the aspiring nationalities in Europe that southerners had
supported a few years prior provided antebellum southerners with a language for
expressing these anxieties about being oppressed at the hands of the growing anti-slavery
forces in the North. Southern commentators largely interpreted failed aspiring nations
abroad as small states fighting, and losing, against the power of large, centralized
governments. They likewise believed that the defeat of the revolutions amounted to the
oppression of the failed nationalities at the hands of the victorious, and tyrannical,
monarchs and empires. The defeat of revolutions in Hungary, Italy, and elsewhere in
Europe thus stood as sharp examples in southern minds of the dangers that could result
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when national power was abused, and therefore of the dangers that the South faced if the
North was able to consolidate power and pursue its anti-slavery agenda. As Mississippi
Congressman A. G. Brown declared at a states’ rights meeting described as “glorious” by
the Natchez Mississippi Free Trader, the South “wanted no political association like that
of Ireland to England, Hungary to Austria, or Poland to Russia.”40 The partitions of
Poland likewise furnished an example of a region supposedly destroyed by the overassertion of external power. For example, a Charleston Mercury journalist using the pen
name “Brutus” wrote that an “unscrupulous” North would do to an unprotected South
what Europe had done to Poland.41 These defeats stood in southerners’ minds as clear
examples of the victory of oppression and tyranny. Because southerners feared what they
saw as the looming oppression of the South at the hands of a centralizing North, they
drew comparisons between the oppression that they observed in Europe and the
oppression that they were afraid they would face at home.42
The comparisons that southerners drew between the defeat of aspiring nations in
Europe, and the oppression that they feared at the hands of the North, were exaggerated,
and more rhetorical than realistic in nature. Through most of the 1850s, southerners did
not yet conceive of the South as an aspiring nation, which complicated the comparisons.
The fact that the oppression they feared was largely anticipatory further challenged these
comparisons. Regardless, these comparisons were remarkably widespread throughout
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southern discourse in the 1850s. Southern opinion-makers found comparisons between
oppression in Europe and the supposed oppression of the South to be a compelling way
strengthen their case for the protection and advancement of slavery. As Virginia
politician Charles James Faulkner said in an address to the National Democratic
Convention, “it was [abolitionists’] purpose to inaugurate the North as the dominant
section. The subjugation of Ireland by force, division, and bribery, was to be reproduced
on this continent, and the Southern States were to be reduced to a mere provincial
appendage.”43 Such comparisons allowed southern opinion-makers to dramatize the
stakes at risk in what they saw as a battle to preserve slavery, and to vividly convey to
their audiences what they perceived as the severity of the situation.44 In addition to
providing a convenient rhetorical device, the widespread usage of these comparisons
reveals that southerners, particularly radical southerners, were beginning to understand
sectional tensions through an international lens, and were beginning to see the South as a
unit that could be compared to aspiring nations – as a possible potential nation, rather
than as a section of nation.
Although many of these comparisons were relatively vague as to how, exactly, the
North was oppressing the South, southern commentators did sometimes spell out the
causes of their concerns over growing northern power. States’ rights, and the North’s
supposed violation thereof, was one of these concerns that southerners processed through
an international lens, helping them to clarify not only their fears of northern power, but
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also the southern values that would best forestall northern abuses. In particular,
southerners often expressed the belief that states’ rights would prevent the South from
facing the oppression suffered by aspiring nations in Europe. According to Georgia
politicians John Bailey and Zachariah Harman, states’ rights were the South’s only hope
to hold out against free soilers and to escape a doom worse than Poland or Hungary.45
States’ rights was no less than a main goal of southern politics; a private citizen, seeking
to hold his Congressmen accountable, wrote to the Macon Weekly Georgia Telegraph
that southern senators were elected to promote the rights of the South, and that for them
to do otherwise would be the same as if Garibaldi, the renowned Italian nationalist, joined
his enemies the Austrians.46 For the North to violate states’ rights, southerners argued,
was for the North to recreate the subjugation of aspiring nationalities in Europe. States’
rights, therefore, were the South’s best defense against similar oppression.
While states’ rights was important to southerners’ defense against what they
feared would be European-style oppression by the North, slavery, of course, was their
central concern. Slavery was at the heart of the sectional tensions that dominated the
nation in 1850, and was thus central to southerners’ explanations of how they felt the
North was oppressing, or would oppress, the South. Northern attempts to restrict slavery
were the most common cause southerners gave to explain why and how the North was
oppressing the South.
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Southerners used comparisons between the supposed plight of the slaveholding
South and that of defeated nations in Europe to criticize abolitionists for seeking to limit
the power and therefore the supposed rights of the slaveholding states. At the Nashville
Convention of 1850, James Lyons of Virginia argued that in tampering with and seeking
to restrict slavery, the North was replicating the most despotic government on earth and
behaving worse than Austria did toward Hungary.47 Such comparisons were also
common at the end of the 1850s, as sectional tensions would eventually reach the
breaking point. For example, William McWillie, governor of Mississippi, informed the
legislature of his state that if an abolitionist were elected president in 1860, such an event
would make the South into Ireland or Poland.48 Threatening the institution of slavery,
according to these southerners, created the possibility for serious abuse of the South.
While these comparisons were used throughout the 1850s, they were most
common during discussions of the territorial expansion of slavery. Southern powerholders feared that if Congress was able to limit slavery in the territories, the balance of
power between slave and free states would begin to favor free states, enabling Congress
to end slavery altogether. Although a series of compromises kept the balance largely
equal, northerners did, in fact, attempt to limit slavery in the territories through efforts,
albeit often failed, efforts such as the Wilmot Proviso. Despite being fairly unsuccessful
at restricting slavery, the attempts by northern politicians to restrict slavery in the
territories represented, in many southern minds, an attempt by northerners to seize power
from the South, which was particularly concerning as this power would then be used to
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end slavery. Debates over slavery in the territories were thus key targets of southern cries
of oppression.
In particular, the debate surrounding the eventual Compromise of 1850, which
temporarily settled the issue of territorial slavery, saw frequent references by southern
opinion-makers to oppressed nationalities in Europe. During this time of crisis,
comparing the supposed oppression of the South with the oppression of aspiring nations
in Europe helped southerners to express their concerns about the sectional dynamic in the
US. Most commonly, these comparisons took the form of claiming that by restricting
slavery in the territories, the North was going to render the South as oppressed as a
defeated nationality in Europe. For example, as early as 1849, a journalist calling himself
“Sylvias” was expressing concern in the Macon Georgia Telegraph that the North would
reduce the South to the condition of long-oppressed Ireland.49 As a citizen of Claiborne
wrote to the Natchez Mississippi Free Trader, the South had no more protections from
the North than Ireland had from Great Britain.50 The Macon Georgia Telegraph critiqued
Henry Clay, who helped author the Compromise, as being as detrimental to his
countrymen as was the betrayal of Artur Gorgey, a Hungarian revolutionary who was
accused of treason and therefore of helping defeat the cause of Hungarian freedom.51
This same paper later implored its readers to take warning from Ireland, asserting that if
the South submitted to the restriction of slavery now, there would be no limit to the
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northern crusade against slavery.52 To southern commentators, if a compromise was not
reached that allowed for the expansion of slavery into the territories, the South would be
doomed at the hands of the North, and crushed, just like aspiring nations in Europe.
Private citizens and journalists making these comparisons followed the lead of
southern politicians, who frequently compared the oppression of limiting territorial
slavery with the oppression of failed nationalities in Europe in their speeches and in
official debates. Albert G. Brown, Democratic politician and former governor of
Mississippi, made frequent usage of international comparisons to dramatize his fears of
the limitation of slavery. During the crisis of 1850, he implored his fellow congressmen
to “picture to yourselves Hungary, resisting the powers of Austria and Russia” to best
approximate the sentiment and fears of “southrons.”53 Whig Henry W. Hilliard of
Alabama agreed that “if we submit, we have examples before our eyes of the condition to
which we shall be reduced. Ireland – luxuriant, fertile, degraded, starving Ireland – is a
picture of what we should be.”54 At an 1850 political meeting in Macon, Representative
William H. Stiles of Georgia, former chargé d’affaires to Austria, stated that the North’s
strategy on the issue of territorial expansion was the same as that adopted by tyrannies
such as Austria when it conquered Hungary.55 Other politicians including Senator Robert
M. T. Hunter of Virginia, the future Confederate secretary of state, and James Henry
Hammond, outspoken defender of slavery and states’ rights, concurred that giving the
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Union into the hands of anti-slavery advocates would replicate the oppression of Ireland,
Poland, and Hungary.56 These southern politicians used their platform and visibility to
advance the idea that the restriction of slavery in the territories would be similar to the
oppression of aspiring nations of Europe at the hands of European tyrants, helping them
to dramatize their defense of slavery. These international comparisons gave these
southerners a language for expressing their fears and for enhancing their defense of
slavery, while also internationalizing southerners’ sense of their own nationhood.
To southerners, the expansion of slavery was necessary to protect the rights of the
South. Any attempts by the North to limit slavery, then, were oppressive. By turning to
comparisons with defeated nationalities in Europe, southerners sought to portray the
extent of the oppression the South faced, or feared it would face, at the hands of the
North. In doing so, southerners used an international lens to shape their sense of their
place within their own nation, and of the values and institutions that were necessary to the
preservation of that nation.
These international comparisons tapped in to an important element of southern
thought on nationalism, and began to prepare influential southerners to see the South as a
potential player in the international conversation about nationhood. Accordingly, as
antebellum southerners began to debate secession, they utilized international comparisons
to explore the possibility of an independent southern nation, using an international
context to highlight both the benefits and drawbacks of secession as a course of action.
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The connection between aspiring nations in Europe and a potential southern
nation, independent of the rest of the United States, first arose at the many southern
conventions held throughout the South in the 1850s in order to deal with the sectional
crisis. Although these meetings were far from unanimous in their debates over the
possibility of secession, and, in fact, most of the delegates still advised loyalty to the
Union, comparisons between the South and defeated nations of Europe nonetheless
proliferated at these events as southerners explored the place of the South within the
nation. For example, at the Nashville Convention, held with the purpose of uniting the
South to protect southern interests, Felix Huston, ardent secessionist and former general
of the Army of the Republic of Texas, informed his fellow delegates that southern states
must cultivate independence, lest they “sink below the miserable state of Ireland.”57
Southern conventions brought southerners together to discuss the South’s place within
the nation, to determine the best way to protect southern interests, and even to explore the
idea of secession. As southerners explicitly contemplated the South’s place within the
Union, southerners turned to European examples to help them understand what was at
stake in this conflict.
Outside of the conventions, comparisons between the South and aspiring nations
in Europe helped southerners to weigh the potential consequences and possibilities of
secession, playing a critical role in shaping antebellum southern opinion on secession.
Many southern commentators used comparisons to help them understand various
hypothetical situations in which their state may or may not want to secede. For example,
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the Macon Georgia Telegraph explored the options available to the state of Georgia in
case South Carolina should secede, concluding that for Georgia to join the Union in a war
against a seceded South Carolina would be the equivalent of an Irishman being forced to
fight with the English against Ireland.58 Other southerners used international
comparisons to ponder the likely consequences of a war between a seceding South and a
North that fought to keep the South in the Union. A. G. Brown of Mississippi often
utilized this type of comparison, and to him, these comparisons showed that secession
could and should be embraced if necessary. Brown stated that if the North threatened
slavery, the South should immediately dissolve the Union, and that the North should then
look to the passion with which Hungary fought against Austria to see how hard the South
would fight.59 Many southerners concurred that the South would actually fight harder
against the North than Hungary, Ireland, and other defeated nations had fought against
their foes, which would ensure southern victory.60 Southerners also suggested that such a
war would have potentially negative consequences for the Union; for example, the
Macon Georgia Telegraph believed that no less than the whole world would be watching
such a war, lest the North recreate the defeat of Poland or Hungary in the South.61 Such
comparisons bolstered southerners’ belief that secession could be a viable course of
action. Although stopping short of calling for secession, these international analyses
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helped southerners shape their sense of the potential benefits that might occur should the
South secede.
If international comparisons were useful for understanding the possible
consequences of southern secession, more radical early secessionists also found them
helpful in making their case that secession would not only be possible, but also would
eventually be necessary. Georgia politicians Bailey and Harman, for example, asserted
that, in order to prevent the South from suffering the much-feared fate of becoming
another Poland or Hungary, southern secession may be necessary.62 An invitee to a mass
meeting to discuss slavery in the territories concurred that secession may be necessary, as
the current union between the North and South was that of Russia to Hungary.63 A
journalist for the Macon Georgia Telegraph warned as early as 1849 that the North’s
aggressions would either reduce the South to Ireland, or force disunion.64 These
southerners agreed that, if the nation continued on its path, the South would eventually be
forced to take action to protect its rights, or it would face similar oppressions as defeated
nationalities in Europe. The southerners who deployed these comparisons used them to
bolster their case that secession was, or would be, necessary, making international
comparisons an important part of the early debate over secession.
While international comparisons helped early secessionists make their case,
secessionists were not the only southerners who used international comparisons to bolster
their side in the debate over secession. Just as secessionists believed international
comparisons pointed to the potential favorability of secession, anti-secessionist
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southerners believed that comparisons proved that secession was the incorrect course of
action, and they used international comparisons to oppose secession. In a direct rebuttal
to the secessionists, William John Grayson, a states’ rights, proslavery, anti-secessionist
South Carolina politician and journalist writing in the Charleston Courier under the pen
name “Curtius,” argued that the South should not secede, as the section had yet to face
the oppression suffered by Hungary and Poland, and therefore secession would not be
justified. Grayson revealed that in his opinion, the equation of the South with defeated
nationalities in Europe was “midsummer nights dreams and nothing more – words
merely, without any meaning.” Showing unusual insight, Grayson then recognized that
repetition, even false, has an impact, and that the secessionists had repeated their belief
that the South was like Hungary or Poland often enough that they were wearing people
down and convincing them there must be an issue.65 As Grayson reveals, even though
the comparisons were false and not all southerners supported them, they nonetheless were
having an impact on southern thought on issues of nationalism. His comments also
demonstrate that southerners on both sides of the secession debate used international
comparisons to make their case.
Other southerners, also taking an anti-secession stance, looked to Europe as an
example of the harms that would befall the South should the South secede, rather than
should the South remain in the union. In particular, these critiques focused on the
problems that came with dividing a nation. The Whig newspaper the Victoria Texian
Advocate warned readers to look to the harms that had befallen a divided Poland to
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understand the dangerous consequences of a national division.66 On a similar note, a
citizen writing to William E. Woodruff’s Little Rock Arkansas State Gazette and
Democrat declared that “let the Union be destroyed” and “we plant a fresh dagger in the
bosoms of the Mazzinis, the Garibaldis, and the Kossuths of Italy and Hungary.”67 For
some southerners, defeated nations in Europe furnished examples of the harms, rather
than benefits, of secession. Antebellum southerners on both sides of the secession
debate, then, looked to comparisons with Europe to support their arguments, revealing
the centrality of international perspective to southerners’ sense of their own nationhood.
As fire-eaters called for secession and southerners contemplated this idea,
international comparisons helped them to process possible outcomes. Southerners on
both sides of the issue used comparisons to support their cases. The international lens
through which southerners were analyzing domestic concerns was thus important in
shaping the debate surrounding secession, as well as to helping guide southerners in
considering the South as potentially separate from the rest of the American nation.
The majority of antebellum comparisons between the South and defeated nations
in Europe reveal a largely positive interpretation of revolutions abroad, but not all
southerners agreed that the South was, or would be, similar to foreign aspiring nations.
Anti-secessionists were among the southerners who viewed events in Europe through a
negative, rather than positive, lens, but this negative interpretation was not limited to the
secession debate. Because the liberal ideals of freedom and equality that were embodied
in foreign revolutions threatened not only slavery, but also southern values of social
order, conservative southerners feared the liberal nationalism emerging in Europe.
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Although most international comparisons praised the aspiring nations in Europe
and held them up as equivalents for the South, some southerners saw more similarities
between European politics and northern politics. Previewing the conservative arguments
that would emerge during the Civil War, some antebellum southerners criticized
European-style nationalisms, blaming European ideology for the problems in the North.
For example, the speaker at a Whig convention asserted that the reason why the North
had betrayed the previously peaceful union between the sections was that it had been
poisoned by “wild political theories” such as communism and red republicanism from
France, Italy, and Germany.68 Similarly, a reviewer for the Southern Quarterly Review
noted with approval that Edward J. Pringle, author of The People, had “detected in this
country symptoms of disease kindred to the fatal maladies which have infected
Europe.”69 Getting more specific about who, exactly, was being infected by these
dangerous doctrines, a self-proclaimed “Lynchburg Virginian” wrote that the northerndominated Congress was trying to create European-style radicalism.70 Because of the
threat that liberal European political ideals posed to southern conservatism, for some
southerners the northern threat was best illustrated through comparisons between the
North and Europe, not the South and Europe. Whether praising or criticizing aspiring
European nations, then, southerners found comparisons with European nationalism useful
for exploring the sectional tensions between the North and the South.
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International comparisons were helpful to southern commentators seeking to
dramatize sectional issues, but southerners also turned to international comparisons to
understand domestic issues that were not overtly sectional, revealing the extent to which
they were increasingly understanding their own concerns, sectional or not, within an
international framework. In the debate over annexation of foreign territories, southerners
who both supported and opposed annexation used international comparisons to make
their cases, utilizing analysis of foreign nationalisms to explore the concept of the
boundaries and actions of their own nation. For some southerners, this meant that
aspiring nations in Europe revealed the benefits of a more territorially limited nation, as
annexation restricted the self-determination of the annexed territory. The Richmond
Whig, for example, was an outspoken opponent of annexation, and frequently compared
American annexation of Texas and Mexican territories to the division of Poland by
European powers. In fact, the Whig declared such annexation to be nothing less than the
“most enormous public crime, which had been perpetuated since the first partition of
Poland.”71 The Alexandria Gazette concurred as to the harms of annexation, declaring
that the United States should not annex Cuba as doing so would be an act of despotism,
and the dire fates of Poland and Hungary show what despotism brings.72 For some
southerners, Europe’s defeated nations furnished examples of the harms of annexation.
For others, however, these comparisons were absolutely false, and annexation, as
shown by events in Europe, was a beneficial way to enhance the nation. The Daily
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Richmond Examiner denounced the Whig’s comparison, calling it “madness” to say that
in annexing Texas, the American people were “equally guilty with the Holy Alliance in
their detestable partition of Poland, and with the ruthless and savage Cossacks, who have
crushed Hungary.”73 For the Examiner, the case studies of Hungary and Poland revealed
only what the annexation of Texas was not. The editors of the Examiner were not the
only southerners to believe that European history supported the idea of annexation; the
New Orleans Daily Picayune wrote that Cuba was to the United States what Lombardy
was to Sardinia, implying that both were parts of a larger whole that should be united.74
The fact that southerners across the political spectrum were using comparisons with
nationalist movements in Europe to advance their beliefs about the appropriate actions
and borders of their nation shows the extent to which this international lens had become
critical to southern understanding of domestic events and of their own nationality.
In the years following the revolutions of 1848, southerners increasingly turned to
comparisons with defeated and aspiring nations in Europe to help them understand their
own domestic affairs. On issues such as secession and annexation, southerners from both
ends of the spectrum used international comparisons to make their point. This rich
debate, incorporating the issues of European nationalisms on both sides, reveals the
importance of international comparisons to southerners’ developing sense of the
boundaries and limits of their own nation, including the South’s place within that nation.
The 1850s were a decade of sectional tension and turmoil in which southerners
increasingly saw the South and its values as distinct from the rest of the nation.
Particularly in times of greatest conflict, southerners began to analyze domestic issues
73

“The Cloven Foot,” Richmond Enquirer, September 18, 1849.

74

“Something of a Parallel,” New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 8, 1859.

85

within an international context to help them understand the issues and prove their
arguments. Instead of using American values to analyze nationalisms abroad,
southerners were now using analyses of nationalist movements in Europe to clarify and
shape their own national values, preparing them to ultimately use an international lens to
help them shape a southern nation.
Analysis of the arrival of foreign revolutionaries in the US, and the creation of
comparisons between the oppression of aspiring nationalities abroad and the oppression
that southerners feared at the hands of the North, helped southerners to clarify their
position on sectional and national issues and to make sense out of the place of their
region within the nation. Debate over the famous nationalists led southern commentators
to believe that the South took a distinctly southern perspective on issues of nationalism.
Comparisons of oppression, real and feared, helped southerners express their fears, not
only about slavery, but also of the place of the South within the nation. As debate over
secession intensified, southerners on both sides of the issue used international
comparisons to seek support for their position. The widespread nature of international
comparisons, appearing at all points of the southern political spectrum, reveals the extent
to which southerners were using an international lens to shape their beliefs about their
own nation in the 1850s.
Southern commentators’ international analysis of sectional issues throughout the
1850s prepared southerners to think of the South as an individual player on issues of
nationhood. These debates clarified southerners’ beliefs about the desired values of
nationhood, and intensified their growing sense that the North and South had different
national values. In a decade of conflict and division, European nationalisms provided
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southerners with a model of nationalism that they could debate and utilize at will to help
them understand their own national issues. This international contextualization of
domestic issues, and this growing sense of differing northern and southern values, would
be critical to preparing southerners to consider secession in 1860.
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Chapter Three
Internationalizing Secession, 1860-1861
In December of 1860, South Carolina seceded from the United States.
Throughout the winter of 1860-1861 and the spring of 1861, ten more slave states would
follow and would form the Confederate States of America. As these states left the Union
and created a southern nation, secessionists and southern nationalists faced the necessity
of explaining the causes of their secession and defining the national mission of the new
southern nation. Legitimizing and justifying secession and crafting a clear national
identity were necessary to win support both from fellow southerners, as well as, ideally,
from an international audience. Accordingly, even before they seceded, secessionists
began the process of laying out their case for secession and for an independent southern
nation, developing a variety of arguments with which they defended the necessity of
southern independence.
As they made their case for secession and for an independent southern nation,
southern nationalists turned to their antebellum tradition of looking abroad and using
analysis of nationalist movements in Europe to refine their opinions about the appropriate
forms of nationhood. In the winter of secession and the early months of the Confederacy,
when the necessity of creating a justification for the southern nation was most critical,
prominent southern nationalists began crafting comparisons between the aspiring
southern nation and aspiring nations in Europe in order to claim a precedent for their
actions. Southern print discourse reveals that secessionists argued that their actions
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followed the models presented by aspiring European nations in seceding from empires;
they claimed that the same values of anti-tyranny and self-government motivated both
southern nationalists and nationalists in Europe; and they asserted that the success of the
Italian Risorgimento heralded similar success for the South, particularly focusing on
international diplomatic recognition. These international comparisons provided
secessionists with a means of justifying secession and of positioning their nationalist
movement as one of many seeking support in the middle of the nineteenth century.
As southern nationalists seceded from the United States and began the process of
creating their own nation, they were very aware of the need to present their new nation,
and its reason for existence, in a positive way, both to fellow southerners as well as to the
international community. They developed a variety of arguments through which they
sought to justify and explain secession, and therefore to defend the need for a southern
nation. One of the most widespread southern arguments for secession was that secession
was a legitimate action undertaken to protect the rights of southerners against abuse by
the North. Secessionists argued that secession was a peaceful redress for harms that the
North had perpetrated, and would perpetrate, against the South, particularly citing
attempts to limit slavery as evidence of this expected harm. Further, they claimed that
independent states had voluntarily entered into a compact when the United States was
created, and that these states could thus leave the union at any time.1 Such arguments
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underlay the claims that the South deserved independence due to the European-style
tyranny it faced at the hands of the North.
A related argument was the claim that southern states were following the example
of their revolutionary forebears by asserting the sovereignty of the people. Southern
secessionists argued that they seceded to protect their rights just as the colonists had
declared independence from Great Britain in order to protect their rights.2 Indeed,
Confederates styled themselves as heirs to the American Revolution, arguing that they
were the true protectors of the ideals upon which the United States had been founded,
while the North had drifted away from the original concept of the union.3 Comparing
their actions to those of the revered founders of the United States, while on the surface
paradoxical for a people breaking away from that same nation, bolstered southerners’
claims that their secession resembled a widely-recognized precedent of nation formation.
Although secessionists cloaked their movement in language of rights, ultimately,
the protection of slavery was the primary motivation for creating the Confederacy.
Because human equality and freedom played such a large role in liberal nationalism,
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however, slavery created a challenge for Confederates who attempted to present a
sanitized argument for secession. Nonetheless, for many secessionists, slavery was at the
heart of the southern cause, and the need to defend slavery was the key impetus for
secession.4
While slavery and rights-based arguments were among the most prominent ways
in which southerners justified and defined their new nation, southern nationalists also
envisioned an international context to their nation that they argued legitimized their
efforts to create a new nation. Southern opinion-makers sought to justify secession by
contextualizing their attempt at nation-building within an international framework of
nineteenth century nationalist movements in Europe. Secessionists and early
Confederates argued that their attempt to create a new nation was part of a larger global
spread of nationalism, and that the Confederacy was thus one of many aspiring nations
deserving independence.5
Claiming equivalence between the southern attempt at nation-building and
European nationalist movements required significant manipulation of both facts and
ideals. The aspiring southern nation was fundamentally premised upon the defense of
slavery, and therefore differed significantly in its ideology and principles from the more
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liberal revolutions with which southerners claimed similarity. Southern analysts,
however, proved willing to ignore the differences between southern nationalism and
nationalisms in Europe. They used the limited vision of nationalism that they had
developed through analysis of the revolutions of 1848 in order to avoid discussion of the
liberal values of aspiring nations abroad that conflicted with a conservative desire for
hierarchical power and social structure. They also built upon the anticipatory
comparisons of the 1850s to argue that slavery was compatible with liberal nationalism
by claiming that the North’s attempts to end the supposed right to slavery in the South
were the equivalent of tyrannical actions undertaken by European despots. Through
these manipulations, secessionists and southern nationalists used international
comparisons to legitimize secession and the southern nation, despite the contradictions
between slavery and the prevailing mid-nineteenth century views of nationhood.
The most common international comparisons used by southern commentators
focused on the values, causes, goals, and ideals supposedly shared by aspiring nations
abroad and by the aspiring southern nation. As they built these comparisons,
secessionists turned to the limited vision of nationalism they had clarified through
analysis of the revolutions of 1848, which aided them in rejecting ideals such as equality
that contradicted slavery, and in re-defining values such as liberty and self-government to
exclude the rights of slaves. Using this limited vision of nationalism, southern
nationalists claimed that the aspiring southern nation shared values such as selfgovernment and the fight against tyranny with aspiring nations in Europe, and thus that
the aspiring southern nation was seeking the same noble causes as those represented by
more popular nationalist movements abroad.
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Southern nationalists were particularly fervent in arguing that the South was
seceding in order to be free of northern tyranny, which they claimed was similar to the
tyranny that had led to nationalist movements throughout Europe. The fight against
tyranny had been one of the national ideals that antebellum southerners had identified as
appropriate for an aspiring nation through antebellum analysis of the revolutions of 1848,
and thus was one of the values to which they now turned in their own nation-building
efforts. As they had observed nationalist movements in Europe, southern analysts had
largely concurred that aspiring nations in Europe had fought against despotism, and that
this was a worthy fight. The newly united and independent Italian nation stood as the
clearest example in southern minds of a nation that had triumphed despite long suffering
at the hands of despotic powers and tyrants; time and again, various southern writers
contrasted the despotism of Austria with the Italian desire for freedom and
independence.6 Although by far the most successful example, Italy was not the only
aspiring nation that southerners believed had faced tyranny and despotism. Southern
journalists, politicians, and other opinion-makers had long favored Hungary’s fight
against despotic Austria; blamed Great Britain for perpetuating similar tyranny against
Ireland that it had once wielded against the American colonists; and lamented that Poland
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was “degraded” by “odious despotism.”7 This long understanding of Italy and other
aspiring nations as oppressed by despotism provided secessionists with a natural point of
comparison when they began to argue that they were also held down by tyranny. This
strategy of comparing tyrannies was appealing not only on the basis of its perceived
ability to situate the aspiring southern nation within an international context, but also
because it fit so closely with southern nationalists’ efforts to claim that the South seceded
in order to preserve its rights.
Building from the antebellum understanding of aspiring nations abroad as seeking
to overthrow despotism, as well as from antebellum equation of abolitionism with
European tyranny, southern commentators compared the actions of the North to those of
European despots, claiming that northern actions toward the South constituted similar
oppression as that faced by aspiring, and defeated, nations in Europe.8 In order to bolster
their claim that secession was necessary in order to protect southern rights, southern
nationalists equated the North with the military despotism of Russia and argued that an
unchecked North would perpetrate abuses worse than those suffered in defeated
nationalist movements in Venice and Poland.9 James L. Bowen, a Virginian of northern
origin, wrote to his fellow Virginians that the Union was acting as a despot of the South,
7
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just like Great Britain was a despot of Ireland.10 The Richmond Daily Dispatch, one of
Richmond’s most circulated newspapers, edited by conservative James A. Cowardin,
claimed that northern tyranny was worse than that perpetrated against Italy by the
dreaded “King Bomba,” or Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies.11 This idea was apparent in
the official political arena as well. Speaking to the Alabama secession convention,
delegate James S. Clark argued that the South was “oppressed to the earth by a system…
more intolerable than that of despotic Austria, and impelled likewise.”12 Secessionists
believed that claiming that northerners acted like despots such as Austria and Russia,
while arguing that the South, like Italy, Ireland, Hungary, and Poland, merely desired
freedom from oppression, bolstered their claims that secession was necessary to protect
the South from abuses by the North.
The North did not just act like a European despot, according to southern
nationalists, however; southern opinion-makers also frequently analyzed the supposed
ideological kinship that informed the actions of both the tyrannical North as well as
tyrannical powers in Europe. The New Orleans Daily Picayune explained the Union
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government’s confidence that the North would receive support from Austria and Russia
by declaring that “such empires as Russia and Austria have a natural affinity for the
principles of government developed at Washington,” adding that the emperors “recognize
coarse imitations of themselves in Abraham Lincoln.”13 Similarly, a sermon preached in
Jefferson County, Georgia, proclaimed that the actions of the North against the South
would cause despots to celebrate, and Italy and Hungary to shriek, hinting at an affinity
between the North and European despots, and the South and aspiring European nations.14
Highlighting the supposed shared values and good will between the Union government
and despotic governments in Europe aided southern nationalists in drawing a connection
between the abuses of European tyrants and the supposed abuses of the North, allowing
them to justify their action of secession.
Following from their despotic actions and values, northerners’ tyranny over the
South supposedly created grave harm for southerners in the form of suppressed liberty
and self-government. One of the reasons why northern tyranny was so fearful according
to southern nationalists was that it limited southern liberty, just as European despots had
restricted the liberty of aspiring nations in Europe. As the New Orleans Daily Picayune
wrote, the North’s opposition to southern secession was supposedly equally harmful to
liberty as Austria’s refusal to grant independence to Italy.15 John Tyler, Jr., son of the
president, and later the Confederate secretary of war, wrote that the triumph of
abolitionist politics in the North would signal the defeat of constitutional liberty, ushering
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in chaos similar to that following the French Revolution.16 Richmond’s Daily Dispatch
turned to American history and values to highlight the severity of the loss of liberty faced
by the South; the editors wrote that Lincoln’s abuses against the cause of liberty were not
only equal to those perpetrated in Europe, but were even worse, since they occurred in a
land consecrated to liberty.17 To secessionists, secession was necessary to ensure that
liberty in the South would not be crushed as it had been in Europe.
To claim liberty as a goal of the southern nation required slave-holding southern
nationalists to limit the definition of liberty to national, rather than individual, liberty.
Southern commentators did just that. For example, a citizen by the initials P. R. G wrote
to the Richmond Whig, distinguishing between the benefits of what he called
constitutional liberty and the drawbacks of what he considered to be social liberty.18
Although comparisons of liberty required conservative southerners to ignore both the
fullest implications of liberty, as well as the contradictions between liberty and slavery,
southern nationalists nonetheless claimed that the aspiring southern nation, like aspiring
nations in Europe, was motivated by a desire for liberty, and therefore was justified in
seceding.
If northern despotism was harmful in part due to the limitations it placed on
liberty, southern commentators argued, its harms against self-government and selfdetermination were perhaps even worse. Self-determination, like the fight against
tyranny, was another value that southerners had confirmed as suitable for an aspiring
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nation through their analysis of the revolutions of 1848.19 Throughout the antebellum
period, revolutions that were seen as fighting for national self-determination had won the
support and praise of southern analysts.20 In contrast, revolutions that appeared imposed
on a people or nation received criticism.21 Utilizing a limited definition of selfgovernment that focused on national self-determination rather than on individual rights to
have a voice in government, secessionists claimed that a southern nation was necessary
because northerners were preventing southern exercise of self-government. Secessionists
argued that northern politics, particularly the rise of abolitionism and the Republican
Party, had altered the original form of American government to the point that southern
voices were no longer being heard. Southern nationalists thus argued that secession was
necessary to protect self-government, just as it had been for aspiring nations abroad. For
example, the Macon Daily Telegraph accused the North of such severe harms to selfgovernment that even Europe would react in disgust.22 In a report on the Louisiana
secession convention, the New Orleans Daily Picayune urged that Louisiana must follow
aspiring nations in Europe, who, though defeated, kept pushing for “the principle that
communities have the indestructible right to create their own governments, and to throw
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off those which they find to be intolerable.”23 Even Jefferson Davis claimed in an 1861
speech in Congress that southerners had the same right to “abrogate and modify their
form of Government whenever it did not answer the ends for which it had been
established” that had been enacted in the American Revolution, and that foreign subjects
of Austria had called upon in their bids for independence.24 Comparisons of the selfdetermination supposedly denied to the South and to aspiring nations in Europe, then,
revealed the harms that northern tyranny would create, thus supposedly justifying
secession.
Interestingly, foreigners living in the South were among the loudest voices
popularizing comparisons of self-government in the South and in their native countries,
perhaps because they were familiar with this language from their countries of origins.
Comparisons crafted by foreigners living in the South provided their fellow southerners
with what appeared to be proof of the validity of the comparisons between southerners’
and foreign nationalists’ desires for self-determination. The Charleston Mercury’s
foreign correspondent John Mitchel, an Irish nationalist, southern sympathizer, and
fervent supporter of slavery, frequently drew comparisons between the oppression faced
by the South and by Ireland. For example, Mitchel reported that the force that the North
deployed against the South was typical of that seen in Europe, and was equally harmful
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against the principle of self-government, citing Russia’s oppression of Poland and Great
Britain’s oppression of Ireland as illustrations.25 Similarly, a former Italian claiming
Confederate affiliation wrote to the Richmond Daily Dispatch that Italy had succeeded in
its fight for “the principle that every nation has a natural right of choosing her own
government,” the same fight that the South now undertook, asking readers “has not this
very war taken place for a long time between Italy and her tyrants? Is not the principle on
which Italy has struggled entirely the same as that which the South has adopted in
America?”26 O. A. Lochrane, an Irishman living in the South, likewise argued that the
South represented the same principle for which the Irish fought, namely the “right of a
people to select their own rulers – the right of a people to change their own
Government.”27 To many southerners, both native- and foreign-born, then, the new
southern nation shared a common goal of self-determination with the nationalist
movements of Europe. A fight for self-determination, similar to that in Italy and
elsewhere, was a fight for a value that had long been established as a main principle of
nineteenth century nationalism. Although claiming self-government as a value of the
southern nation required an alternative vision of this value that allowed for the
elimination of slaves’ rights, southern nationalists nonetheless compared their desire for
self-government with European nationalist movements’ desire for self-government,
allowing them to claim that southern secession fit within the mainstream of nineteenth
century international politics.
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The idea that the North was a tyrannical power, oppressing the South and
stripping southerners’ ability to achieve self-government, depended in part upon the
perception that the North and South were different peoples, and that the North was thus
an illegitimate foreign power imposing its will upon the South. While the primary
arguments with which southern nationalists justified secession dealt with the language of
rights, ethnic nationalism, or the idea that a people deserved nationhood based on cultural
and historical distinctiveness, also shaped southern thought about nationhood.28 This
language of distinctiveness influenced southern discourse about the South’s place relative
to other nations.29 One southerner who spoke of the South’s distinctiveness from the
North, comparing it to that of aspiring European nations’ differences from their
oppressors, was James M. Mason, Virginia congressman and later diplomat for the
Confederacy. Mason justified his desire for Virginia to hold a secession convention by
arguing that “the people of the North… have separated themselves from the people of the
South, and the government they thus inaugurate will be to us the government of a foreign
power. We shall stand to such powers as Italy to Austria, and Poland to Russia. It will be
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one people governed by another people.”30 The Richmond Daily Dispatch agreed,
writing upon Lincoln’s inauguration that “this day the South comes under a dominion
which has been forced upon her by the North; this day she begins a servitude as
involuntary as that of Italy to Austria; this day inaugurates a foreign rule as distinct and
complete as if we had been conquered by European bayonets,” adding a few days later
that the struggle of the South against the North “is the struggle of Italy against Austria; of
a Confederation of independent States, occupied by a homogeneous people, against
foreign oppressors, who have violated the common league into which they have
entered.”31 Southern nationalists claimed that the North and South were distinct, and that
the North thus constituted an illegitimate foreign power, imposing its own agenda on the
South and thereby stripping southerners of their right to self-government. Deriving from
this view, they claimed that through secession, the South sought only to establish selfgovernment that would free southerners from any northern tyranny.
As southerners discussed the supposed tyranny perpetrated by the North, and the
harms that this tyranny of a supposedly foreign power caused for southern liberty and
self-government, newly-elected president Abraham Lincoln played a central role in their
international comparisons, featuring prominently as the worst of tyrants and despots,
equal to or surpassing any European despot. Even before the election of 1860, the
Charleston Mercury, a secessionist paper owned by Robert Barnwell Rhett, reported that
Lincoln’s election would create a situation similar to those in much-oppressed Ireland
30
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and Poland, and in Italy before Italy gained independence.32 Lincoln’s inauguration only
increased this vitriol, with the Richmond Daily Dispatch claiming that Lincoln’s
inauguration marked the conquering of the South, as complete as if the South had been
“annexed to the throne of some continental despot.”33
Popular as justifications for secession, these accusations that Lincoln was a despot
also continued throughout the early war, as southern nationalists continued to define their
actions and their nation through comparisons with European despotism. In the summer
of 1861, the Charleston Mercury informed its readers that “the cruelty and despotism of
the Lincoln government have not been exceeded in late times – not even in Austria.”34
Indeed, even the “foreign despotism” faced by Italy was “not as base and contemptible as
the Lincoln despotism” according to the Richmond Daily Dispatch. 35 By comparing
Lincoln to the supposed despots of Italy, such as the Austrian empire, Confederates
furthered their argument that the southern states seceded because of tyrannical
oppression, the same foe that Italy and other aspiring European nations fought in their
struggles for independent nationhood.
Comparisons of northern and European tyranny, and the of the right to selfgovernment sought by the southern nation and aspiring European nations, constituted an
important part of secessionists’ efforts to justify secession, as they used these
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comparisons to claim a place for the South within the larger mainstream of nineteenth
century nationalism. Despite southern nationalists’ claims, however, the aspiring
southern nation was not premised upon the same goals and values as aspiring nations in
Europe. Ultimately, the defense of slavery was southern nationalists’ main concern. A
slave-holding society, based upon inequality and hierarchical power structures, differed
drastically in ideology from nationalist movements inspired by ideas of equality,
freedom, and democracy, undermining the validity of southerners’ comparisons.
Further complicating the comparisons was the reality that the South was not
actually oppressed by the North. Any oppression was more anticipated than actual, and
was, once again, based upon supposed harms against slavery. To southern nationalists’
international audience, northern attempts to restrict slavery did not equal the oppression
of defeated nations abroad, an issue with which later Confederates would have to deal.
For many elite southerners, however, northern abolitionism represented a legitimate
abuse – or potential abuse – of what they saw as the South’s right to own slaves. Since
the 1850s, southerners had been using comparisons between oppression in Europe, and
the oppression they feared the limitation of slavery would bring to the South, in order to
dramatize their defense of slavery. As they undertook the process of secession and
nation-formation, they expanded these comparisons to justify secession on the basis that
northern attempts to limit slavery constituted despotism equivalent to that found in
Europe.
Comparisons of tyranny thus required significant ideological manipulation on the
part of secessionists, as slave-holders ignored the actual lack of oppression, as well as the
vast gulf between nationalist movements motivated by ideals of freedom and equality and
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a nationalist movement motivated by conservatism and slavery. International
comparisons proved so compelling to southerners, however, in part because of these
inconsistencies. Southern nationalists used comparisons to center their slave-based
nation as one of many other aspiring nations in order to claim that, despite the
contradictions between slavery and liberal nationalism, the aspiring slave-holding
southern nation was still a part of the larger movement of nationalism.
Southern analysts were explicit in connecting attempts to end slavery with
European-style tyranny, making it clear that they believed that offenses against slavery
still qualified as offenses against legitimate national rights, and that the South was
therefore justified in seeking independence under the guise of liberal nationalism. For
example, a citizen by the initials P. R. G. wrote a letter to the editor of the Richmond
Whig arguing that Italy, while under Austrian rule, was the best example of a nation
lacking political liberty, which he defined as distinct from social liberty, such as freedom
from slavery, with the latter kind of liberty being undesirable. He then suggested that if
the South threw off northern rule, it would enjoy the same right of political liberty that
Italy, now free of Austria, enjoyed.36 To P. R. G., by freeing themselves of northern
abolitionists, the South could achieve the same freedom as a nation like Italy, and do so
while still preserving slavery. Similarly, Clement Clay, a politician from Alabama,
warned that if the North succeeded in dictating the national conversation about slavery
and the territories, the South would be “doomed to worse shame, subjugation and
vassalage, than Ireland or Hungary now endures,” urging that southerners must take care
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not to allow this to happen.37 As early as March of 1860, John Tyler, Jr. wrote in
DeBow’s Review under the penname “Python” that the triumph of Black Republicanism
would lead to the fall of property rights, pointing to revolutionary France as an example
of the chaos that would follow.38 Of course, slavery was the primary property right with
which most elite southerners were concerned. These comparisons make it clear that the
oppression that secessionists feared was the elimination of slavery, and that they believed
that arguing that such an elimination of slavery equaled tyranny would help them
legitimize secession.
Claiming that their desire to preserve slavery was equivalent to European nations’
desire to be free of political oppression allowed southern nationalists to attempt to
legitimize their creation of a slave-holding nation. Despite the contradictions between
slavery and liberal nationalism, southern nationalists embraced international comparisons
that helped them cloak their desire to preserve slavery in the language of nationalism, and
to situate the preservation of slavery as an equivalent national goal with those pursued by
aspiring nations abroad. Even though these claims were inaccurate, southern nationalists
sought to use these international comparisons to help them make their case that the
southern nation deserved membership in the international family of nations.
The importance of international comparisons of tyranny, and one of the reasons
why secessionists utilized these comparisons despite the ideological inconsistencies
inherent to them, can be seen in southern opinion-makers’ efforts to not only use said
comparisons to justify secession, but also to use them to gain the support of their fellow
southerners. Southern nationalists used comparisons of tyranny as a rallying cry and call
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to arms for their audiences. As secessionists sought support for their agenda, they urged
their fellow southerners to fight against the northern despotism or risk a similar or worse
fate than that of the aspiring nationalities that southerners had followed in Europe. The
Charleston Mercury reported with approval, for example, that Mr. Charles O’Conor, an
Irishman in New York, had given a speech declaring that without action, “the people of
the Southern States will submit to insults and outrages, and to become subject provinces,
precisely as… Ireland has long been to Britain, as many other nations have been subject
to tyrannical and monarchical States.”39 Similarly, a self-identified southern Democrat
wrote to the Baton Rouge Daily Advocate that the South must follow the example of Italy
in throwing off tyranny and monarchy, lest the South face the fruits of old world
tyranny.40 Threatening that if they allowed northern dominance to continue, southerners
would suffer the fate of oppressed nations of Europe aided secessionists not only in
defining their cause, but also in soliciting the support of fellow southerners. When faced
with the necessity of gaining supporters for the causes of secession and then southern
nationalism, as well as with the necessity of justifying secession, southern nationalists
turned to comparisons with European despotism in order to situate the aspiring southern
nation within the larger international movement of nationalism.
Comparisons of the challenges faced and values shared by southern nationalism
and nationalisms in Europe were important to secessionists’ efforts to justify secession
and to internationalize the southern cause. International comparisons defined the
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Confederacy according to the values that southerners supposedly shared with these
European nationalists. These comparisons also highlighted the harms that the South
would supposedly face if it remained in the Union, harms that were similar to those faced
by failed nationalities abroad. Through claiming similarity with aspiring nations in
Europe, southern nationalists placed their efforts at nation-building within the larger
context of the spread of nationalism. Doing so was particularly critical for southern
nationalists’ efforts to claim legitimacy despite the problems that their defense of slavery
created for their claims to nationhood. By relying on limited definitions of key concepts,
and focusing on those values that they claimed they shared with aspiring nations abroad,
secessionists used international comparisons to legitimize southern efforts at nationbuilding.
International comparisons proved beneficial in helping southern nationalists claim
legitimacy for their attempt at nation building, not only through bolstering claims that the
southern nation represented widely recognized values of nationhood, but also by
providing a precedent for secession in southern minds. Secessionists believed that if they
could claim that not only their values and their cause, but also their methods, followed
the model of nation-building presented by foreign nationalisms, such an argument would
further strengthen their case for nationhood. Accordingly, secessionists looked abroad to
find an aspiring nation that they could claim had been formed through secession.
Italy, which, unlike the many defeated nationalities of the revolutions of 1848,
had recently succeeded in gaining unity and independence, proved particularly critical to
these comparisons. The Risorgimento, Italy’s nationalist movement, had begun in the
early part of the nineteenth century as various Italian states had sought Italian unity as
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well as independence from foreign empires such as Austria. Despite many failures
through the decades, by 1860, the majority of the Italian peninsula was successfully
united under Piedmont control as the Kingdom of Italy. The success that Italy had
enjoyed in its nation-building efforts made it a particularly attractive model for southern
secessionists. Additionally, Italy enjoyed widespread international sympathy and
support, further enhancing its appeal as a model of nation building.41
Because Italy provided such an attractive model of the process of claiming
nationhood, secessionists sought to draw parallels between their actions and those of
Italian nationalists in order to justify their own secession. In the winter and spring of
1861, as the southern states debated and began the process of secession, southern
opinion-makers advanced the argument that Italy, like the aspiring southern nation, had
been formed through secession. Southern reports frequently claimed that the Italian
states had seceded from the Austrian Empire, and thus the Risorgimento had been a
secession movement.42 Southern nationalists were so invested in the idea that Italy had
been formed through secession that they argued that Italian secession inspired not only
southern secession, but also other separation movements, such as Ireland’s struggle for
independence from Great Britain.43 Southern nationalists’ belief in the Italian states’
supposed secession from their foreign rulers helped to establish the South’s right to
secede in southerners’ minds by seemingly proving that secession could be used to form a
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successful nation.44 While southern commentators did also speak of the Risorgimento as
a unification movement, the idea that Italy had gained independence at least in part
through secession was nonetheless widespread among southern analysis, and widely used
as a tactic to legitimize southern secession.45
These claims of similarity with Italy on the basis of secession once again required
significant manipulation on the part of southerners. Most contemporaries understood that
the southern states’ secession from the Union on the basis of slavery was not the same
action as Italian nationalists’ struggles for unity and independence, and that secession and
unification were not similar methods of nation-building. Nonetheless, many southern
nationalists chose to interpret the actions of Italian nationalists in a way that bolstered
southerners’ international comparisons. Characterizing the Risorgimento as a secession
movement rather than as a unification movement allowed southern nationalists to claim
Italy as an example of a new nation based upon secession, bolstering their argument that
southern secession was a legitimate method of nation-building, and was part of the
mainstream of nineteenth century nationalism.
If Italy provided a model of a nation supposedly built through secession, it also
seemed to provide proof that such an attempt at nation-building would ultimately be
successful, according to secessionists. As they undertook the extreme actions of seceding
from the Union and building a new nation, secessionists sought reassurance as to the
advisability of their actions. Turning once again to international comparisons, southern
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nationalists argued that their secession and that the Confederacy would be as successful
as the Risorgimento and Italy had been. International comparisons thus not only proved
secession to be legitimate in secessionists’ minds; they also proved secession to be the
correct course of action and all but guaranteed success, at least according to southern
analyses. When the future of the South seemed uncertain, southern nationalists turned to
international comparisons for reassurance.
In the winter of the secession crisis, southern nationalists looked to Italy for
guarantees that the actions they were considering would be successful. In particular,
advocates of secession used comparisons with Italy to strengthen their case for secession,
using international comparisons as a way to encourage other southern states to secede and
join the new southern nation. These secessionists argued that Italy’s successful
unification predicted that, if the southern states united together, they would be equally
successful. This was an ironic stance for many reasons, not only because these same
southerners interpreted the Risorgimento as a secession movement, but also because
secession constituted disunion, not unity, and was widely recognized as such.
Nonetheless, a reporter for the New Orleans Daily Picayune directed readers to consider
the success that Italy had gained upon uniting, arguing that if southern states united
together against the Union, they could gain equal strength.46 Similarly, an Italian
correspondent wrote in the Fayetteville Observer, an originally Unionist paper that began
publishing pro-Confederate articles during the Civil War, that having witnessed the
Italian revolution first-hand, he believed that the only way for secession to succeed was
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for seceding southern states to unite, as the Italian states had done.47 Despite all evidence
and arguments to the contrary, the unity of Italy seemed to promise success to
secessionists if they followed Italy’s example in uniting the southern states. This
argument is an excellent example of southern nationalists’ tendency to manipulate the
ideals and facts in order to support their international comparisons; as such, it also reveals
the importance of these international comparisons to southern nationalists’ efforts to
define, legitimize, and ensure the success of the southern nation.
While unity provided perhaps a dubious guarantee of success, the official
diplomatic recognition of the new Italian nation by European powers proved much more
promising for secessionists seeking indications that their actions would lead to success.
Italy gained recognition from European powers including Great Britain and France, as
well as from the United States, in the spring of 1861, just as southern nationalists were
excited about the possibilities of the new Confederacy. Southern reports eagerly
anticipated that once Italy achieved official diplomatic recognition from other nations, the
Confederacy was sure to quickly attain the same, revealing the fervency of Confederates’
belief that their nation belonged alongside Italy as one of the new nations of the
nineteenth century, and would be successful in achieving that status. In a typical
expression of these beliefs, the Richmond Daily Dispatch wrote that “we are happy to see
it announced that the French Government will soon recognize the independence of Italy,
to be followed, it is predicted, by a speedy recognition of the Confederate States. Both of
these Governments have been brought into existence by the popular voice, and both have
47

“From Italy,” Fayetteville (NC) Observer, February 25, 1861. See also “Legislative Proceedings,”
Charleston Daily Courier, November 10, 1860; “Opening Celebration of the Charleston and Savannah
Railroad,” Charleston Mercury, November 5, 1860. Anti-secessionists also used comparisons with Italy’s
unity to bolster their case; see “Anti-Secession in North Carolina,” Little Rock Arkansas State Gazette,
January 5, 1861.

112

bravely established in the field their claims to independence.”48 As the secession crisis
gave way to nation formation in the spring of 1861, southern nationalists utilized
comparisons of claims to diplomatic recognition as an additional way of bolstering the
perceived legitimacy of the new southern nation.
Even as they were beginning the process of creating a nation, Confederates
immediately recognized the importance of gaining diplomatic recognition. The
Confederacy quickly established formal diplomatic efforts in order to win recognition
and support from the major powers of Europe. Gaining the recognition of France and
especially Great Britain, a major trading partner of the USA and the would-be CSA,
would have benefitted the Confederacy immensely, through both public opinion as well
as actual aid.49 Accordingly, in fall of 1861, the new Confederate government sent James
M. Mason to London and John Slidell to Paris, charged with the mission of winning
foreign support for the new southern nation. Initially, southerners were confident that
these efforts would quickly bear fruit. Although Confederates were fully aware of the
benefits that diplomatic relations could bring them, however, and despite some European
pro-Confederacy sentiment that encouraged southern hopes, Confederates never
succeeded in gaining recognition from foreign nations, in part due to the pro-slavery
orientation of the Confederacy.50 Later Confederates would be forced to deal with the
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lack of foreign recognition, but in the spring of 1861, hopes of recognition still flourished
throughout the South.
As new Confederates sought diplomatic recognition, they turned once again to
international comparisons to bolster their case that they were an independent nation and
deserved to be recognized as such. Although Confederate politicians and diplomats and
their European targets spent little time debating comparisons between the Confederacy
and Italy, domestic discourse on the new southern nation’s place in the international
community of nations devoted much attention to arguing that the Confederacy deserved
the same international diplomatic recognition given to Italy.51 This argument built on the
previously-discussed claims that southern secession was a similar action to Italy’s fight
for independence from Austria; that the North was tyrannical despot oppressing the
South, like Austria had been a tyrannical despot oppressing Italy; and that the South, like
Italy, represented the values of self-government and liberty. If Italy deserved
recognition, then, so too did the Confederacy, at least in the minds of many southern
nationalists. As early as November of 1860, foreign correspondent John Mitchel was
speculating in the Charleston Mercury that Europeans would perceive the secession of
South Carolina to signal the creation of a new power in the Americas, similar to the
recent creation of a new power in Europe with the formation of Italy.52 Like the
comparisons of national values, then, comparisons of claims for official international
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recognition aided southern nationalists in legitimizing their nation, further proving that
secession would be a success.
Comparisons of claims to diplomatic recognition proved particularly prophetic of
success, at least in southern minds, once Italy received recognition. When Italy gained
official recognition from European powers in spring of 1861, southern nationalists
celebrated that their own recognition would soon be forthcoming. In particular, France’s
recognition of the Kingdom of Italy sparked excitement among southerners. In July of
1861, the Richmond Daily Dispatch reported that France’s impending recognition of Italy
boded well for the Confederacy, as Italy and the Confederacy were “both creatures of the
same god” and therefore to recognize one was to recognize the other.53 An anonymous
southerner called “Gamma,” writing from Europe, reminded readers that recognition of
the Confederacy was linked to that of Italy, and as France had recognized Italy,
recognition of the Confederacy was assured.54
One of the reasons why France’s recognition of Italy was so encouraging for
southerners was that French officials had long been hinting at support for the
Confederacy by drawing the same comparisons between Italy and the Confederacy that
southern nationalists themselves did. Early in 1861, French diplomats declared that the
South had the same right to secede from the North that Italian states had to secede from
Austria.55 As recognition of Italy became more likely, French officials mixed
comparisons between Italy and the Confederacy into these declarations of support. In
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spring of 1861, Edouard Thouvenel, French minister of foreign affairs, urged southerners
not to give up hope for recognition by France, as France had not yet recognized Italy, and
recognition of both would surely be forthcoming.56 No less a person than Napoleon III,
emperor of France, proclaimed that the Confederacy “has the same claims for its
acknowledgment as a new kingdom that Italy had,” thus bolstering Confederates’ own
estimation of their equivalence to Italy, and to Italian nationalism.57 Such a statement by
the leader of a major nation seemed to prove to southern nationalists that their
comparisons were correct.
Southern nationalists were equally excited about what they perceived to be their
impending recognition by Great Britain after that nation extended recognition to Italy.
According to southern reporters, Great Britain could not fail to soon recognize the
Confederacy as an independent nation after granting such recognition to Italy. The
Charleston Mercury took the liberty of telling its readers they “have only to substitute the
word ‘South’ for ‘Italy’… to see how complete is the application” of Lord John Russell’s
speech supporting recognition of Italy, to the recognition of the Confederacy.58
According to Paris correspondent John Mitchel, Great Britain, like France, was actually
“eager” to recognize the Confederacy after recognizing Italy.59 As with French
politicians, some British commentators bolstered these hopes. Upon British recognition
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of Italy, the London Press reported that even as Great Britain recognized Italy, another
aspiring state, the Confederacy, sent commissioners who were confident of receiving
recognition. This confidence, according to the Press, was “well founded.”60 Because
Great Britain formed the major target of Confederate diplomacy, British recognition of
the Confederacy, like that granted to Italy, would be a major victory for southern
nationalists, one that southern nationalists believed would prove the rightness of their
actions and legitimacy of their nation, thereby promising success for their experiment in
nation-building.
Recognition, along with the legitimization that recognition would grant to
southern nationalists’ international comparisons, proved elusive. The hopeful reports of
diplomatic efforts through spring and summer of 1861, however, reveal the desire that
Confederates had to use similarities with Italy to place their own nation within a larger
international context of aspiring nations seeking independence. They also reveal the
importance of international comparisons to southern nationalists’ attempts to define and
legitimize their secession and their new nation. Although southern commentators failed
to convince the international community that if Italy deserved recognition, so too did the
Confederacy, a problem with which later Confederates would be forced to deal, many
Confederates themselves nonetheless clearly endorsed this similarity. The widespread
and complex nature of this comparison demonstrates that Confederates argued that Italy
and the Confederacy were fighting the same battle, using this claim to legitimize their
60
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nation by connecting their own nationalist movement to the more widely-supported
movements of Italy and other European nations. If foreign powers would only recognize
the similarities between the Confederacy and Italy, Confederates argued, and grant the
Confederacy the same diplomatic recognition granted to Italy, then the southern nation
would be recognized as legitimate, and would be a success.
Through international comparisons, southern nationalists sought to justify their
actions, define their values and identity, and guarantee the success of their experiment in
nation-building. Claiming European nationalist movements as a precedent for their own
attempt at nation-building aided secessionists in arguing that the South deserved the same
independence as aspiring European nations, as well as in placing the aspiring southern
nation within the mainstream of nineteenth century nationalism. These comparisons also
helped secessionists and southern nationalists deal with the problem that slavery created
for their claim to nationhood by focusing attention on the similarities that they
supposedly shared with more widely supported nationalist movements in Europe while
seeking to obscure the differences. International comparisons were central to southern
efforts to place southern secession and the Confederacy within the mainstream of
nineteenth century nationalism in order to claim legitimacy for an independent southern
nation. These comparisons thus played a critical role in the ways in which secessionists
and southern nationalists justified and legitimized secession, defined the southern nation,
and sought support for the Confederacy during the winter of secession and the spring of
nation-building.
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Chapter Four
Defending International Comparisons, 1861-1865
Building on an antebellum tradition of understanding issues of nationalism
through an international lens, secessionists had sought to legitimize their actions by
claiming aspiring nations in Europe as precedents for a southern nationalist movement.
These international comparisons that secessionists had used to justify secession continued
to resonate with many Confederates during the war. Claiming that the North’s actions
against the South resembled the tyranny found in Europe and that the South represented
the cherished values of liberal nationalism appealed to Confederates seeking to
legitimize, define, and gain support for their nation, just as it had for secessionists
seeking to defend secession.
While these ideas continued to be echoed throughout the South during the war,
growing indications that southerners were alone in their belief that the Confederacy
resembled new nations such as Italy, and aspiring nations such as Hungary, Poland, and
Ireland, increasingly challenged Confederates’ international self-perception. The
problems inherent in southerners’ claim that a slave-holding nation represented liberal
values were apparent to northerners and Europeans alike, and the lack of support for the
Confederacy from abroad increasingly emphasized the reality that the Confederacy did
not, in fact, represent the same liberal tradition that had helped to inform many of the new
and aspiring nations in Europe.
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The failure of foreign powers to treat the Confederacy as the legitimate nation it
aspired to be forced the Confederates who believed in their new nation’s similarity to
nations abroad to respond. More conservative southerners did so by positing an
alternative interpretation of the relationship of the Confederacy to other new and aspiring
nations, but the southerners who remained committed to the American tradition of liberal
nationalism continued making the case that the Confederacy, like more popular new and
aspiring nations abroad, represented liberal nationalist values and therefore deserved
independence. Despite the fact that the Confederacy’s illiberal emphasis on slavery and
limited democracy was ideologically dissimilar from liberal nationalism’s emphasis on
natural rights, liberty, and freedom, for these Confederates, the vision of the Confederacy
as an equal among the family of nations, one of many aspiring nations to seek
independence in the middle of the nineteenth century, was a key part of their new
national identity. In order to preserve this sense of the Confederacy as part of a larger
trend of liberal nationalism, however, Confederates were forced to manipulate not only
the definition of liberal nationalism, as they had proven willing to do since their analysis
of the revolutions of 1848, but also the contemporary symbols and ideals that represented
liberal nationalism to both domestic and foreign audiences during the years of the Civil
War. In the face of opposition, instead of changing tactics, Confederates manipulated the
ideals and symbols of nationalism in order to preserve their international comparisons
and their vision of the Confederacy as the newest member of the international community
of nations.
Confederates throughout the war continued attempting to place supposed northern
threats and southern values within an international context, shifting from using these
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comparisons to justify secession to using them to defend the southern nation.1 The idea
that the North was as tyrannical as European despots was so well-known by 1864 that
even the Confederate Congress could assume that these comparisons were understood, as
when they informed their citizens that “the past, or foreign countries, need not be sought
unto to furnish illustrations” of the tyranny that would result should the Union prevail.2
If the tyrannical North was the antithesis of what a nation should be, Confederates
argued, the Confederacy represented the ideal nation. Similarities to the admired aspiring
European nations, particularly similar national values, provided supposed proof of the
Confederacy’s national legitimacy and strength. As during secession, these values were
the ones that antebellum southerners had identified as the values of liberal nationalism
that were not so liberal as to threaten the institution of slavery. Liberty – narrowly
defined to avoid the implications of radical liberty for a slave society – was among these
values that Confederates claimed that they, like aspiring European nations, represented; if
the South won independence, the Richmond Daily Dispatch reported, it would be
“enshrined in the sympathies and respect of all lovers of liberty and national
1
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independence by the side of chivalric Hungary and heroic Poland.”3 A desire for selfgovernment, as with liberty, provided another point of comparison between the
Confederacy and aspiring nationalities in Europe.4 Republicanism, long a southern and
American value, was another supposedly mutual goal shared by the Confederacy and
aspiring nations such as Ireland and Poland.5 By comparing southern national values
with those represented by aspiring nations in Europe, these Confederates claimed that the
Confederacy deserved independence, not only because it fought against a European-style
despot, but also because it exhibited the same values of liberty, self-government, and
republicanism admired in new and aspiring European nations.
Although many Confederates were convinced that their project in nation-building
followed the model presented by nationalist movements in Europe, the rest of the world
had different assessments of the place of the Confederacy within the international
community of nations. Southern politics was conservative and centered on slavery,
which inherently contradicted ideals such as democracy and equality.6 International
events throughout the period of the Civil War increasingly made clear that Confederates
were alone in comparing a nation premised upon slavery with aspiring nations motivated
by liberal principles. Foreign nationalists’ assessment that the Confederacy did not
constitute a legitimate nation forced Confederates to re-evaluate and defend their
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international comparisons, as they continued to attempt to convince their fellow
southerners, if not an international audience, of the merits of a southern nation.
Giuseppe Garibaldi, famous hero of the Italian Risorgimento, was one of the most
important foreign observers who questioned the Confederacy’s right to nationhood. Italy,
united in nationhood in 1860 after a long struggle for unity and independence, had always
been central to southern nationalists’ international comparisons, as the best and most
recent example of a nation that had successfully parlayed the principles of nationalism
into independence. Garibaldi, the “hero of two worlds” who had risen to prominence in
nationalist conflicts in South America and gone on to a storied military career in the
Italian Risorgimento, stood as a powerful representative of Italy and of liberal
nationalism to observers worldwide.
Throughout the antebellum period, Garibaldi had received much praise and
sympathy from southerners for his role in advancing the cause of nationalism and the
Italian nation. In addition to leading the charge for Italian unity, southerners believed
that Garibaldi represented critical political virtues such as “popular rights,”
republicanism, liberty, independence, the right to nationality, the fight against tyranny,
and freedom.7 In one clear illustration of support for Garibaldi, as well as of the
perceived connection between Garibaldi’s nationalism and their own nationalism, on the
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eve of secession southern periodicals published a satirical advertisement seeking a
president of the United States who would possess, among other qualifications, the “spirit
and determination of… Garibaldi.”8 Southerners were not alone in their high regard of
Garibaldi; by 1860, Garibaldi was already a well-recognized international symbol of
nationalism. Southerners, like the rest of the world, saw Garibaldi as a representative of
the Italian nation, and of the best qualities of nationalism.9
Despite widespread antebellum southern support for Garibaldi, however,
southerners’ positive view of Garibaldi, and their self-comparisons with Italy, was
challenged when Garibaldi repeatedly expressed sympathy not only for the Union, but
also for values associated with the North, such as abolition. Garibaldi’s support for the
Union forced Confederates to re-think their view of the renowned Italian nationalist, as
well as their claims that the Confederacy followed the example and values of Garibaldi’s
Italy.
The crisis for southern nationalists’ support for Garibaldi, and therefore their selfcomparison with Italy and with liberal nationalism, initially came in the summer of 1861,
when, reacting to an idea proposed by one of Garibaldi’s officers and by the US consul in
Antwerp, the Union government, via Secretary of State William Seward, invited
Garibaldi to fight for the Union. When news of this invitation broke, Confederates were
shocked and angered by Garibaldi’s response, which, while not an outright yes, was
8
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nonetheless a criticism of the South’s claims to legitimate independent nationhood.
Garibaldi replied that if he was not needed in Italy he would indeed come fight for the
Union, but only on the condition that he was appointed commander in chief and granted
power to emancipate the slaves. The emancipation in particular would prove to Garibaldi
that, as the US consul who met with Garibaldi phrased Garibaldi’s opinion, the Civil War
was not merely “a civil war in which the world at large could have little interest or
sympathy,” but a war against slavery, thereby elevating the war to Garibaldi’s standards
of a nationalist conflict and making it worth his while to fight.10 Although this deal never
came to pass, Garibaldi’s expressed support for the Confederacy’s sworn enemy angered
many southerners. Even more problematic was Garibaldi’s statement that, unless the
North fought to free the slaves, the war was merely a localized civil war. This made it
clear that to the renowned symbol of nationalism, the centrality of slavery to the
Confederacy meant that the Confederacy’s bid for nationhood had no similarities to the
nationalist struggles that Garibaldi himself supported and represented. If southerners
were to accept Garibaldi’s stance that the Civil War was unlike Europe’s nationalist
conflicts, then Confederates’ comparisons between their nation and aspiring nations in
Europe were not valid and therefore of no use in legitimizing the southern nation.
Instead of accepting Garibaldi’s interpretation of the issues of the Civil War, as
Confederates confronted the problems that Garibaldi’s support for the Union raised for
their international comparisons, they developed a variety of strategies for dealing with
Garibaldi’s implicit rejection of these comparisons. Critically, these responses would
have to deal with the issue of slavery and its incompatibility with the ideals of
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nationalism represented by Garibaldi. Although Confederates cloaked their movement in
the language of rights, a global community that had largely rejected slavery understood
the inherent contradiction between the language of liberal nationalism and the reality of
slavery. Southern nationalists had previously attempted to side-step this contradiction by
manufacturing their own, more limited, definition of liberal nationalism, allowing them to
embrace national self-determination and republicanism while rejecting the implications
of full-scale liberty and equality. Garibaldi’s support for the Union, however, proved that
while southerners themselves may accept their limited definition of nationalism, the
international community still embraced a fuller vision of nationalism. In order to defend
their argument that the Confederacy deserved independence because it emulated the
nationalist values represented by the Risorgimento and other nationalist movements in
Europe, Confederates extended their earlier manipulation of the definition of liberal
nationalism to now manipulate the image of Garibaldi as a symbol of nationalism.
As rumors that Garibaldi might fight for the Union first broke in spring of 1861,
southern analysts initially took an aggressive stance, seeking to forestall the rumor’s
momentum from the beginning. They asserted that what they assumed was southern
dominance and superiority over Garibaldi and the North would render neutral any threat
that Garibaldi’s support for the Union could pose to the South. Adopting this tactic, the
Charleston Mercury essentially warned Garibaldi, and the world, that if Garibaldi would
be foolish enough to come fight for the Union, the South would easily and resoundingly
defeat him. Calling on the memory of southern heroes of the American Revolution, one
reporter wrote that “[the South has] not lost the guerilla breed; and the sons of Sumter…
are ready to teach him the swamp fox and game cock lessons such as he could never learn
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at the hands of Neopolitans and Austrians.”11 A month later, John Mitchel, Irish
nationalist and Confederate sympathizer, writing from Paris as the foreign correspondent
for the Charleston Mercury, beseeched South Carolinians to exercise restraint in dealing
with Garibaldi should Garibaldi join the Union, “beg[ging] for [Garibaldi’s] life – for the
sake of what he has done elsewhere.” Mitchel envisioned that if Garibaldi did arrive in
the South, he would end up “locked up in a southern calaboose… or summarily lynched
by Carolinian citizens,” and he subsequently asked that Carolinians instead merely give
Garibaldi “four dozen” and “send him back.”12 By claiming southern superiority over
Garibaldi, southern nationalists sought to minimize Garibaldi’s stature, and therefore the
power of his potential support for the Union. If Garibaldi did not have the strength to
defeat the South, these Confederates assured their audience, then his support for the
Union was of little consequence.
A less colorful but equally pervasive early response to the Union’s invitation to
Garibaldi was to argue that Garibaldi did not and would not initiate such an invitation,
and that the North had instead imposed its own desires on an unwilling Garibaldi.
Through the spring and summer of 1861, before Garibaldi’s reply was published
internationally, disbelief filled southern analysis of the Union’s offer to Garibaldi as
Confederates refused to accept that the great hero of liberty would involve himself in the
fight against southern independence. The earliest of such reports stated that Garibaldi
was so pre-occupied in Italy that he could not come to the aid of the Union.13 Other
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Confederate commentators pointed out that the Union, not Garibaldi, had made the offer,
allowing for the possibility that Garibaldi would join southerners in scoffing at a
misguided attempt to pull Garibaldi away from his own values.14 Denying Garibaldi’s
involvement in the invitation aided southerners, at least temporarily, in ignoring the
ideological issues that would lead Garibaldi to support the Union.
As spring turned to summer and fall and rumors still circulated about Garibaldi
and the Union, many southern analysts turned to simply denying that there could possibly
be any truth to the rumor. The Daily Columbus Enquirer of Columbus, Georgia
dismissed the rumor of the exchange between the Union and Garibaldi as “amusing” and
nothing more, refusing to give weight to the idea that Garibaldi could support the North.15
In keeping with this response, the Richmond Daily Dispatch called the New York
Tribune’s report of the invitation “a joke on the gullibility of its readers,” and furthered
the next day that “there is no authenticated statement in regard to Garibaldi's offer of his
services to the Federal Government. It is probably a canard.”16 Laughing at the idea that
Garibaldi would possibly fight for the Union preserved comparisons with Garibaldi by
claiming that reports of his potential support for the Union were incorrect, and therefore
the Confederacy could and did, in fact, still stand for the same values as Garibaldi.
While dismissive scoffing was common in early reports, other early responses to
the invitation engaged the issue of the potential connection between Garibaldi’s cause
14
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and that of the North more deeply. Alongside reports that mocked the rumors and
threatened Garibaldi’s safety, some southern reports argued that the very reason why
Garibaldi would never fight for the North was that the Union’s values were contrary to
Garibaldi’s own. Adopting this strategy, the New Orleans Daily Picayune reassured its
readers that Garibaldi could never “espouse a cause” such as the northern one “for which
he can entertain no degree of sympathy.” 17 A reporter for the Macon Daily Telegraph of
Macon, Georgia mocked the idea of Garibaldi fighting for the Union, exclaiming “as if
[Garibaldi] would come here to overthrow what he was seeking to establish in his own
land.”18 Claiming that Garibaldi’s values would lead him to deny, not support, the Union
aided Confederates in preserving the supposed connection between their ideals and those
of Garibaldi, even in the face of Garibaldi’s potential support for their enemy. If
Garibaldi’s cause was not that of the Union, it stood to reason, it must be more closely
related to that of the Confederacy, and therefore southerners’ international comparisons
would be secure.
When Garibaldi’s reply to the Union, declaring his support for the northern cause
and for abolition, was published in southern and international newspapers in the early fall
of 1861, southerners were forced to abandon their strategies of denial and to deal directly
with Garibaldi’s allegiance to the North and his belief that emancipation was a critical
value of liberal nationalism. Confederates were confronted with the contradiction
between their claims as to what their nation represented and what the rest of the world
recognized the Confederacy as representing, and they responded by manipulating the
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symbol of Garibaldi as they continued to convince themselves that the Confederacy did
follow the model of Italy.
Confederates initially responded to Garibaldi’s reply to the Union by discrediting
Garibaldi and the North in an attempt to render harmless Garibaldi’s opinions.
Throughout the fall of 1861, southern commentators joined together in using the Union’s
invitation to Garibaldi to belittle the North for extending such an invitation. Ignoring
Garibaldi’s anti-slavery beliefs and focusing instead on the relatively less-threatening
relationship between Garibaldi and the Union, these Confederates claimed that the
invitation had more to do with northern desperation and weakness than with any
compatibility between Garibaldi’s ideology and nationalism and that of the Union. For
example, the Richmond Daily Dispatch wrote that this proposal was “mortifying” to
northern officers, “who cannot fail to see in such stuff an imputation upon their own
intelligence and efficiency,” adding that “if the world can show a more disgusting want
of chivalry and courage, we know not where it can be found.”19 Mississippian H. C.
Clarke wrote in his published diary that “the Federal government despairs of finding able
Generals and officers at home, to engage in its unholy war against the South” and that the
North “makes overtures to all the broken down Generals and officers of European nations
to come and assist them,” emphasizing the theme of northern weakness.20 Reports in
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English and French newspapers that similarly ridiculed northerners’ supposed
dependence on outside aid seemed to support Confederates’ claim that the invitation was
about lack of northern strength rather than similarity between the Union’s ideals and
Garibaldi’s own ideals.21 The strategy of mocking the North for reaching out to
Garibaldi neatly avoided the issues of ideology that fueled Garibaldi’s pro-northern
sentiment, allowing southern nationalists to preserve their sense of connection to the
Italian ideals that Garibaldi represented.
Once Garibaldi’s pro-Union leanings were made public, Garibaldi himself also
came in for criticism as Confederates sought to prove that they did, in fact, represent the
values for which Garibaldi enjoyed international renown. Southern commentators
calculated that if they could prove that Garibaldi did not deserve his status as an
international symbol of nationalism, his support for the Union, and his belief that
emancipation fit with liberal nationalism, would be less problematic. Beginning in the
fall of 1861 and continuing throughout 1862, the Richmond Daily Dispatch was a
particularly vocal advocate of this idea, claiming that Garibaldi himself had nothing to do
with his own victories, and arguing that circumstances outside of Garibaldi’s control,
rather than his reliance on the positive values of nationalism, were what had led to his
success in Italy. To make this argument, southern reporters informed their readers that
Garibaldi himself had contributed little to the success of the Italian Risorgimento. The
Richmond Daily Dispatch claimed that it was Garibaldi’s volunteer soldiers, rather than
Garibaldi himself, who had led Italian forces to victory.22 This same newspaper joined
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praise for the South with criticism of Garibaldi by claiming that the only reason why
Garibaldi’s armies had succeeded was that his soldiers had resembled those who would
later fight for the Confederacy.23 The Richmond Daily Dispatch repeated this
juxtaposition a few months later, now arguing that it was Garibaldi’s cause – which
resembled that of the South – that led to his victories.24 By separating Garibaldi from the
success that had made him famous, and therefore undermining his appeal as a
representative of the strengths of nationalism, southern nationalists sought to claim that
Garibaldi should not be a symbol of nationalism. As they attempted to protect their
image of the Confederacy as an aspiring nation similar to Garibaldi’s own Italy,
Confederates manipulated the image of the main international figurehead of this
nationalism, displaying their commitment to the international comparisons they used to
legitimize the southern nation.
While most responses to the relationship between Garibaldi and the Union
glossed over the ideological implications of Garibaldi’s response, southern commentators
did occasionally engage with the political dimensions of the issue. Taking their
manipulation of the image of Garibaldi one step further, southern commentators argued
that in supporting the Union it was Garibaldi, not the Confederacy, who was betraying
the values of Italy and of liberal nationalism. Continuing to deny the incompatibility
between liberal nationalism and slavery, in late fall of 1861, southern reporters began
calling Garibaldi a hypocrite for supporting the Union’s cause. To prove that Garibaldi’s
support for emancipation and the North was hypocritical in light of his embrace of Italian
nationalism, the Richmond Daily Dispatch argued that if Garibaldi fought for the North,
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he would be “in opposition to the very principles for which he contended in Italy.”25 As
George N. Sanders, a former US diplomat and political radical who was working abroad
to further the cause of the Confederacy, wrote in a letter to Hungarian patriot Louis
Kossuth, for Garibaldi to aid the Union “would be a burning and devouring lie to all of
his eventful and hitherto glorious career.”26 In embracing abolition, Confederates argued,
Garibaldi turned his back on the very principles for which he fought in Italy. Through
this manipulation, Garibaldi, not the Confederacy, was mistaken as to the compatibility
of slavery and liberal nationalism, and, further, if Garibaldi was a hypocrite, he could no
longer be considered a symbol of nationalistic virtue, leaving the nation he had rejected –
the Confederacy – as the new exemplar of these values.
Responses to the Union’s offer to Garibaldi became less frequent in the winter of
1861-1862, as other matters preoccupied southerners. The issue of Garibaldi’s support
for the Union once again captured Confederates’ attention, however, when the invitation
to fight for the Union appeared to be renewed in the fall of 1862. After Garibaldi’s
campaign to secure Rome for the Italian nation failed due to his defeat and arrest at
Aspromonte, Thomas Canisius, the US consul in Vienna, took it upon himself to renew
negotiations with Garibaldi. This time, Garibaldi was willing, but the Union government
was no longer interested. Because Canisius forwarded their correspondence to the press,
however, Garibaldi’s interest in fighting for the Union was well-known.27
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Southerners utilized all the strategies they had developed in order to respond to
the first invitation to deal with this second show of support by Garibaldi for the Union.
Perhaps due in part to their earlier manipulations of Garibaldi, Confederate reporters had
already been critical of Garibaldi for what they saw as rash and wild behavior leading to
his failure at Aspromonte, and they transitioned easily from criticizing Garibaldi’s
leadership and military strategy to once again mocking and discrediting him.28 As
southerners had after the first invitation, the Richmond Daily Dispatch mocked the
North’s desperation and denigrated Garibaldi’s success, claiming that “the Federalists
must be hard run for military leaders when they have to apply to that defeated, wounded,
captured, played-out European brigand.”29 In response to a rumor that Garibaldi’s
veterans would come fight for the Union that appeared simultaneously in the southern
newspapers with news of Garibaldi’s desire to lead the northern army, the Daily
Columbus Enquirer echoed the aggression that had characterized the first responses to
news of the invitation, claiming that if Garibaldi’s veterans did come to fight for the
Union, they would be “mere land pirates, and deserving as such to be shot or hung.”30
This same paper implied that Garibaldi had been immaterial to the formation of the
Italian nation, calling him the “hero of everybody else’s business, except his own.”31
Going even further, the New Orleans Daily True Delta wrote that Garibaldi was “a poor
28
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and disloyal citizen of his own country” and was, in fact, “detrimental to the cause of
liberty” in Italy; in this view, Garibaldi had not only failed to accomplish the goals of
Italian nationalism, but also was harmful to the pursuit of those goals, and therefore was
certainly not a worthy representative of the ideals of Italian nationalism.32 The reaction
to the supposed second invitation utilized the same strategies created in response to the
first.33 Confederates were secure in their negative portrayal of Garibaldi; a simple
reminder to southerners of the previously-developed reasons why Garibaldi’s support for
the Union did not disprove Confederate comparisons with Italy was sufficient by late
1862.
The final event in the on-going challenge that Garibaldi’s support for the Union
presented for Confederate comparisons with Italy came with a widely-published August
1863 letter from Garibaldi to Lincoln. Responding to the Emancipation Proclamation,
Garibaldi praised Lincoln as the “true heir of the teaching given us by Christ and John
Brown,” and enthused that “if an entire race of human beings… has been restored to
human dignity… this is by your doing.”34 Since Confederates frequently equated Lincoln
with the terrible despots who had fought against Garibaldi and Italian nationalists, this
exchange highlighted the reality that, despite the comparisons Confederates had created
between their cause and that of Garibaldi and other foreign nationalists, they were not, in
fact, fighting the same fight. As with the rumors of a second invitation for Garibaldi to
fight for the Union, responses to this letter followed the pattern of initial responses. The
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Daily Richmond Enquirer mocked Garibaldi as “the biggest fool in the world.”35
Southern reporters referred to the letter as “blasphemous” and “monstrous.”36 Southern
Punch, a short-lived Confederate humor magazine established by John Wilford Overall in
Richmond in 1863, followed the strategy of attempting to discredit Garibaldi’s
contributions to his own success, claiming that Garibaldi had “achieved fame on the basis
of brute courage alone” rather than due to any particular virtue or adherence to principles
of nationalism.37 Additional strategies and analyses were not necessary, however. The
symbol of Garibaldi had already been remade within the Confederacy. Southern
manipulation of Garibaldi as a nationalist hero had already discredited him in southern
minds, and comparisons between the Confederacy and Italy were secure.
Through several distinct expressions of support for the Union by Garibaldi,
Confederates continued to manipulate the image of Garibaldi as a nationalist hero,
claiming that he was anything but that in order to maintain their self-comparison with
Italy. This southern manipulation of the symbol of Garibaldi extended beyond criticism
of Garibaldi himself. Just as in the antebellum period Garibaldi had served as a yardstick
by which other nationalists’ qualifications and character could be measured, during the
war, Confederates continued to use a now-rejected image of Garibaldi as a lens through
which they could evaluate and judge other nationalists. Following from their image of
Garibaldi as a hypocrite, southern nationalists began to use Garibaldi as a symbol of a
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failed nationalist, and, further, they began to claim that anyone associated with Garibaldi
was therefore also a failure as a representative of the values of nationalism.
The debate over the Garibaldi Guard, or 39th New York Volunteers, provides the
best example of southern usage of Garibaldi to discredit those associated with him.
Southern writers latched on to any evidence that the Garibaldi Guard was failing,
attributing this failure to its namesake’s supposedly weak ideals. For example, a former
Italian citizen who was naturalized as a citizen of the Confederacy wrote that he fervently
hoped that no Italian would enlist in the Garibaldi Guard as doing so would mean
fighting against the very ideals for Italy had fought.38 Southern analysts frequently
referred to the members of the Garibaldi Guard, as well as other immigrants enlisted in
the Union army, as refugees, adventurers, and other such terms that mitigated these
soldiers’ commitment to the Union cause, sometimes even outright claiming that these
foreign soldiers were duped by false northern claims of nationalistic virtue.39
Resignations from the Garibaldi Guard, and, especially, desertions from the Garibaldi
Guard to the Confederate Army, further proved to Confederates that Garibaldi was not a
legitimate inspiration of nationalism.40 Instead of using Garibaldi to attribute glory to
others, Confederates now used the Garibaldi Guard’s association with its namesake to
discredit the unit. In doing so, Confederates turned Garibaldi’s rejection of the
Confederacy around to serve their own purpose of identifying themselves, and their cause
of nationhood, with Italy.
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By portraying Garibaldi’s support for the Union as in opposition to the values he
supported in Italy, Confederates sought, contrary to reality, to prove that such a powerful
symbol of liberty and nationalism could never belong to the Union, helping them to
sustain their comparison and subsequent claim to the virtues that Garibaldi represented.
As they attempted to limit the association of Garibaldi with the desired ideals of
nationalism, southerners once again strove to alter the discourse about, and understanding
of, nationalism and its symbols in order to reconcile southern slavery with liberal
nationalism. As they wrestled with this contradiction, Confederates re-committed
themselves to their own, limited definition of nationalism and to the idea that this
nationalism represented a legitimate attempt at nation-building.
Garibaldi’s support for the Union presented an early and sustained symbolic
challenge to Confederates’ self-equation with Italy. Garibaldi was not the only foreigner
to point out the contradictions between slavery and liberal nationalism, however, and his
support for the Union was not the only challenge to Confederate self-comparisons with
aspiring nations in Europe. Confederates’ international comparisons also faced very
pragmatic challenges as well. In particular, the much-hoped-for official diplomatic
recognition that Confederate officials had sought from the beginning of the war failed to
materialize, casting serious doubt on southern analysts’ vision of the Confederacy as an
equal member of the community of nations. Southern opinion-makers who shaped
domestic discourse about the place of the Confederacy in the world were aware of
Confederate diplomatic efforts and failures, and throughout the war, used their analysis of
the Confederacy’s supposed claims to diplomatic recognition to bolster their efforts to
legitimize and defend the southern nation through international contextualization.
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The international contextualization of the South’s claims to national independence
led Confederate officials and citizens alike to argue that, as an aspiring nation adhering to
the popular nineteenth century principles of nationalism, the Confederacy deserved
diplomatic recognition.41 Confederate officials began pursuing diplomatic recognition as
soon as the Confederacy was established, hoping that aid from abroad would help lead to
southern victory.42 Although international comparisons played only a minor role in
official diplomatic efforts to win support for the Confederacy, diplomats were aware of
these comparisons, and Robert M. T. Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, instructed
diplomat James M. Mason to inform the British government of the supposed similarities
between the Confederacy and Italy, which Great Britain had recognized.43 The main
diplomatic strategies of the Confederacy, however, rested predominantly on the idea that
European demand for southern cotton would win support for the South.44 King Cotton,
and Confederate diplomacy in general, proved less compelling than Confederates had
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hoped.45 Many Europeans did feel sympathy for the Confederacy, and even used private
channels to raise support for the southern nation.46 Due to a combination of European
nations’ domestic concerns, fears of becoming entangled in war, and distaste for slavery,
however, official recognition and aid never came.47
Through 1861 and in to 1862, Confederates who analyzed foreign opinion
remained convinced that their recognition would be forthcoming, especially due to their
claims of similarity with Italy, a new nation that had been recognized by major powers
including Great Britain, France, and the United States in late spring of 1861.48 As the
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Charleston Mercury exclaimed, “upon every principle of the laws of nations, [the
Confederate States] have a right to be recognized as one of the nations of the world,” just
as with the new nation of Italy.49 The Confederacy had done its duty in proving that it
met the requirements for nationhood, according to southern analysts.50 The belief that the
Confederacy deserved recognition strengthened Confederate conviction that the southern
nation was equal to nations such as Italy. Despite this confidence, however, recognition
never came.
Although international comparisons were only a small portion of official
diplomatic efforts to gain recognition, domestic analysis of diplomacy played a critical
role in southern commentators’ efforts to claim a place for the southern nation within the
international community of nations. In order to reconcile the lack of diplomatic
recognition with their belief that the Confederacy had equal claims to national legitimacy
as Italy, Confederates began developing explanations as to why European powers would
not recognize the Confederacy, despite the apparent similarity between the Confederacy
and recognized nations in Europe. These explanations reveal less about the actual
reasons for the lack of recognition than they do about the importance of the international
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perspective from which Confederates viewed their nation, as well as these Confederates’
commitment to their international comparisons. To southern commentators during the
Civil War, international comparisons proved that diplomatic recognition should be
forthcoming; when recognition was never granted, these commentators thus sought to
explain the failure in terms of these same international comparisons.
One of the first southern responses to lack of recognition was to claim that
European powers were always slow to recognize new nations. This argument began as
early as the spring of 1861 before Great Britain and France had extended recognition to
Italy. Reporters and analysts pointed out that although France and Great Britain had not
yet recognized the Confederacy, they also had yet to recognize Italy, and therefore the
Confederacy should not be concerned. The fact that Italy had yet to be recognized
seemed to excuse the fact that the Confederacy was also unrecognized.51 Lack of
recognition, these Confederates claimed, was due to European patterns of action, and not
due to any failings on the part of the Confederacy to meet international requirements for
nationhood.
While this initial strategy of claiming that the lack of recognition had nothing to
do with the Confederacy and its national values allowed Confederates to ignore slavery
and its incompatibility with liberal nationalism, domestic discussions of the lack of
recognition did frequently engage the issue of slavery. Slavery had been a critical part of
southerners’ international comparisons as early as the 1850s, when southerners compared
the North’s attempts to limit slavery with European tyranny. In late 1861 and early 1862,
while southerners still hoped for recognition, some Confederates began to address the
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problems that slavery caused for the Confederacy’s case for international recognition.
Instead of admitting to the burden that slavery imposed on a nation seeking independence
on the basis of adherence to the principles of liberal nationalism, however, southern
commentators argued that Europeans were incorrect in seeing slavery as inconsistent with
the standards of nationalism that Confederates sought to claim, and that slavery should
therefore not prevent recognition. Europeans, southerners claimed, were simply ignorant
of the truth of the South, slavery, and the relationship between the North and South. John
Mitchel explained this supposed ignorance by pointing out that the northern press
dominated the news that Europe got from America, and therefore skewed European
views of American affairs.52 This served as a call to arms for fellow southerners, as when
the Macon Daily Telegraph suggested that the Confederacy should use the occasion of
the 1862 London World’s Fair to educate Europe about the reality of the South, or when
the Charleston Daily Courier encouraged its readers to send more southern journals
abroad to eliminate the bias toward the North.53 In southern minds, shaped by a limited
vision of the key tenets of nationalism that excluded the full implications of liberty and
equality, slavery was compatible with the principles of nationalism exhibited by aspiring
nations abroad. Still hopeful of foreign aid, southern commentators remained committed
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to their narrow vision of nationalism, claiming that Europeans would support the South
when they realized that the issues of slavery and abolition were more complicated than
Europeans believed and that the Civil War was about nationality as well as slavery, and
thus slavery did not preclude a legitimate claim to nationhood.54 Ignorance, southerners
argued, not ideology, prevented Europe from recognizing the South.
While the idea that Europeans were simply misinformed about slavery and the
Confederacy had its roots in the early days of the Confederacy, the idea became
popularized around 1863 when Edward Pollard, ardent secessionist and influential
journalist, advocated this belief in his analyses of the Confederacy and the war. Pollard
had been one of the more outspoken advocates of secession, and would go on to play a
critical role in the formation of the Lost Cause. During the war, he used his considerable
platform as editor of the Daily Richmond Examiner, along with his authorship of several
pamphlets, to spread his views. Moving beyond early-war declarations that the
Confederacy would gain recognition alongside Italy and that Europeans simply did not
know enough about the South to fairly evaluate slavery, Pollard asserted that the
increased exposure to the South that Europe had gained during the early years of the Civil
War would actually reverse Europeans’ opinion of slavery. He claimed that over time,
the wartime abuses committed by northern abolitionists had caused European sympathy
for those abolitionists to wane, and that “the war had also given occasion to intelligent
persons in all parts of the world for a more thorough, a more interested and a more
practical study of slavery in the South,” one that caused stories of “fiendish masters” to
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become “objects of skepticism or derision in Europe.”55 Because Europe now understood
that the North actually had no love for the slave, and that southern slavery was not as
harmful and immoral as they had believed, Europe would soon realize that slavery was
not incompatible with the principles of nationalism, and Europeans would thus soon
support the South.56
Pollard was the most outspoken and prominent advocate of this position, but he
was not alone. Other Confederates echoed this belief, arguing that as the war educated
Europeans on the benign nature of slavery, Europeans would support the Confederacy.57
If Europe was simply misinformed, about America, the Civil War, and slavery, then lack
of recognition was not a fault of the national values of the Confederacy. If slavery was
benign, Pollard and others argued, it did not prevent the Confederacy from meeting
international requirements for nationhood, and southern nationalists’ international
comparisons were secure. Of course, this argument depended upon southern
manipulations of the ideals of liberal nationalism; only in southerners’ minds could
slavery be compatible with liberal nationalism. Nonetheless, the argument that erosion of
European ignorance of slavery would lead to support from European powers allowed
Confederates to retain their sense that the South, like aspiring European nationalities,
deserved national independence.
Although Confederate reports did frequently deal with the issues of slavery and
recognition, another strategy that emerged by the midpoint of the war, as Confederate
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recognition no longer seemed tied to that of Italy and as defeat began to seem possible,
was for Confederates to turn to defeated, and thus unrecognized, aspiring nations in
Europe as a means of explaining the lack of recognition granted to the southern nation.
By 1863, in order to protect their self-identity as one of many deserving nations seeking
independence, southern nationalists rejected Italy as a point of comparison and instead
began comparing themselves to aspiring nations in Europe that had not received the
recognition that Confederates believed they deserved. In this formulation, the
Confederacy was just one of many hopeful nations to be unjustly excluded from the
family of nations. The Daily Richmond Examiner pointed out, for example, that
European powers had not cared about the sufferings of Hungary, Poland, and Ireland any
more than they did those of the Confederacy.58 Southern Punch argued that if Europe
was willing to stand by and tolerate the extreme suffering of Poland, it was unlikely that
Europe would intervene to aid the South.59 Rev. Stephen Elliot, the Presiding Bishop of
the Episcopal Church of the Confederacy, also espoused this idea, arguing that the great
powers of Europe had always feared and therefore opposed revolution, as in Hungary and
Poland and even in Italy and Belgium, and they would be no more well-disposed toward
revolution in America.60 If European powers failed to recognize the Confederacy,
southern nationalists argued, they had equally failed to recognize supposedly legitimate
and suffering nations in Europe. The Confederacy was not alone in its lack of
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recognition, and therefore could still be portrayed as following the precedent of aspiring
European nations.
Some Confederates even began to point to the harm that had befallen nations that
had received recognition as proof that the Confederacy did not actually want recognition
after all. Greece, as William Graham Swan, Confederate Congressman from Tennessee,
informed his fellow congressmen, had been rendered no more independent than a puppet
after receiving recognition from Great Britain and its allies, and Portugal had become a
servant as a result of European intervention.61 Foreign comparisons not only revealed
that the lack of recognition was not the fault of the Confederacy; indeed, southerners
utilizing these comparisons also endeavored to show that the lack of recognition was not
a problem, period.
Emerging out of this sense that the lack of diplomatic recognition was due to
European, rather than Confederate, failings, southern commentators during the middle
and late periods of the war began accusing other nations of being hypocritical in refusing
to recognize the Confederacy. Southern analysts believed that the Confederacy – which
had now successfully sustained itself and waged war for two years – was stronger than
other nations that had been recognized, and they questioned why, in light of this national
strength, recognition of the Confederacy continued to be withheld. The Southern
Illustrated News, a Confederate-era weekly out of Richmond, declared (contrary to the
ample evidence of the many failed aspiring nations in Europe) that “the Confederate
States are the only new power [Great Britain] has refused to recognise, and yet they have
manifested a degree of strength greater than all those we have enumerated put together.
61

William Graham Swan, Foreign Relations: Speech of Hon. W. G. Swan, of Tennessee, Delivered in the
House of Representatives of the Confederate States, February 4, 1863 (Richmond, VA: Smith, Bailey, and
Co, 1863), 5.

147

We have, under these circumstances, we think, some right to be indignant.”62 Fueling
this sense of indignation, even some London newspapers began to question why Great
Britain would recognize Italy and Greece, among others, but not the Confederacy.63 The
lack of recognition of the Confederacy, southern nationalists argued, was due to the
hypocrisy of foreign powers. This argument enhanced Confederate belief in the
endurance of a southern nation that had survived years at war, even as it allowed southern
nationalists to avoid the issue of why the Confederacy failed to meet standards of liberal
nationhood by shifting the blame to other parties.
The lack of recognition, while primarily an issue for Confederate diplomats in
Europe, nonetheless resonated with domestic commentators and opinion-makers. These
Confederates at home had to either confront the reality that the lack of recognition, while
largely due to issues unrelated to the Confederacy’s similarities or lack thereof to aspiring
European nations, nonetheless suggested the failure of their international comparisons,
or, alternatively, find a way to claim that, even in the face of failure in the international
court of opinion, the Confederacy was a legitimate aspiring nation. Through claiming
that slavery was only a problem due to European ignorance, that lack of recognition was
a European pattern rather than a response to the Confederacy, and that European powers
were hypocrites for recognizing other aspiring nations but not the Confederacy,
Confederates defended their sense of the Confederacy as part of a larger trend of
nationalist movements that sought independence for aspiring nations.
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Although lack of diplomatic recognition and official aid was the greatest failure of
Confederate diplomatic efforts abroad, the failure to win more widespread and enduring
support among the general populations in Europe also contributed to Confederate
difficulties abroad. While many British and other Europeans did support the
Confederacy, Confederates were aware that this support and sympathy was not as
widespread or enthusiastic as the support and sympathy given to various nationalist
movements in Europe.64 Southerners had watched carefully as Europeans and Americans
alike had exploded in sympathy for nationalist movements from the Greek independence
movement, to the revolutions of 1848, to the Italian Risorgimento. Now that southerners
were undertaking their own experiment in nation-building – one they claimed followed
the precedent of those earlier and much-celebrated movements – they wondered where
their support and praise was. Extending their claims of hypocrisy due to lack of
recognition, southern nationalists argued that the lack of support given to the
Confederacy in general was hypocritical when contrasted with the outpouring of
sympathy shown for other nationalist movements. Such a formulation once again
required the manipulation of the ideals of liberal nationalism, as the true ideological
incompatibility was the South’s; nonetheless, Confederates cried hypocrisy to sustain
their international defense of the southern nation.
Early accusations of hypocrisy targeted Europeans who fought for the Union
army. To many Confederates, these foreign born soldiers were fighting against the
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principles for which their nations in Europe stood. Richmond’s Daily Dispatch withdrew
any sympathy the South had given to foreign nationalists on the basis that “the Europeans
whom we have been sympathizing with so universally compose the vast bulk of the army
which is invading our country,” adding that “the great motive urged upon them for
enlistment is, that if this ‘rebellion’ is not put down, the cause of freedom Abroad will
suffer! So that freedom in America must perish in order that freedom in Europe may be
established.”65 John Mitchel praised Irishmen fighting for the South and mocked the idea
of Irish soldiers in the North taking up arms against the southern rebellion, scoffing “as if
the very idea of rebels and rebellion were the thought most abhorrent in Irish nature.”66
Similarly, the Augusta (GA) Daily Constitutionalist wondered how Thomas Francis
Meagher, a leading Irish nationalist who joined the Union army and recruited his fellow
Irishmen to fight for the North, could aid the subjugation of the South when the South
was the true hope for the principles Irishmen held dear.67 The Confederacy, southern
commentators argued, fought for the same cause as did Ireland and other aspiring nations
in Europe, and therefore to support the aspiring European nations while seeking to defeat
the Confederacy was an act of absolute hypocrisy. The lack of foreign support for the
Confederacy, then, was not about the Confederacy’s failures to qualify for national
independence, but instead, was due to the hypocrisy of the Confederacy’s international
observers.
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By 1862 and 1863, driven by the growing enmity toward the North that wartime
sufferings engendered, accusations of hypocrisy shifted from foreign born soldiers
fighting for the Union to criticism of the northern nation itself. Southern analysts began
expressing disbelief that the North refused to acknowledge the connection between the
ideals of the nationalist movements that northerners had supported in Europe and the
ideals of the Confederacy. The Richmond Daily Dispatch was one of the main supporters
of this argument, crying that “whether it was Irish rebels against England, Greeks against
Turkey, Frenchmen and Germans against their kings, or Italy against the Austrians, the
North boiled over with enthusiasm in their cause,” only “attach[ing] any opprobrium to
the name of rebel; a name which has always heretofore been with them a synonym for all
that is praise worthy and glorious” when the South itself “threw off the chains of
vassalage and determined to be free.”68
The sense that northerners were acting as hypocrites for denying selfdetermination in the South while supporting it in Europe was common among southern
intellectuals and power-brokers. Robert Barnwell Rhett, fire-eating secessionist and
Confederate congressman, concurred with this conclusion, informing a convention of the
state of South Carolina that the North demonstrated a disregard for freedom of which
“history had no record,” as the North declared “with a hypocrisy only possible with an
unparalleled depravity” that they “are contending for the liberties of the earth” while truly
setting back the cause of “free government” for “centuries.”69 Similarly, in a clear
68

“Northern Despotism,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, April 24, 1862. See also “Garibaldi,” Richmond Daily
Dispatch, August 18, 1862.
69

“Speech of the Hon. R. B. Rhett, Delivered in the Convention of the State of South Carolina,” Charleston
Mercury, October 29, 1862. See also Journal of the House of Delegates of the State of Virginia, 17. This
view occasionally was expressed in foreign publications as well; for example, see “Comments of the
London Times on American Affairs,” Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser, July 22, 1862.

151

condemnation of the North, pamphleteer T. W. MacMahon wrote that northerners,
“accustomed to weep over the fate of Greece, Poland, and Hungary – accustomed to
espouse the cause of Lombardy and Venetia against Austria, the cause of the Papal States
against the Pope – they have voted thousands, reckoned by hundreds, of men, and
millions of money, to support a despotism, compared with which, those of King Bomba
and Francis Joseph were balm.”70 John L. O’Sullivan, the journalist who originated the
term “Manifest Destiny,” also embraced this idea. Despite long being entrenched in
antebellum northern politics, O’Sullivan supported the Confederacy after the outbreak of
war. He utilized his war-time residency in Lisbon and London and his background as a
journalist to publish pro-Confederate pamphlets in London in an effort to spread southern
propaganda throughout Europe. O’Sullivan, already disillusioned with the North for
waging war instead of letting the South secede peacefully, embraced the idea of northern
hypocrisy, accusing the North of replicating Russia’s oppression of Poland by
perpetuating war against the southern states, as well as of betraying the American
Revolution.71 As the reality of war pervaded the South, elite southerners explained
southern suffering to their fellow countrymen by claiming that the hypocritical North
actively fought to limit in the South the same principles that it had praised abroad.
Despite the fact that the North fought a war against southern nationalism,
Confederates still managed to be offended that northerners did not celebrate the South’s
claim to nationhood in the ways that they had those of other aspiring nations, proving the
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importance of this comparison to southerners’ perception of the South as an independent
nation. The South, like Poland, Italy, and other aspiring nations of Europe, Confederates
argued, fought for liberty and against tyranny. Any nation that supported these causes in
Europe, then, must support them in America, too, or else be a hypocrite. Certainly these
arguments ignored the real hypocrisy of claiming to support slavery and the ideals of
liberalism at the same time. Confederates had proved willing, however, to manipulate
ideals and symbols in order to preserve their own sense of their nation as part of a century
of nationalism. By pointing out what they perceived to be an inconsistency in the
Union’s reaction to new nations, Confederates sought to maintain their own position as a
legitimate new nation, similar to those in Europe.
Confederates did not easily accept that the Confederacy was not, in fact, similar to
the new and aspiring nations in Europe that they used to claim legitimacy. They denied
that the Confederacy’s failure to live up to international standards for nationhood had
anything to do with the lack of diplomatic recognition they received; they called foreign
nations hypocrites for showing sympathy and support for new and aspiring nations in
Europe but not for the Confederacy; and they attempted to remake the image of
Garibaldi, the international symbol of nationalism, to protect their international
comparisons even in the face of Garibaldi’s support for the Union cause. These
responses to the international failure of southern nationalists’ comparisons reveal just
how committed southern nationalists were to proving that the Confederacy was one of
many new nations aspiring to membership in the international community of nations in
the middle of the nineteenth century. These responses also reveal the extent to which
Confederates were willing and able to ignore the ideological problems that plagued these
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comparisons, rejecting the reality that slavery opposed the same liberal ideals that
southern nationalists tried to claim through international comparisons.
Southern commitment to these international comparisons proved so strong that, as
military defeat loomed, Confederates turned once again to these international
comparisons, now utilizing comparisons to help them understand and process the
possibility of defeat. Looking now at defeated nationalities, and acknowledging that so
many of the aspiring nations that they admired had not succeeded in establishing
independent nationhood, southern nationalists drew comparisons between the plight of
these unfortunate nations and the situation that they believed that southerners would face
if the North were victorious. They used these comparisons to spur their fellow
southerners to continue fighting, as well as to understand the meaning of defeat.
Many of these comparisons of the doom of defeat centered on the idea that the
South needed to strengthen its efforts in order to avoid the fate suffered by failed
nationalist movements in Europe. As the Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel warned
as early as 1863, nations are responsible for their own fate, and the Confederacy, “the
newest born of nations, having before it so marked a warning,” should “heed the
warnings of history” lest it suffer the same fate as Poland, “blotted from the map.”72 This
type of rhetoric increased in 1864 and 1865, as military success seemed less likely. No
less an authority than the Congress of the Confederacy warned its citizens that “the fate
of Ireland at the period of its conquest, and of Poland, distinctly foreshadows what would
await us” if the Confederacy fell to the Union.73 Similarly, the Richmond Whig
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expounded at length upon the similarities between Ireland’s subjugation to England and
the subjugation that the South could expect upon re-entering the Union, highlighting the
lack of representation and political power it anticipated.74 Confederate Senator Benjamin
Hill asserted that if the South gave in to Lincoln, it would become the Hungary, Poland,
and Ireland of America, and make those oppressed nations feel like a “paradise.”75
International comparisons provided southern nationalists with a way to understand what
was at stake as defeat loomed, as well as with a way to continue encouraging their fellow
southerners to help stave off that defeat. Even when the end of the Confederacy seemed
nigh, southern nationalists continued to turn to international comparisons as a way of
explaining the Confederacy and the necessity of its independence.
Although Confederate responses to the failure of their international comparisons
most often denied the contradiction between slavery and liberal nationalism, very rarely,
a few Confederates did show glimmers of understanding that the Confederacy did not
fully follow the precedent of aspiring nations abroad. John Mitchel, who typically
vehemently defended the southern nation and its similarity to aspiring European nations,
did at one point admit that the oppression the South faced simply was not enough to
justify intervention on the part of European powers.76 Mitchel’s newspaper, the
Charleston Mercury, likewise admitted that Europeans recognized that the South had not
suffered the way aspiring nations like Poland had.77 Even some of the most vocal
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proponents of the idea of the South as following the precedent of aspiring nations in
Europe did occasionally temper their arguments with the recognition that, despite claims
to the contrary, the Confederacy failed to meet the ideological standard of the liberal
nationalist movements to which southern nationalists compared their own.
As the end of the war drew near, the Richmond Whig, in an article republished
widely in other southern journals, had the clearest statement of understanding of the
problems that threatened Confederates’ self-comparisons with aspiring nations in Europe.
The editor of the Whig admitted that if the international audience believed southern
claims that the Confederacy was motivated by the spirit of the Greeks and the Dutch,
southern victory would be assured – and yet, victory seemed to be slipping away. The
Whig explained that although southerners flattered themselves that they held the qualities
that had won these other nationalities respect and recognition, in truth southerners had yet
to reach that standard.78 For at least this one Confederate, impending defeat brought with
it recognition that the comparisons with which Confederates had sought to legitimize
their nation throughout secession and the war were, in fact, rhetorical inventions. The
Confederacy was not like new and aspiring nations in Europe, and did not have similar
legitimacy on the basis of shared liberal nationalist principles.
Despite Confederates’ assertions that their nation deserved legitimacy, and that
foreign recognition and independence would quickly be forthcoming, the Confederacy
failed to secure national independence. The international comparisons that resonated so
widely throughout the Confederacy were built upon false premises, as, despite
Confederate insistence to the contrary, a slave-holding nation could never live up to the
standards of nationalism that prevailed in the climate of mid-nineteenth century liberal
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nationalism. The international community rejected the Confederacy from the family of
nations, most pointedly by refusing diplomatic recognition. Giuseppe Garibaldi,
international symbol of nationalism, revealed some of the reasons behind this lack of
support and recognition when he repeatedly expressed his sympathy for the Union. If the
Confederates’ comparisons had resonated internationally, these dual rejections would not
have occurred.
Even as international events highlighted the differences between the Confederacy
and aspiring nations in Europe, many Confederates remained committed to their vision of
their nation as one of many aspiring nations legitimately seeking independence. Instead
of switching strategies, southern analysts spent their energies developing ways to defend
their comparisons, even in the face of an international climate that discredited the
supposed similarity between the Confederacy and aspiring European nations. They
manipulated the ideas of nationalism, and the reality of international politics, to support
their own beliefs. These Confederates claimed that the lack of diplomatic recognition
was due to European policy rather than Confederate failings; they called foreigners and
foreign powers hypocrites for supporting other nationalist revolutions but not the
Confederacy; and they sought to re-make the symbol of Garibaldi, detaching him from
the principles of nationalism with which he was so closely associated in order to mitigate
the harm that his support for the Union did to Confederate comparisons with Italy. When
defeat seemed assured, they then turned to these comparisons once again to help them
make sense out of their failure. Throughout the war, evidence continually mounted that
disproved Confederates’ comparisons with aspiring nations abroad. Despite this
evidence, however, many Confederates remained committed to their vision of the
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Confederacy as one of many nations aspiring to membership in the family of nations in
the middle of the nineteenth century.
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Chapter Five
Crafting Conservative Comparisons, 1861-1865
International influences proved critical to southern nationalists’ efforts to define
and defend the southern nation, and this held true across the political spectrum. While
the most common southern usage of international comparisons was to claim that the
southern nation followed in the ideological footsteps of liberal nationalist movements in
Europe, to the most conservative of southerners, the southern nation held a very different
place within the family of nations. More conservative southern analysts developed an
alternative interpretation of the meaning of European nationalisms for the southern
nation, one that claimed that the southern nation was an exception among new nations,
and that the conservative Confederacy represented an improvement upon the model of
nation-building presented in Europe.
To the more conservative southerners who debated and analyzed issues of
nationhood, southern nationalism was premised not upon a liberal nationalism resembling
that of new and aspiring nations abroad, but instead was built upon slavery and
conservative principles of hierarchy, social order, and limited democracy. In this
formulation, the conservative Confederacy, not liberal nations in Europe, was the model
to which other nations should aspire. Further, these conservative southerners argued that
the North, not the South, was shaped by the liberal ideologies of European nationalisms,
and that the growing influence of these liberal ideas in the North was what had
necessitated a separate southern nation. Conservative southerners thus used international
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contextualization to celebrate and extol the unique virtues of a conservative southern
nation.
Conservatism was a major force in southern politics throughout the antebellum
and Civil War eras. Like other Americans, southerners were influenced by the
Enlightenment philosophies that had shaped the United States, and thus southerners, like
their fellow countrymen, held republicanism as the ultimate form of government.
Southern respect for the liberal institutions of the United States was always tempered,
however, by conservative desires for such principles as a hierarchical social order and
limited democracy.1 The necessity of defending slavery further fueled southern fears of
the implications of such ideals as freedom and equality.2 Even during the early national
period, conservative southerners sought to promote states’ rights and to limit the power of
the national government, and they advocated for a vision of republicanism and of liberty
based on this preference for local community over central government. As the southern
defense of slavery intensified in the antebellum period, conservative southerners folded
slavery into their vision of the good society, emphasizing the importance of the protection
of property to liberty and to republicanism, and even arguing that slavery allowed for a
stronger, more advanced form of republicanism.3 Historians have identified the critical
influence that southern conservatism and the defense of slavery had on the creation of the
southern nation, even highlighting the ways in which southern nationalists believed their
1
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slave-based nation would provide a new and improved model of nationhood.4 Such
conservative discourse, as with larger southern debates over the meaning of nationhood,
was not limited to domestic issues, however; even the most conservative of southerners
understood nationhood and nation-building through an international context, using their
conservative values to analyze the place of the new southern nation within the larger
international community.
The southern nationalists who analyzed the international context of the
Confederacy through a conservative lens both resembled and differed from those
southern nationalists using liberal comparisons. Many influential southern periodicals,
such as the Charleston Mercury and the Daily Richmond Examiner, printed both liberal
and conservative analyses of the southern nation’s place within an international
community of nations. Other publications leaned strongly in one direction. The
Richmond Daily Dispatch was one of the leading proponents of the argument that the
southern nation resembled aspiring nations abroad, while magazines, including the
Southern Literary Messenger and, particularly, DeBow’s Review, almost exclusively
argued that the South’s conservatism set it apart from other nations. Southern analysts
actively debated the meaning of southern nationhood within an international context,
sometimes strategically deploying whichever comparisons seemed most useful, but also,
at times, revealing deeply-held beliefs about the appropriate form of southern nationhood.
The main reason why certain southerners embraced conservative analysis over
liberal was that they interpreted foreign revolutions through a more conservative and
critical lens, and thus they rejected more liberal comparisons that used foreign nations as
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a positive point of comparison for the southern nation. The southerners who crafted
conservative analyses of the international context of the southern nation were responding
to different themes in antebellum southern thought than were the southerners who
endorsed more liberal comparisons. While most antebellum southerners had watched the
revolutions of 1848 with some wariness, liberal comparisons between the southern nation
and new nations abroad nonetheless characterized nationalist movements in Europe
primarily as seeking positive values such as republicanism, whereas conservative
comparisons relied more on the southern heritage of suspicion of revolutions abroad.5
Guided by their concerns about the chaos and violence created by revolutions in Europe,
conservative southerners defined their new nation by its difference from, rather than
similarity to, aspiring nations abroad, and claimed that the North, not the South, inherited
the unchecked and harmful liberalism demonstrated by European nationalist movements.6
These southern opinion-makers celebrated conservatism and slavery as the basis of
southern national identity, arguing that limitations of freedom and democracy would
strengthen the southern nation and would even purify nationalism of the excesses of
liberalism found in nationalist movements in Europe. In part because these conservatives
believed that foreign nationalist movements deviated from what they saw as acceptable
forms of nation-building, conservative southerners had never fully embraced nationalist
5
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movements in Europe. This suspicion of and antipathy toward aspiring nations abroad
would form the basis for conservatives’ international comparisons that claimed that the
Confederacy had little to nothing in common with the revolutions in Europe, and that the
differences between the southern nation and aspiring European nations placed the
southern nation in the position of superiority.
In 1860 and 1861, as southerners seceded from the United States and undertook
the process of creating a southern nation, conservative southerners, like their more liberal
compatriots, turned to international comparisons to explain and make sense out of the
differences between the North and the South and to justify the creation of an independent
southern nation. As they did so, southern nationalists who used conservative
comparisons to justify secession agreed with their more liberal counterparts that the
Confederacy upheld the true tradition of the American Revolution, and that northern
liberalism had corrupted the principles of the American nation. While admitting that the
nation was founded with the intent of protecting rights and liberties, for example, an
author in DeBow’s Review argued that the power of the government, as directed by
northerners, had grown so strong as to abuse the rights it had been founded to protect.7
Such arguments often grew out of conservative southern desire to preserve slavery;
another writer for DeBow’s Review argued that northern devotion to equality of the races
had betrayed the founders’ wisdom at rejecting such racial equality.8 To most southern
opinion-makers, northern liberalism had corrupted the original American national
principles.
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While agreeing that the North had betrayed the original principles of the
American republic, many southern nationalists also believed that southern conservatism
had strengthened the early nation, and that secession and a southern nation would redeem
and protect these beneficial and necessary conservative principles from northern
liberalism.9 Southern conservatism, conservatives argued, had kept northern liberalism in
check until the recent growth of northern power. Without the stabilizing influence of
conservatism, “the debased Yankee… dances with joy over the grave of his liberties” as
the Daily Richmond Examiner explained.10 Secession was thus necessary to rescue the
original principles of the United States from the northern violations thereof.11 This idea,
useful in justifying the creation of an independent nation as it happened, remained
popular throughout the war; as South Carolina conservative and Confederate
Congressman Robert Barnwell Rhett said in an 1862 speech, “the great cause of free
government [northerners] have thrown back, perhaps, for centuries, and have left its
preservation, on this continent at least, alone to the Confederate States.”12 Because
southern conservatism purified what northern liberalism had corrupted, southerners
argued, they were justified in creating an independent southern nation.
As conservatives made their case that northern liberalism betrayed the intent of
the American Revolution, and that a conservative southern nation would save the true
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American national principles, they turned to international context to bolster their claims.
Failed, and excessively liberal, attempts at nation-building in Europe provided an
example of the harm that conservative southern nationalists believed would occur if
northern liberalism were not checked by southern conservatism. Not only did the loss of
conservatism lead to the destruction of the North and of the American nation, for
example, but it also “reduced the Abolition states to the condition” of post-Revolutionary
France, according to the Daily Richmond Examiner.13 Southern opinion-makers also
turned to criticism of the revolutions of 1848 that had blamed the defeat of aspiring
nations on excess liberalism in order to claim that unchecked northern liberalism would
create similar harm in America. Antebellum southern analysts had argued that red
republicanism, mob violence, and various forces of liberalism had corrupted and
destroyed nationalist movements in Europe, and conservative southerners during the
Civil War agreed.14 To southern conservatives, liberalism was a dangerous force, both in
the United States and in Europe. Without conservatism to check this liberalism, these
southern nationalists argued, the nation would decline to the chaos they had feared while
watching revolutions in Europe; only a new, and more conservative, southern nation
could prevent the spread of this chaos.
Conservatives expanded their comparisons of the excess liberalism of the North
and the excess liberalism of nationalist movements in Europe in order to claim that the
reason why the North threatened the South and betrayed the nation’s heritage was that
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northerners had been corrupted by the same liberalism that had doomed revolutions
abroad. Rejecting liberal comparisons that explored northern abuses against the South by
comparing the South to oppressed nations in Europe, conservative southerners instead
blamed European nationalists for the harms that the North would perpetuate against the
South. In particular, conservative southerners blamed red republicans and other radical
elements of European nationalist movements for spreading the ideas of abolitionism and
what they called black republicanism.15 Southerners had been wary of red republicans
during the revolutions of 1848, blaming these radicals for corrupting the revolutions.16
As they evaluated what had corrupted the United States and thus necessitated southern
secession, they turned once again to red republicanism, now equating that European
political party with the new Republican Party in the North, as well as with any form of
northern political ideology that conservatives saw as threatening. This comparison was
particularly popular through 1860 and early 1861, as southerners were beginning to
conceive of the South as distinct from the North and were creating justifications for
separating the South from the North.17 As John Tyler, Jr., Confederate secretary of war,
wrote under the penname “Python,” the harms were the same “whether the Protean shape
assumed be that of the ‘Roundhead,’ the ‘Sans-culotte,’ ‘Red Republican,’ or ‘Black
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Republican.’”18 Because black republicanism, following in the footsteps of red
republicanism, would usurp political power and endanger political rights, southern
nationalists argued, the South was justified in creating a separate nation.
While particularly useful in explaining why the South must break away from the
northern-dominated United States, the equation of black republicanism with red
republicanism and European liberalism continued throughout the war, as southerners
used this comparison to explain the harms that northern and European liberalism caused,
and that the Confederacy would avoid through conservatism. South Carolina politician
and diplomat William Henry Trescot expanded on the problems created by black
republicans in emulation of red republicans, asserting that “the Black Republican Party of
the United States is the same as the Red Republican Party of Europe. Butler combines the
principles of Mazzini with the practices of Haynau. You are fighting against chartered
privileges for the absolute tyranny of the mob.”19 Similarly, a journalist for the Daily
Richmond Examiner declared that black republicans, like red republicans, had supposedly
committed endless crimes in the name of liberty.20 The similarity of black republicanism
and red republicanism constituted a serious threat in the minds of southern conservatives
throughout the war, as well as created a powerful raison-d-être for the southern nation.
Southern conservatives, like most southerners, understood issues of nation
through an international context, and analyzed the harms that the North threatened
against the South through international comparisons. Instead of claiming a similar fight
18

Python [John Tyler, Jr.], “The Issues of 1860,” 268.

19

William Henry Trescot, “Letter from Wm. Henry Trescot Esq, of South Carolina, to Hon. J. R. Ingersoll,
of Pennsylvania,” Charleston Mercury, October 17, 1863.
20

“A Trip to the North - Personal Observations in Yankee Land,” Daily Richmond Examiner, November
15, 1862.

167

against tyranny with aspiring nations in Europe, however, the southern nationalists who
created conservative comparisons retained a fuller reliance on the critiques of the
revolutions in Europe as corrupted by liberalism, and thus used nationalist movements
abroad as a point of comparison with the North, rather than with the South. In this
analysis, the liberal nationalism exhibited abroad was not a way to escape northern
tyranny, but instead was responsible for creating northern tyranny, through poisoning the
political thought of the North. For southern nationalists who viewed nationalist
movements abroad as primarily characterized by dangerous ideals, conservatism was
necessary to provide a bulwark against the dangerous liberal ideas that had spread from
Europe to the North. The ideological similarity between the North and nationalist
movements in Europe, then, justified a separate, and more conservative, southern nation.
If conservative southerners believed that the liberal nationalist movements in
Europe provided the inspiration for harmful northern doctrines, then logically, the South
had more in common with the European regimes against which the nationalist
movements had fought. As they explored options for a new southern nation in the early
days of the Confederacy, a few southern conservatives aligned themselves with the
governments that had opposed the new and aspiring nations that frightened conservative
southerners. Looking to examples of monarchy and aristocracy in Europe, these most
extreme of conservatives posited that the South should forgo democracy and
republicanism altogether and adopt an aristocratic or even monarchical government.
Conservative southerners gave many reasons for supporting the creation of a
monarchy or, particularly, of an aristocracy in the southern nation. Southern
conservatives had long been concerned with the implications of full democracy, and,
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looking abroad, they believed that strict hierarchical forms of government would protect
conservative political values by eliminating the political voice of the undesirable
masses.21 The Southern Field and Fireside, for example, argued that the aristocratic
nature of democracy in the South would protect against tyranny.22 An author for
DeBow’s Review likewise asserted that “aristocracy is the only safeguard of liberty.”23
More direly, another author in DeBow’s Review warned that a government conceived in
too much democracy, without the stabilizing effect of aristocracy, would end in “anarchy,
despotism, and ruin.”24 Given the potential consequences of too much democracy, some
southern conservatives preferred to create a more limited form of government for their
new nation.
The creation of a formal aristocracy seemed natural to many conservatives, who
believed that the South already benefitted from many of the advantages of a hierarchical
social structure. The hierarchical nature of a slave society created what many southern
conservatives saw as a natural aristocracy. For example, a Scotchman living in Mobile
characterized the South as a “republican aristocracy” as he made a case for a potential
southern monarchy.25 DeBow’s Review claimed that a “permanent aristocracy, founded
upon the natural diversity of races” gave the South a “vital strength and energy.”26
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DeBow’s Review even went so far as to claim that southerners were “the most aristocratic
people in the world,” because “pride of caste, color, and privilege, makes every white
man an aristocrat in feeling.”27 The hierarchical racial structure of the South lent it the
form of aristocracy, according to conservatives, which they believed only benefitted the
South.
The benefits of aristocracy that the South enjoyed seemed eclipsed by the benefits
enjoyed by formal aristocracies and monarchies abroad, as international context provided
support for conservative southerners’ desire for aristocracy. Observations of aristocracies
and monarchies in Europe helped to convince some conservatives that the informal
southern aristocracy should be made official. DeBow’s Review looked to France’s many
revolutions, and to the turmoil that still plagued the French nation, to argue that France’s
attempts to eliminate aristocracy had ended in failure and chaos not once, but twice,
proving the superiority of a formal aristocracy.28 The Little Rock Arkansas State Gazette
went even further, claiming that France’s repeated failures to establish a republic were
proof that republics were weak and that monarchy was the best form of government. So
convinced was this author of the benefits of monarchy that he expressed surprise that
fellow southerners would not apply this principle in their own nation.29 Italy, which had
gained national independence and unity under a monarch, likewise revealed the benefits
of monarchy according to the Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, which claimed that
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a monarchical government would benefit the South.30 Analysis of aspiring nations
abroad proved to some conservative southerners that democracy was neither necessary
nor desirable for the southern nation, and that more hierarchical forms of power would
provide better governance for the Confederacy.
As they debated the relative merits of aristocracy and monarchy, not all
conservatives were convinced that these systems of government should be implemented
immediately. Many southerners praised the benefits of aristocracy and monarchy both in
theory and as enacted abroad, but argued that these more limited forms of government
should be a last resort for the South. For example, in writing to the editor of the Augusta
Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, one southerner praised Great Britain’s monarchy for
protecting property rights, suggesting that the South should create a similar government,
but only if democracy failed to protect those rights.31 For the Scotchman in Mobile,
although the South benefitted from its form as a republican aristocracy, monarchy was an
option to be considered only as a last safeguard against emancipation.32 Likewise, the
Macon Daily Telegraph endorsed monarchy only in response to British rumors that the
South would create such a government, claiming that monarchy would be preferable to
“Lincolndom,” but nonetheless admitting that rumors of the establishment of a southern
monarchy were false.33 Even among those conservatives who supported aristocracy and
monarchy, that support was often limited and qualified.
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Intensifying the debate over forms of government, other southern nationalists
outright opposed the idea of monarchy or aristocracy. The Augusta Daily
Constitutionalist rebutted its fellow Augusta newspaper, the Augusta Daily Chronicle
and Sentinel’s, endorsement of monarchy, arguing that northern abuses of the system,
rather than the American system of government itself, required reform.34 Even while
praising aristocracy, DeBow’s Review assured readers that “there is no danger that we
shall run into monarchy.”35 And, of course, for the majority of southerners, republicanism
was still the form of government to which they aspired.
As they debated the formation of a new southern nation, the most conservative of
southerners found inspiration, albeit largely theoretical, in the more conservative forms of
government they saw abroad. The benefits of limited participation in government would
supposedly preserve liberty and protect against tyranny, building off of what they saw as
a southern heritage of racial aristocracy. Ultimately, however, even these conservatives
were not fully convinced that monarchy or aristocracy was the best form of government
for the South.
International context helped southerners to explore different forms for the
southern nation as they undertook the process of creating a new nation. A southern
nation, conservatives argued, should avoid the unrestrained liberalism that had spread
from Europe to the North and caused the North to betray the original principles of the
American nation. While ultimately retaining the republican ideal, conservatives also
suggested that monarchies and aristocracies in Europe provided potential models for a
more conservative southern nation. Through 1861, then, international context helped
34
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conservative southerners to justify an independent southern nation, as well as to develop
the political form of that new nation.
Analysis of the place of the new southern nation within the larger community of
nations also helped conservatives to shape the national identity and mission they believed
the Confederacy should pursue. In particular, contrasting the Confederacy with new and
defeated nations in Europe revealed to conservatives what, exactly, defined the
Confederacy and set it apart as a conservative nation. International context was thus
critical in shaping conservatives’ sense of their own nationhood and desired national
identity.
Slavery, of course, was the main institution that defined the Confederacy and
distinguished the southern nation from other new and aspiring nations. White supremacy
was, as Confederate vice president Alexander Stephens famously put it, the “cornerstone”
of the Confederacy. The defense of slavery had been the major motivation for secession,
and Confederates were clear that the preservation of slavery was one of their national
missions. Confederates were aware that slavery set them apart in a world increasingly
turning toward emancipation, but they nonetheless centered slavery at the heart of their
nation.36
Beyond slavery, conservative southerners, guided by their rejection of the excess
liberalism of nationalist movements abroad and by their sense that conservatism was a
necessary corrective against this liberalism, identified many conservative values that
defined the Confederacy and distinguished the southern nation from other recent attempts
at nation-building. Conservative principles created a very different national identity for
36

For discussions of slavery’s centrality to the Confederacy and to Confederate national identity, see Faust,
The Creation of Confederate Nationalism, 22-32; McCurry, Confederate Reckoning; Sinha, The
Counterrevolution of Slavery; Bonner, Mastering America.

173

the southern nation than that forged by the values of liberty and equality that underpinned
nationalist movements in Europe. By focusing on the values that they believed were
consistent with slavery, conservative southern nationalists developed a conservative
national identity and, ultimately, a sense that the conservative Confederacy represented a
superior form of nationhood.
One of the main ideals on which conservative southerners sought to build their
new nation was the limitation of liberty. In contrast to their more liberal counterparts,
who argued that the Confederacy, like aspiring nations abroad, sought to preserve liberty,
conservatives used international comparisons to support their belief that the limitation of
liberty was necessary for a strong southern nation. These conservatives feared that an
excess of liberty would lead to anarchy by putting the power of the government in the
hands of people ill-suited for such power; in particular, slave-holding southerners feared
the implications of liberty for a slave society.37 Using an international context to bolster
their case for limited liberty, conservatives looked abroad to examples of failed
nationalist movements to argue that excess liberty doomed attempts at nation-building.
An author for DeBow’s Review lamented that the overthrow of law and order in the failed
revolutions of 1848 had “paralyzed the constitutional party in the unfortunate struggle for
rational liberty,” leading to harmful consequences.38 George Fitzhugh, an outspoken and
widely-published advocate of slavery, declared that outside the South, “liberty was
disintegrating into licentiousness, and ‘anarchy…’ stared us in the face” as he contrasted
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the conservative southern nation with the revolutions of Europe.39 A. Jeffrey, a
contributor to the Southern Literary Messenger, similarly bemoaned the “licentious
liberty” that he attributed to European immigrants, who brought these ideas with them to
the North.40 Conservative southerners believed that liberty was best in small doses,
restricted to a “rational” level, and they used the chaos, violence, and failure of
revolutions in Europe to support their case for limited liberty and to define the southern
nation as a nation premised upon limited liberty.
Conservatives argued that the best way for the southern nation to limit liberty was
through limited democracy and suffrage.41 As an author for DeBow’s Review explained,
“we of the South must so modify our State institutions as to remove the people farther
from the direct exercise of power” in order to ensure stability of government.42 J.
Randolph Tucker, attorney general in Virginia and long-time defender of slavery, worried
about the potential for buying votes in a democracy that was too free, likewise preferring
a limited democracy.43 For southern conservatives, limitations on democracy were a
necessary aspect of the southern nation.
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Again disagreeing with the more liberal southern nationalists who claimed that
the South sought the same value of self-government that motivated revolutions abroad,
conservatives asserted that the example of the European nationalist movements proved
that limited democracy should be a key characteristic of the Confederacy. According to
Georgia governor Joseph E. Brown, a careful study of the history of other nations
revealed that self-government was doomed to failure if “all of every class white and
black” were allowed to “indiscriminately… exercise political rights.” He furthered that
“the experiments made in France and in other enlightened countries, where domestic
slavery is not tolerated, have shown that sufficient virtue and intelligence never exist to
enable the people to perform the task, when the whole mass of people of every class are
permitted to participate actively in the affairs of the State.” 44 Taking an equally dim
view of the political capabilities of various Europeans, and utilizing the full racist rhetoric
of his time, Mississippi doctor and pamphleteer William H. Holcombe questioned how
“those who say that the French, the Italians or the Prussians, are not yet fit for freedom”
would “thrust the splendid privilege of Anglo-Saxon superiority upon the semi-barbarous
negro!,” exclaiming “what folly, what madness!”45 The Richmond Whig was more
optimistic about the French nation, if not other European nations, asserting that France
was more advanced than Italy, Austria, or Russia only because it had adopted a limited
form of democracy.46 Not only their own domestic politics and political tendencies, but
also their analysis of and comparisons with aspiring nations abroad, enhanced southern
44
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conservatives’ argument that self-government was harmful to nations, and that limited
liberty and democracy were critical national traits for the Confederacy.
Besides protecting against the harms of unchecked democracy, another benefit of
limited, rational liberty in the conservative mind was that it allowed for a more orderly
society. Social order, particularly a hierarchical social order based on racial inequality,
was a primary value for southern conservatives.47 As A. Featherman wrote in DeBow’s
Review, absolute equality led to chaos, and only through social dependence could social
order could be achieved. The revolutions of 1848 provided a case study of what to avoid
for Featherman, who declared that in the wake of the revolution of 1848 in France, “a
government instituted on the principle of ‘liberty, fraternity and equality’ became the
stepping-stone… for the usurpation of imperial power.”48 South Carolina newspaperman
and writer Leonidas W. Spratt concurred that slavery was a key principle of social order
that would prevent the South from following the chaotic path of other revolutions.49 To
southern conservatives, greater social order would protect the Confederacy from what
they saw as the harmful consequences of too much freedom that had doomed attempts at
nation-building in Europe.
As conservatives analyzed new and aspiring nations abroad, they identified
several key differences between the Confederacy and new and aspiring nations in Europe.
The Confederacy’s emphasis on slavery, limited liberty and democracy, and social order
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distinguished the southern nation from the failed attempts at nation-building in Europe.
These values not only set the Confederacy apart from other new and hopeful nations,
however; they also defined the identity of the southern nation. By using the contrasts
between the Confederacy and aspiring nations abroad to define southern national values,
conservative southerners used international analysis to shape their vision of their national
identity.
As conservatives strengthened their sense of their new national identity through
international comparisons, they also sharpened their vision of the Confederacy’s
international meaning and larger national mission. To conservatives, the liberal
underpinnings of European nationalist movements had led to anarchy, tyranny, and other
undesirable outcomes. Because the Confederacy rejected the liberal doctrines that had
corrupted aspiring nations in Europe, however, the southern nation would supposedly
avoid these evils. The southern nation thus represented a superior national form
according to conservative southerners. Southern conservatives even went so far as to
argue that southern nationalism purified the nationalism exhibited by new and aspiring
European nations. The conservative nationalism exhibited by the Confederacy
supposedly represented the purest form of nationalism yet created, elevating the
Confederacy to new global importance, not as the latest aspiring nation to emulate the
ideals of liberal nationalism, but as the originator of a new political tradition.
Slavery, at the heart of southern identity and conservatism, was also at the center
of conservative claims that the Confederacy represented a new and improved form of
nationhood. Slavery was one of the values and institutions that granted the Confederacy
its conservative character, underpinned southern conservative politics, and, especially
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through the days of nation-formation in 1861, helped shape the identity of the new nation.
To conservative southerners, looking to define the Confederacy as distinct from and
superior to liberal nations, slavery played a key role in forging the unique strengths and
national mission of the southern nation.50
One of the ways that conservatives claimed that slavery strengthened the southern
nation, and created a superior form of nationhood, was through granting protection and
freedom to white citizens. As conservative southerners anticipated an independent
southern nation in 1860 and early 1861, they reassured themselves that a slave-based
nation, unique among its peers, would provide protection for all whites. As the
Charleston Mercury argued, slavery protected white citizens from coarse labor, and thus
was the underpinning of “free society in Europe and America.”51 DeBow’s Review
declared in July of 1860 that should the South form an independent nation, the southern
nation would be “peculiarly circumstanced, and advantages would be hers such as no
nation has heretofore been favored with.” Accordingly, a southern nation would usher in
a new era in the history of the world. This global importance would be based in large
part on the South’s “perfect labor system,” which ensured that “liberty is the sole heritage
of the white race.”52 The protection that slavery afforded white citizens would, according
to southern conservatives, grant the southern nation a unique place among nations of the
world.
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Slavery would also enable the southern nation to fulfill its national mission in part
because slavery supposedly stabilized society and the social order. Slavery, according to
DeBow’s Review, protected against the fanaticism that roiled Europe, and thus provided
“a solution of all the disturbing problems, social, political, ethical, and economical, that
are convulsing the bosom of modern society.”53 A. Featherman likewise argued that
slavery protected against the failures experienced by the revolutionaries of 1848 by
providing the “most perfect social system that can possibly be devised.”54 The Daily
Richmond Examiner informed its readers that slavery was nothing less than the “divine
law of social order” and would ensure the superiority of the southern nation.55 For
conservatives who believed that an orderly society was a key national value, slavery was
critical to building a strong nation that could stand out among, and stand above, its
international peers.
Slavery did not just protect the white race and preserve social order, however; to
conservative southerners, it also did nothing less than preserve civilization. Although
much of the rest of the nineteenth century world was turning away from slavery,
southerners nonetheless saw slavery as not only compatible with, but even necessary for,
progress.56 If slavery was critical to the preservation of civilization, then it only stood to
reason that a southern nation built on slavery would be the most civilized of new nations.
William H. Holcombe argued that “African slavery is no retrograde movement, no
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discord in the harmony of nature, no violation of elemental justice, no infraction of
immutable laws, human or divine – but an integral link the grand progressive evolution of
human society.”57 Colonel A. S. Atkinson of Georgia concurred that the current level of
civilization could not be maintained if slavery were destroyed in the South, asserting that
if slavery were ended, the South would follow the path of defeated and destroyed nations
before it.58 To conservative southerners, slavery was not incompatible with progress – it
was necessary for the same, and a southern nation based in slavery would actually be the
most progressive of the nations of the world.
As the most civilized society, the slave South would also become the perfect
model of a successful, virtuous nation according to southern conservatives. A convention
of South Carolinians informed their fellow southerners in January of 1861 that a united
southern nation, based on slavery, would be “among the most important of the nations of
the world… whose renown must spread throughout the civilized world.”59 As war began,
the Richmond Daily Dispatch relied on a similar idea to bolster its readers’ faith in
southern ability to win independence, arguing that “the whole history of mankind shows
that the military power of nations has in every case been built up at the beginning, by the
enslavement of conquered peoples.”60 DeBow’s Review declared that “history furnishes
abundant proof that the institution of domestic slavery conduces to national strength; and
the events of the day are about to confirm the lessons of history,” enthusing that “we of
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the South are about to inaugurate a new civilization. We shall have new and original
thought; negro slavery will be its great controlling and distinctive element.”61 As
Confederates created their new nation, conservatives argued that slavery would not only
give the new nation its strength, but would also ensure the perfection of the southern
nation, and even of the concept of nationhood in general.
By protecting white citizens, ensuring an orderly society, advancing civilization,
and perfecting the nation, conservatives argued, slavery would elevate the southern
nation among all other nations. Slavery did not only grant the southern nation an
elevated position in the community of nations, however. Conservative southerners also
believed that even as it uniquely strengthened the southern nation, slavery also purified
the same values that had driven nationalist movements in Europe. Although they
considered the idea of non-republican styles of government, ultimately even conservative
southerners agreed that the southern nation should be a republic. To these conservatives,
however, republicanism was best served by conservative values, and was thus enhanced
by slavery, rather than limited by slavery. Conservatives argued that the southern nation
was not only a model nation through its conservatism and slavery, but that it was also a
model republican nation, one that purified the ideals that unrestrained liberalism had
supposedly corrupted in nationalist movements abroad.
The idea that slavery, and therefore the southern nation, purified republicanism
was popular throughout the existence of the Confederacy. A writer for the Southern
Literary Messenger claimed in January of 1861 that slavery preserved “peace” and
“harmony” and prevented the “angry strifes which agitate and destroy other nations,” and
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therefore a southern nation would have “the greatest opportunity ever vouchsafed to any
people, of establishing free republican institutions.”62 Years later in 1864, Rev. William
A. Hall of New Orleans declared that the southern nation, based on the superiority of the
white race, “is the perfection of republican government.”63 Slavery elevated the southern
nation not only by introducing an alternative set of national values, but also, according to
conservative southerners, by purifying the very same values that had motivated
nationalist movements abroad.64
A common basis to the claim that slavery purified republicanism was the
argument that limited democracy, a major part of conservatives’ sense of national
identity, and one of the strengths of the southern nation, also strengthened republicanism.
The Daily Richmond Examiner blamed “direct democracy” for the degeneration of the
American republic as controlled by the North, arguing that it ushered in tyranny and
oppression, whereas “here in the South the presence of negro slavery has acted as a
corrective.”65 In 1861, DeBow’s Review published Beverly Tucker’s Nashville
Convention speech, in which Tucker had declared that “the institution of domestic
slavery… gives stability to government, and renders universal suffrage and perfect
freedom possible to those who are free.”66 At an 1861 Virginia Convention held to
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debate secession, delegate James H. Cox agreed with fellow delegate Thomas S.
Flournoy, former congressman and future colonel of the Confederate army, that slavery
was “essential to the preservation of American freedom.”67 To Tucker, Cox, Flournoy,
and other southern conservatives, limiting the freedom of slaves enhanced the freedom
available to white citizens, creating a more perfect republic. The southern nation thus
represented the purest and strongest form of republican nationhood.
Through the early years of the war, as southerners forged a southern nation,
conservatives argued that slavery would elevate the southern nation above all other
nations. Slavery would protect whites, preserve civilization, strengthen the nation, and
even purify the republicanism that had motivated nationalist movements in Europe. The
southern nation was not just necessary for the protection of southerners, according to
southern conservatives; it would also be the strongest and purest new nation in the
international community of nations.
Such comparisons were critical to conservatives’ efforts to justify secession and
shape the identity of their new nation. As the immediate demands of nation-formation
shifted to the task of sustaining and defending that nation, however, southerners’
international comparisons began to shift. For more liberal southerners, the fact that the
rest of the world responded negatively to their comparisons between the southern nation
and aspiring nations in Europe led them to intensify their manipulation of the ideals of
southern nationalism and of liberal nationalism in order to preserve their comparisons.
Conservative southerners responded differently to the lack of support from the rest of the
world. To conservatives, the southern nation was unique among nations, strengthened
and set apart by its conservatism. It made sense, then, that the rest of the world would
67
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respond negatively to a nation premised on a different set of values. Conservative
comparisons during the war thus focused on explaining why international rejection of the
South was not a problem.
Through 1862, as the Confederacy settled in to the task of sustaining a nation and
winning a war, conservatives began to popularize a new argument that directly contrasted
the process of nation-formation in the South with the recent examples of nation-formation
in Europe. Conservatives who had previously argued that slavery and the southern nation
purified republicanism now extended that argument to claim that secession and the act of
creating a southern nation had purified and corrected the excesses that had characterized
revolutions and nationalist movements in Europe. Pointing to the supposed superiority of
the southern revolution not only continued to bolster the legitimacy of the southern
nation, but also allowed southerners to sidestep the lack of international approval by
attempting to enhance the appearance of the Confederacy as a superior nation, even from
its conception.
For conservative southerners, the southern nation’s conservatism purified the
negative liberalism that had characterized and shaped the revolutions and nationalist
movements abroad. As the Richmond Daily Dispatch explained in a February 1862
article on events in Italy, the South “has of late discovered that its worst enemies in
Europe are the insurrectionists, and its only friends the conservative classes,” asserting
that “the Southern revolution, which is a conservative and constitutional… movement,
which has for its object the protection of property and constitutional liberty, has of course
no friends among those who make war upon property” and declaring that “under these
circumstances, the future popular agitations of Europe can scarcely be expected to excite
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any interest in the South.”68 For the Richmond Daily Dispatch’s writer, the southern
revolution was set apart from European revolutions by its very conservatism, which also
elevated the southern revolution into the position of superiority. Similarly, George
Fitzhugh blamed Locke’s principles of human equality for destroying government and
stability in Europe, leading to the revolutions that had characterized the continent for the
past several decades. He contrasted the “Southern Revolution of 1861” with the earlier
Lockean revolutions, characterizing the southern revolution as “reactionary and
conservative… a solemn protest against the doctrines of natural liberty, human equality
and the social contract.”69 This vision of the Confederacy as purifying revolution with its
conservatism persisted throughout the war; in 1864, Rev. William A. Hall celebrated the
formation of the Confederacy as the world’s first conservative revolution, calling the
southern revolution the only true and pure revolution and arguing that the Confederacy
marked the beginning of a new age of conservatism.70 To southern conservatives, the
creation of the southern nation stood as an exemplar of conservatism in action, as well as
a rebuke to the supposedly harmful liberalism that had driven nationalist movements in
Europe.
While celebrating the conservatism of the southern revolution, southern
conservatives also reiterated the exact harms against which the conservative southern
project in nation-building would protect. These harms that a year before had justified
secession were now used to defend that same act of secession in retrospect. Anarchy and
68
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mob violence were the most frequent evils produced by revolutions abroad that
conservatives claimed that the southern revolution had avoided. Thomas Howell Cobb,
president of the provisional Southern Congress and a former congressman and governor
of Georgia, argued that “the one remarkable characteristic of the revolution which
distinguishes it from all others recorded in history” is that the southern revolution was
based on conservatism, contrasting it with other revolutions whose “popular tendencies
have too frequently degraded them into anarchy and discord.”71 In his inaugural address,
Governor Zebulon Baird Vance of North Carolina celebrated that “mob violence, that
dangerous offspring of revolution, has been equally repressed by the conservatism of our
people.”72 The idea that the Confederacy was unique in its avoidance of violence
persisted even throughout many long years of war, with the Confederate Congress still
asserting in 1864 that the Confederacy “is a child of law instead of sedition, of right
instead of violence, of deliberation instead of insurrection. Its early life was attended by
no anarchy, no rebellion, no suspension of authority, no social disorders, no lawless
disturbances… The utmost conservatism marked every proceeding and public act,” in
contrast to the European revolutions that had not shown such conservatism.73 The
supposedly conservative nature of the southern revolution furnished proof for southern
conservatives that the southern nation, unlike aspiring nations in Europe, upheld the
principles of conservatism rather than falling to the excesses of liberalism. From its very
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beginnings as a purified, conservative revolution, southern conservatives argued, the
Confederacy had undertaken a unique national mission that set it apart from the inferior
new and aspiring nations in Europe.
In the later years of the war, as foreign aid and support continued to be withheld,
conservative analyses of the South’s place within the international community shifted
from defending the southern revolution to explaining why the South’s international
isolation was not a problem. In an exuberantly-punctuated statement, the Augusta Daily
Constitutionalist lamented that “our social organization and our labor system are such as
the world, in this enlightened (!) day, puts under the ban of its reprobation,” recognizing
that “we stand almost alone as to our peculiar institutions” but arguing that the institution
of slavery nonetheless created greater harmony and peace in the South than was found in
other nations.74 In a similar statement, the Daily Richmond Examiner wrote that “we
stand alone… for we have no faith in our European admirers,” but that while the South’s
ideological isolation “is a bleak position,” it was “not an unhealthy one,” and that
southerners “are content to keep aloof from the ‘spirit of progress’ which is making all
over the world such a sad hotch-potch of true civilization.”75 The Confederacy may have
stood alone among nations of the world, but to conservatives, that was acceptable, as the
benefits of slavery simply ensured that the South stood alone at the top.
In an attempt to further mitigate the lack of international support, additional
analysis of the role of slavery within the Confederacy, and of the Confederacy within the
world, directly criticized the European nations that had failed to support the South’s bid
for national independence. The Augusta Daily Constitutionalist declared that slavery
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would not only strengthen the Confederacy and preserve republicanism, but also that,
without slavery, southerners would become “the Spain and Italy, the hybrid of America,
the lazaroni [sic] of the world,” dismissing these nations and their people as unfit for the
international support that was granted to them but withheld from the Confederacy.76 The
Index, Confederate propagandist Henry Hotze’s London newspaper, wrote that the North
was like oppressive Russia and the South like patriotic, freedom-loving Poland, who had
recently been defeated in a fight against Russian control. Hotze made a critical exception
to this comparison, however, in claiming that racial slavery in the South ensured that the
Confederacy would be successful where Poland failed.77 Slavery, the heart of the
southern experiment in nation-building, set the South apart from other aspiring nations.
According to conservative southerners, this merely meant that the South was superior to
nations based on more liberal principles, and therefore the lack of support from abroad
could not threaten the southern national mission. During the long years of war,
international comparisons assured conservative southerners that the lack of international
support was due to southern superiority rather than to any failures of the southern nation.
To southern conservatives, the Confederacy was justified and defined by its
differences from, rather than similarities to, new and aspiring European nations.
Conservative southerners were still guided by critiques of European nationalist
movements as destroyed by excess liberalism, and thus they rejected liberal comparisons
that claimed similarity between the South and aspiring nations abroad, arguing instead
that the South improved upon and purified, rather than resembled, the model of these
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aspiring European nations. Southern conservatism, and its differences from the liberal
ideals that the North had adopted from Europe, justified an independent southern nation
according to conservatives’ international comparisons. Analysis of the international
context of the new southern nation helped southern conservatives to determine the form
that their new government should take, and to identify the values that would define the
southern nation. These conservative values set the Confederacy apart from the more
liberal new and aspiring European nations, supposedly strengthening the Confederacy
and granting it a unique national mission. This mission was carried out as southern
conservative values, particularly slavery, created a new form of nation that conservatives
argued both rejected and purified the liberal values that had fueled nationalist movements
abroad. Conservative southerners were clearly incorrect in their assessment that
conservatism and slavery would create a stronger, better nation that purified the
nationalism exhibited by aspiring nations elsewhere. For conservative southerners during
the Civil War, however, as for their more liberal counterparts, international analysis was
critical to defining the Confederacy and its place within the world.
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